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Administrative Law. McAninch v. State of R.I. Dept. of Labor and
Training, 64 A.3d 84 (R.I. 2013). The Superior Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over administrative appeals, and the Superior Court Rule of
Civil Procedure that extends the last day in computing any time period to
any day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, applies to such
appeals.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On June 30, 2009, the last day of the Providence Public
Library’s (hereinafter “the PPL”) fiscal year, the PPL terminated
thirty-eight union and eight nonunion employees. 1 Subsequently,
on July 9, 2009, Karen McAninch (hereinafter “McAninch”), the
business agent for the United Service and Allied Workers of Rhode
Island (USAW-RI) and representative for the union employees of
the PPL, filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and
Training (hereinafter “the DLT”) alleging that the PPL failed to
pay these employees a total of $149,482.82 in accrued vacation
pay.2 The PPL argued that employee vacation pay did not accrue
until July 1, 2009, the beginning of their new fiscal year, and, as
none of the thirty-eight workers were still employees as of that
date, they were not entitled to vacation pay.3
The DLT held a hearing on July 8, 2010, at which the hearing
officer found that the employees were not entitled to vacation
pay.4 On October 12, 2010, McAninch filed a complaint seeking
Superior Court review of the DLT’s decision in favor of the PPL.5
On October 5, 2011, the trial justice sua sponte dismissed
McAninch’s appeal, finding that the Superior Court did not have
1. McAninch v. State of Rhode Island Department of Labor and
Training, 64 A.3d 84, 85 (R.I. 2013).
2. Id. As support, McAninch argued that the PPL/USAW-RI collective
bargaining agreement and the PPL employee handbook stated that the
employees would be entitled to this accrued pay. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 85–86.
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subject matter jurisdiction because McAninch had not filed a
timely request for review. 6 Under the language of § 42-35-15(b),
McAninch had thirty days from September 9, 2010, the date the
DLT mailed its decision to the parties, in which to file her
complaint with Superior Court. 7 The thirty day filing window
ended on October 9, which fell on the Saturday of Columbus Day
weekend in 2010. 8 McAninch contended that she filed the
complaint first on October 12 when it was hand-delivered to the
clerk’s office and again when the identical complaint was mailed
on October 8. 9 However, the clerk’s office did not record it as filed
until October 13. 10
In dismissing the case, the trial justice noted several issues.
First, she found that administrative appeals are similar to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court’s review of Superior Court decisions
and, since time limitations to the Court are “mandatory,” “Rule 6
of the [Superior Court] Rules of Civil Procedure—which extends
the last day in computing any time period to the next day which is
neither a Saturday, Sunday, nor holiday—[was] not applicable” to
administrative appeals.11 In addition, she found § 42-35-15(b), 12
the statute governing the judicial review of contested cases,
including the filing period, does not contemplate waiving the time
limitations for “excusable neglect,” an alternative theory put
forward in the plaintiff’s complaint. 13
McAninch filed a writ of certiorari on November 4, 2011,
arguing that the trial court erred in its calculation of the date by
which the complaint must have been filed and, alternatively, that
even if the complaint was not timely filed, the court should find
excusable neglect and allow the review. 14 The Rhode Island
6. Id. at 86.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 85 n.1.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 86.
12. “Proceedings for review are instituted by filing a complaint in the
superior court of Providence County or in the superior court in the county in
which the cause of action arose, or where expressly provided by the general
laws in the sixth division of the district court or family court of Providence
County, within thirty (30) days after mailing notice of the final decision of the
agency . . . ” R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 42-35-15(b) (2011).
13. McAninch, 64 A.3d at 86.
14. Id.
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Supreme Court granted the writ on February 2, 2012. 15
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviews the applicability of
Rule 6 to administrative appeals de novo because “the meaning
and effect of court rules is a question of law.” 16 Under § 42-35-16,
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), the Court also reviews
de novo questions of administrative law keeping in mind that the
“ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended
by the Legislature.” 17
Upon review, the Rhode Island Supreme Court first sought to
determine if the Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction
over an administrative appeal. The Court determined that, based
on the language in § 42-35-15(a) and (b), the Superior Court has
subject matter jurisdiction over administrative appeals and, if the
USAW-RI appeal was timely, the Superior Court’s jurisdiction
should be invoked.18
On appeal, McAninch argues that Rule 6 should apply to
administrative appeals because of the rule’s “clear language” and
points to the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure 80(c) and
81. 19 In response, the PPL and the DLT argue that the Supreme
Court had previously held that Rule 6 did not apply in
administrative appeals, 20 that Rule 80(b) which states that the
timeline under which a petitioner can file for review of an
administrative decision “shall be provided by law,” and that the
“unambiguous[ ]” language in § 42-35-15 regarding the thirty day
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. (quoting Heritage Healthcare Services, Inc. v. Marques, 14 A.3d
932, 936 (R.I. 2011)).
18. Id. at 87 (citing Rivera v. Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode
Island, 70 A.3d 905, 911 (R.I. 2013)).
19. McAninch, 64 A.3d. at 87–88. Rule 80(c) states that “these rules, so
far as they are applicable, shall govern review proceedings.” Id. at 87 n.2.
Rule 81 contains the proceedings to which the Rules of Civil Procedure do not
apply and administrative appeals are not among the proceedings listed. Id.
at 87 n.3.
20. Id. at 88 (citing Pizzi v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board,
857 A.2d 762, 763–64 (R.I. 2004) (finding that a memorandum order for a
case dismissed on procedural grounds; however, the Court discussed whether
Rule 6 allowed for the time limitation to be extended by one day if the
plaintiff received the decision by mail)).
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filing period, should control here. 21
In finding that Rule 6 applies to administrative appeals and,
therefore, McAninch’s complaint was timely filed, the Court
reasoned that, although “the time and procedure” “to secure
appellate review are to be strictly construed,” the Superior Court
has the “equitable authority” to determine whether a statute
providing for judicial review should be tolled. 22 The Court looked
to court rules and case law to address the defendant’s arguments
with regard to Rule 80(b) and § 42-35-15. In its holding, the Court
found three Superior Court rules relevant: (1) Rule 6(a), which
allows the filing of a request for review to occur up until the end of
the day that is not “a Saturday, Sunday, nor a holiday” if the last
day of the time allowed by a statute is a Saturday, Sunday, or
holiday; (2) Rule 80(c), which affirms that the rules of civil
procedure govern the review proceeding of administrative actions;
and (3) Rule 81, which does not include administrative appeals on
the list of proceedings to which the Rules of Civil Procedure do not
apply. 23
Further, by identifying case law which held that other
Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure applied to administrative
appeals, the Court found precedent for the application of Rule 6
here.24 The Court found additional textual support for its decision
in Rule 1 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure which
states that “rules of civil procedure [are to] be construed and
administered ‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action’ . . . those rules of civil procedure
which are consistent with the nature of an appellant proceeding
may be applied in the furtherance of that goal.” 25 The Court
noted that its own Rule of Appellate Procedure, Article 1, Rule
20(a) contains language similar to Rule 6 “that extends the last
day in computing any time period to the next day which is neither
a Saturday, Sunday nor a holiday.” 26 In its determination that
“consistency demands that Rule 6(a) appl[y] to the Superior
21. Id. at 88.
22. Id. The Court found precedent for this reasoning in Rivera. See id.
23. Id. at 88–89.
24. Id. at 89 (citing Carbone v. Planning Board of Appeal of South
Kingstown, 702 A.2d 386, 389 (R.I 1997)).
25. Id. at 89.
26. Id.
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Court’s review of administrative decisions,” the Court noted that
the practical result of the trial court justice’s ruling would have
resulted in the McAninch having only twenty nine days to file, not
thirty days as afforded by law. 27 The PPL and the DLT’s
argument with regard to the proffered case law provided
precedent was not compelling to the Court. 28
COMMENTARY
The Court clearly resolved this matter based on a logical
analysis of standard practices in the court system and a brief
exploration of case law that had applied other Rules of Civil
Procedure to administrative appeals. Although the Court did not
return to a specific inquiry about the legislative intent, § 42-3515,(a) and (b) lay out both the right to judicial review and the
process of the review, including timelines for accessing and
performing that review, the latter included presumably to promote
judicial efficiency.29 By holding that Rule 6 applies to the
Superior Court’s review of administrative decisions because
“consistency demands [it],” it appears that the Court indirectly
“give[s] effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the
Legislature,” as it promotes access to the right to judicial review of
administrative decisions and maintains efficient court processes. 30
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Rule 6 of the
Superior Court’s Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable to
administrative decisions and therefore, the trial justice had erred
in determining that the Superior Court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction over McAninch’s timely appeal. The Court
relied on textual support in court rules as well as case law in
extending Rule 6 to administrative appeals, finding that the
application of the rule to this type of proceeding was consistent
27. Id.
28. Id. at 89–90. The Court noted that the case cited by the PPL was
dismissed on procedural grounds, so the language in the memorandum did
not provide precedent, and, further, that the facts in Pizzi were substantially
different than those at issue here. Id. at 90.
29. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-15.
30. McAninch, 64 A.3d at 85, 89.
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Alix R. Ogden
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Administrative Law. Rivera v. Emp. Ret. System of R.I., 70 A.3d 905 (R.I.
2013). A Rhode Island Superior Court has equitable authority in
administrative appeals to determine whether the statute R.I. Gen. Laws 1956
§ 42-35-15(b), which provides the timeline for judicial review of
administrative decisions, should be tolled in appropriate circumstances.
While this statute was held to unambiguously require administrative appeals
be filed within thirty-days from the day after the notice of decision is mailed,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court held the Superior Court abused its
discretion in not finding a reasonable reliance basis for equitable tolling in
this case. The court abrogated prior legal precedent that had misstated the
administrative appeal timeline as requiring appeals to be filed thirty-days
from the receipt of notice and because this same timeframe was
communicated to the plaintiff multiple times by the deciding agency, the
court found the plaintiff had a reasonable reliance basis to justify equitable
tolling in this case.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On September 17, 2007, Cranston Police Department
sergeant Lillian Rivera applied for accidental disability benefits
for post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety disorder. 1 On
January 9, 2008, the Retirement Board used its authority under
R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 36-8-3 2 to deny Ms. Rivera’s accidental
disability application. 3 In the notice of denial dated January 18,
2008, the letter stated that Ms. Rivera could appeal to the
Retirement Board if the appeal was received “within 30 days of
the receipt” of the letter.4 Ms. Rivera subsequently appealed, and
the Retirement Board sub-committee voted to deny her claim and
the matter was presented to the full Retirement Board for a final
determination on May 14, 2008.5 The full Retirement Board voted
unanimously to uphold the sub-committee’s decision to deny Ms.
Rivera’s accidental disability pension; however, during this
hearing, the chairman of the board stated to Ms. Rivera, on the
record, that she may seek judicial review with the “Rhode Island
1. Rivera v. Emp. Ret. System of R.I., 70 A.3d 905, 906 (R.I. 2013).
2. Id. at 907 n.1 (describing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-8-3 (1989) (providing
provides the statutory framework for the Retirement Board and its authority
to oversee the retirement system through rules and regulations)).
3. Id. at 907.
4. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. Id.
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Superior Court within 30 days of receipt” of the denial notice. 6
In the denial notice to Ms. Rivera, dated May 19, 2008, the
executive director of the Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode
Island (ERSRI) wrote that Ms. Rivera had a right to judicial
review and that “the thirty-day requirement would begin from the
date the U.S. Post Office indicates the letter was received” by Ms.
Rivera. 7 However, accompanying that letter, which was mailed to
both Ms. Rivera and her attorney, was a document entitled
“NOTICE OF RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW.” 8 This notice
indicated, pursuant to “Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15,”
that Ms. Rivera had “thirty (30) days from the date of the mailing
of” the denial notice to file an appeal. 9 The denial letter was
dated May 19, 2008 and postmarked on May 21, 2008. 10 Ms.
Rivera signed an affidavit that she received the certified mail
notice and also retrieved the certified letter on May 29, 2008.11
Ms. Rivera appealed the ERSRI final decision to the Superior
Court on June 27, 2008, 12 which the Supreme Court noted was
filed within thirty days of Ms. Rivera’s receipt of the notice of final
decision.13
On March 16, 2011, the trial judge of the Superior Court held
that the “‘[the Superior] Court lack[ed] jurisdiction over this
matter’” because the petitioner did not file the appeal within the
statutory timeframe dictated in General Laws 1956 § 42-3515(b). 14 Further, the trial judge found against Ms. Rivera’s
contention that this statute was ambiguous and instead found the
statutory language was unambiguous, “require[ing] the filing of
agency appeal in Superior Court thirty days from the mailing of
the notice.” 15 The trial judge also considered Ms. Rivera’s
6. Id. at 907–08 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
7. Id. at 908 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
9. Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10. Id. n.4 (explaining that Ms. Rivera claimed the letter’s postmark
really read May 22, 2008).
11. Id. at 908.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 913.
14. Id. at 908; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-15(b) (providing that
proceedings for review are instituted by filing a complaint in superior court
“within thirty (30) days after the decision thereon”).
15. Rivera, 70 A.3d. at 909.
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argument that she had reasonable reliance for her appeal date but
found that while equitable tolling “could apply,” it should not
apply in this case because Ms. Rivera did not have a sufficient
basis for reasonable reliance of the agency’s erroneous statements
about the filing timeframe. 16 The primary basis for the finding of
unreasonable reliance precluding equitable tolling was that Ms.
Rivera’s attorney “should have been aware of the correct
deadline”; thus, the Superior Court entered judgment against Ms.
Rivera on April 28, 2011. 17
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
Ms. Rivera’s appeal of the Superior Court’s decision regarding
denial of administrative appeal. 18 The Court noted that while it
never before expressly decided the standard of review for Superior
Court decisions regarding equitable tolling, abuse of discretion
was the proper review standard to evaluate the trial judge’s
decision as to whether or not to allow equitable tolling to extend a
statutory appeal deadline. 19 The Court decided this was the
appropriate standard because other courts used this standard in
similar circumstances. 20
Substantively, first the Court addressed the trial judge’s
holding regarding whether § 42-35-15(b) was ambiguous and
upheld the lower court’s holding that the statute was clear and
unambiguous, and thus, the statute must be interpreted literally,
giving plain and ordinary meaning to words with “no room for
statutory construction” whereby requiring the statue to be applied
“as written.” 21 Further, because the Court found § 42-35-15(b)
unambiguous regarding the timeline for administrative appeals,
the Court was forced to abrogate its previous holding in Bayview
16. Id. (emphasis in original).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 909–910; see generally R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-15(g).
19. Rivera, 70 A.3d. at 909–10 (citing Holmes v. Spencer, 685 F.3d 51, 62
(1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Gabaldon, 522 F.3d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir.
2008); Zerilli-Edelglass v. New York City Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 81 (2d
Cir. 2003)).
20. Id.
21. Rivera, 70 A.3d. at 910 (citing Planned Env’t Mgmt. Corp. v. Robert,
966 A.2d 117, 121 (R.I. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Towing, Inc. v. Stevenson. 22 In that case the Court had misstated
the statutory timeline as allowing appeals to be filed thirty days
“after receiving notice” and clarified that the thirty-day timeline
for administrative appeal decisions begins the day after notice is
mailed.23 The Court also held that the postmark provided
conclusive but not exclusive evidence of mailing date; however,
here such a holding was inconsequential because by any
calculation the petitioner’s June 27, 2008 complaint was filed
more than thirty days from the date of the denial notice mailing.24
Second, the Court addressed the trial judge’s statement that
the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction for appeal of this
administrative decision due to timeliness.25 The Court held that
the Superior Court had jurisdiction for administrative appeals and
unquestionable power to adjudicate the subject matter, but also
noted that the proper question was whether or not the Superior
Court should have adjudicated equitable relief given the
unambiguous timing statute for administrative appeals and the
fact that “[s]tatutes prescribing the time and the procedure” for
appellate review should be “strictly construed.” 26 Nevertheless,
the Court noted that strict statutory construction in the context of
equity is not an “impenetrable bar” and held that the Superior
Court has equitable authority to determine if judicial review of
administrative decisions pursuant to § 42-35-15(b) “should be
tolled in appropriate circumstances.” 27
Third and finally, the Court questioned whether the trial
judge abused his discretion by finding no reasonable reliance and
answered this question in the affirmative. 28 The Court specifically
pointed to the inaccurate timelines that had been affirmatively
communicated to Ms. Rivera twice by letter and in the final
22. Id. at 911; 676 A.2d 325, 328 (R.I. 1996) (emphasis in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Rivera, 70 A.3d at 911.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 908.
26. Id. at 909, 911–12 (citing Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Saccocio, 43 A.3d
40, 44 (R.I. 2012); Johnson v. Newport Cnty. Chapter for Retarded Citizens,
Inc., 943 A.2d 1045, 1051 (R.I. 2008); Sousa v. Town of Coventry, 774 A.2d
812, 814 (R.I. 2001)) (emphasis added). Specifically, the Court stated in
Johnson that “equitable tolling is an exception to the general statute of
limitations based upon principles of equity and fairness.” 943 A.2d at 1051.
27. Rivera, 70 A.3d at 912 (citing Johnson, 943 A.2d at 1051).
28. Id. at 913.
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hearing on May 14, 2008, by the chairman.29 Therefore, the Court
held that while the notice of judicial review that accompanied the
final denial letter did contain the correct statutory timeframe, the
multiple conveyances of the erroneous deadlines through ERSRI’s
official communication made it reasonable that Ms. Rivera would
rely on the erroneous deadline. 30 Further, as Ms. Rivera’s appeal
was filed within the thirty-day timeline dictated under the
erroneous but relied-upon timeline, the Court could not uphold the
trial judge’s finding of unreasonable reliance.31 The Court thus
found the trial judge’s refusal to toll the statutory deadline was an
abuse of discretion and thus, quashed the judgment of the
Superior Court, directing that on remand Ms. Rivera’s appeal was
to be considered timely.32
COMMENTARY
The holding in this case clarifies the statutory deadline for
appeals in Administrative Law cases. The holding had
underpinnings of fairness policy in an area of law, specifically
statutory deadlines, that typically has little emphasis on fairness.
Thus, the holding can be interpreted as opening the door in
comparable factual circumstances where tolling of statutory
deadlines serves the principles of fairness and equity.
The Court based its holding on the fact that authoritative
misstatements were communicated to Ms. Rivera by the
administrative agency, the same erroneous statements about the
administrative deadline were made in Bayview Towing, and that
case was subsequently followed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit in Providence School Department v.
Anna C., and therefore it was reasonable for Ms. Rivera to rely on
the erroneous timeline as the applicable law for administrative
29. Id. at 907–08, 913. The original denial notice dated January 18,
2008 and the final determination denial notice dated May 19, 2008 both
indicated that the thirty-days began upon receiving notice of denial. Id. at
907–08.
30. Id. at 908, 913. The court also noted that while Ms. Rivera’s
attorney should have implemented the better practice of consulting the text
of the actual APA, that this did not negate Ms. Rivera’s reasonable reliance.
Id.
31. Id. at 913–14.
32. Id. at 914.
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appeal deadlines in Rhode Island. 33 The Court emphasized that
the Superior Court has equitable authority to apply tolling in
certain circumstances and held that because reliance was
reasonable in this particular circumstance denying equitable
tolling in this case was an abuse of discretion.34
The Court opinion, on its face, emphasized that “principles of
equity and fairness” dictated the outcome in this “rather unusual
case,” implying a rather narrow holding. 35 However, despite the
impliedly narrow holding, the Court also highlighted that the
principles of equity and fairness should dictate the application of
equitable tolling in future administrative appeals under § 42-3515(b), despite the general rule that unambiguous statutes create
a presumption that statutory timelines should be construed
strictly. 36
The Court’s further emphasis of equity and fairness principles
at the end of the decision seems to imply that these principles
were important to the Court and could help predict outcomes in
future cases.37 Further, in the portion of the opinion refuting that
statutory construction is an “impenetrable bar” to concepts of
equity, the Court emphasized the holding in Johnson, which
states specifically that “equitable tolling is an exception to the
general statute of limitations based upon principles of equity and
fairness.” 38 Given the emphasis on equity and fairness throughout
the opinion it seems possible that in similar future cases
principles of equity and fairness may provide an additional
argument for relief where administrative appeals would be
otherwise barred by § 42-35-15(b).
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court abrogated prior
misstatements as to the applicable statutory deadline for
administrative appeals under § 42-35-15(b) and clarified that the
statute requires appeals to be filed within thirty-days from the
33. Id. at 912–13; see also 676 A.2d at 328; 108 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1997).
34. Rivera, 70 A.3d at 912–13.
35. Id. at 913–14.
36. Id. at 910, 912; see also Planned Env’t Mgmt. Corp., 966 A.2d at 121;
Sousa, 774 A.2d at 814.
37. See Rivera, 70 A.3d at 913.
38. Id. at 912 (quoting Johnson, 943 A.2d at 292).
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mailing of the administrative agency’s denial notice. 39 The Court
reaffirmed that while statutes prescribing administrative
deadlines are to be strictly construed, Superior Courts can apply
equity principles if reasonable reliance is met such as in this
case.40

Paige Munro-Delotto

39.
40.

Id. at 911.
Id. at 912–14.
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Arbitration. Wheeler v. Encompass Ins. Co., 66 A.3d 477 (R.I. 2013). A
defendant’s objection to a plaintiff’s petition to confirm an arbitration award
is sufficient to satisfy the “application” element of R. I. Gen. Laws § 10-314(a), allowing the Superior court to conduct a modification inquiry.
Findings that arbitrators made an error of law are not sufficient to permit
modification of an arbitration award.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Plaintiff, Joyce Wheeler (“Plaintiff”), was injured in a motorvehicle accident with an underinsured driver, the tortfeasor, on
October 19, 2007.1 The tortfeasor’s insurance company,
Progressive Insurance Company (“Progressive”), did not contest
liability and paid Plaintiff the $25,000 policy limit for bodily
injury. 2 Plaintiff also sought to recover for her injuries under the
uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) provisions of her own
policy with Encompass Insurance Company (“Encompass”), the
Defendant.3
Plaintiff’s insurance contract with Encompass
capped payment of UM coverage at $100,000. 4 Encompass
contested the nature and extent of Plaintiff’s injuries and the
parties agreed to submit the dispute to binding arbitration.5
There was no record of the question(s) submitted to the
arbitration panel. 6
The arbitration panel concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to
a total award of $172,750, which included damages and
prejudgment interest. 7 The panel also concluded that Progressive
had paid $25,000 of those damages and Encompass had paid
$5,000 pursuant to the Medical Payment provision of the policy. 8
Following arbitration, Encompass made payment of the UM policy
limit, $100,000, to Plaintiff. 9
Plaintiff filed a petition in Superior Court to confirm the
arbitration award, to which Encompass filed an objection.10
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Wheeler v. Encompass Ins. Co., 66 A.3d 477, 478 (R.I. 2013).
Id.
Id. at 479–80.
Id. at 479.
Id.
Id. n.2.
Id.
Id.
Id. n.3.
Id.
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Encompass argued that Plaintiff could not recover more than the
UM policy limit of $100,000 and objected to the amount of the
arbitration award that was over $100,000. 11 Plaintiff argued that
when determining the amount an injured party was entitled to
recover from a UM, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Lombardi permitted
arbitrators to award prejudgment interest in excess of policy
limits. 12 In response, Encompass alleged that it entered
arbitration subject to the terms of Plaintiff’s policy, which limited
arbitration to disputes regarding the amount Plaintiff could
recover from a tortfeasor; as the litigation at issue was not
between Plaintiff and Encompass the arbitration panel was barred
from rendering an award in excess of policy limits. 13 The Superior
Court justice, relying on Allstate Insurance Co. v. Pogorilich,
concluded that the arbitrator made an error of law and found that
the award of prejudgment interest was therefore improper. 14
Based on this conclusion, the trial justice sustained Encompass’s
objection to the extent that the award exceeded the policy limit.15
The trial justice went on to modify the arbitration award, vacating
the portion of the award in excess of $100,000. 16 Plaintiff
appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.17
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Prior to addressing the issues, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court reiterated the standard of review for arbitration awards. 18
The Court highlighted the statutory proscription against courts
vacating an arbitration award absent corruption, fraud,
substantial prejudice, arbitrators exceeding their power, or such
11. Id.
12. Id. at 479–80 (citing 773 A.2d 864, 870 n.2 (R.I. 2001). The Court in
Lombardi made it a point to show that when an arbitration panel was asked
to determine the liability of the UM prejudgment interest could be included.
773 A.2d at 870 n.2. The Lombardi Court pointed out that Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Pogorilich announced the principal that when the arbitration panel
was determining the tortfeasor’s liability the limit of payment would be the
tortfeasor’s policy limit. Id. (citing 605 A. 2d 1318, 1321 (R.I. 1992).
13. Wheeler, 66 A.3d at 479–80.
14. Id. at 480, 483 (citing 605 A.2d 1318, 1321 (R.I. 1992)).
15. Id. at 480.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 480–81.
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imperfect execution of the arbitration that no final judgment on
the matter submitted was made. 19 The Court went on to point out
that courts must modify or correct an award when there is evident
material miscalculation of figures or in descriptions of persons,
things, or property; when arbitrators make an award on a matter
not submitted to them; or when the award is imperfect in form not
affecting the merits.20 The Court also reiterated its authority
under R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-3-19 to make orders “as the rights of
the parties and the ends of justice require.” 21
The Court first reviewed a procedural hurdle presented by
Plaintiff’s petition to confirm the award.22 The Court pointed out
that upon a petition a trial justice must grant an order affirming
the award except in limited statutorily prescribe situations. 23 The
procedural roadblock existed because in order for the trial justice
to have the authority to modify an award § 10-3-14(a) as written,
required an “application” for an award modification by one of the
parties; however, none of the parties had filed such an
“application.” 24 The Court concluded that when the trial justice
granted of the petition to confirm the award and vacated the
portion of the award with regard to the amount in excess of the
policy limit, this had the effect of modifying the award. 25
Therefore, if no “application” by either party existed, the
modification would have been invalid.26 In overcoming this issue
the Court held that Encompass’s objection citing specific grounds
against Plaintiff’s petition to confirm the award satisfied the
“application” requirement of § 10-3-14(a). 27 The Court reasoned
that because Plaintiff’s petition to confirm the award set in motion
the review and because Encompass’s objection provided sufficient
19. Id. at 480–81 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-12 (1956)).
20. Id. at 481 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-14 (1956)).
21. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-19 (1956)).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 481–82.
25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-3-14(a) (1956)).
27. Id. at 482. The Court relied on the analogous situation present in
City of E. Providence v. United Steelworkers of Am, Local 15509. 925 A.2d
246, 253–55 (R.I. 2007). The Court pointed out that in that case a motion to
confirm an award alone was sufficient to trigger a review of the award and an
objection to that review constituted an “application.” Wheeler, 66 A.3d at 482
n.6.
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grounds to warrant further inquiry by the lower court, there had
been an “application.” 28
The Court then turned to the merits and held that the trial
justice erred in modifying the arbitration award. 29 The Court
reiterated that the standard of review for arbitration agreements
permitted modification of an award only in the limited, statutorily
enumerated, circumstances. 30 Further, the court reiterated its
assertion made in Paola v. Commercial Union Assurance
Companies, that “[a] trial justice has no power to modify an
award” absent the statutorily enumerated situations.31 The Court
made special note that there was no record of the arbitration
proceedings or of the question(s) submitted to the panel, and that
the parties agreed that the insurance policy was not presented to
the panel.32 The Court also noted that there was a legally valid
award calculating prejudgment interest. 33 From there, the Court
examined the trial justice’s analysis and concluded that the trial
justice had inappropriately engaged in a de novo review and had
modified the award to correct a mistake of law. 34 The Court
pointed out that the trial justice had incorrectly determined that
the arbitrators had made a mistake of law, believing that the law
prohibited an arbitrator from awarding prejudgment interest
above policy limits. 35 The Court went on to show that as a matter
28. Id.
29. Id. at 482–83.
30. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-14(a) (1956)).
31. Id. (quoting 461 A.2d 935, 937 (R.I. 1983)).
32. Id. at 483 n.7 (countering the argument by the dissent and the
decision of the trial court, the Court argued that it would be inappropriate to
judge the validity of an arbitration agreement based on the wording of a
policy that had not been available to the arbitration panel).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 484.
35. Id. n.8. The Court was careful to point out that the trial court’s
assessment that there had been a mistake of law was likewise incorrect. Id.
The Court stated that the decision in Lombardi did not bar the award of
pretrial interest in excess of policy limits when arbitrators had been asked to
determine the amount injured parties may recover from the UM insurer and
that the Pogorilich decision only barred the UM insurer from paying in
excess of the policy limit when the arbitrators had been asked to decide the
amount the ensured party was entitled to recover from the tortfeasor. See
id.; 773 A.2d at 870 n.2; 605 A.2d at 1321. The Court further highlighted the
fact that when there was no record of the issue submitted to the arbitrators,
that as long as the agreement to arbitrate is valid and the matter of the
dispute is arbitable, the arbitrators are free to frame the issue as they see fit.
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of settled law, a mistake of law is not sufficient grounds for
overturning an award.36 The Court argued that to engage in a de
novo review of the arbitration panel’s award would be
inappropriate, given the limited role of the judiciary in modifying
arbitration awards. 37 As such the trial court had been obligated
to confirm the award. Therefore, the Court vacated the order of
the Superior Court that modified the award and remanded the
case to Superior Court with instructions to issue an order
confirming the award.38
Justice Robinson, while in concurrence with the majority
opinion on the sufficiency of the “application,” dissented against
the majority’s refusal to frame the issue of the award’s validity
through the lens of the arbitration panels authority as announced
by the insurance policy.39 Justice Robinson relied heavily on the
terms of the insurance policy which provided that the parties
would resort to arbitration to resolve the amount of damages owed
to the Plaintiff by the tortfeasor. 40 In Justice Robinson’s opinion,
because the panel had made an award on an issue not submitted
to them, specifically the issue of the UM insurers liability, the
statute mandated that the trial justice modify the award.41
Justice Robinson based his argument in large part on the notion
that an arbitration panel obtains its jurisdiction from the consent
of the parties and that a panel’s jurisdiction is limited to those
subjects over which the parties have given it authority.42 Justice
Robinson argued that, because there was no specific record of the
questions or the issues presented to the panel, the panel’s
Wheeler, 66 A.3d at 484 (citing Purvis Sys., Inc. v. American Sys. Corp. 788
A.2d 1112, 1116 (R.I. 2002)). Further, the Court noted that the panel must
have understood the dispute to be between the Plaintiff and Encompass
because it crafted the award in accordance with the formula presented in
Metropolitan Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Barry. 892 A.2d 915, 923–24 (R.I.
2006).
36. Wheeler, 66 A.3d at 473 (citing Aponick v. Lauricella, 844 A.2d 698,
704 (R.I. 2004); Purvis Sys, Inc., 788 A.2d at 1115; Westminster Constr. Corp.
v. PPG Indus., Inc., 376 A.2d 708, 711 (1977)).
37. See id. at 483–84.
38. Id. at 484.
39. Id. at 484–85 (citing Bush v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 448 A.2d 782,
784 (R.I. 1982) (Robinson, J., dissenting)).
40. Id. at 485 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 485–86 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 485 (citing Blackstone Valley Gas & Elec. Co. v. R. I. Power
Transmission Co., 12 A.2d 739, 749 (R.I. 1940) (Robinson, J., dissenting)).
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authority could only be determined by examining the language of
the insurance policy’s very narrow grant of authority. 43
Furthermore, Justice Robinson also pointed out that an
arbitration panel derives its authority from the mutual consent of
the parties to be bound. 44 Here, he argued that the mutual
consent of the parties grant of authority to the arbitrators could
only be determined to extend to the amount of damages Plaintiff
suffered, not to, as the panel decided, the contractual obligations
of Encompass. 45
COMMENTARY
In examining the Court’s decision it becomes apparent that
the Court was not motivated to see the decision of an arbitration
overturned. 46 Further, the Court seems to have been motivated to
penalize Encompass, the insurer, the party with the most ability
to frame the arbitration, for failing to properly create an
arbitration agreement beyond the single paragraph present in the
insurance policy boilerplate. The Court appears to have been
completely aware that the entire case could have been avoided if
Encompass, in drafting such an agreement, had instructed the
panel as to its authority and which matters would be arbitable.
While the dissent raises the concern that the importance of
express mutual assent to the issues of arbitration has been
weakened by the majority decision, 47 it does not grasp the
function of this decision. The functional effect of this decision is to
force parties in future arbitrations, especially those between
insured and insurance companies whose stock and trade are
written agreements, to specify through unambiguous arbitration
agreements the scope and extent of an arbitration panel’s
authority.
The danger of the majority’s decision is that it could function
to drive up insurance costs for consumers in the state. The
decision creates two separate avenues whereby insurance costs
may climb. First, the decision effectively denies insurers judicial
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 485 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
Id. (Robinson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 487 n.11 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
See id. at 483.
See id. at 486 (Robinson, J., dissenting) .
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recourse should an arbitration panel make a mistake of law. Such
mistakes of law threaten an insurer’s ability to effectively cap
their UM liability through policy limits when a dispute is
submitted to arbitration. This increases the likelihood that
arbitration becomes too unpredictable and incentivizes insurers to
turn to the courts, a far more costly process. Such additional cost
would conceivably be passed on to policyholders.
Second, the result may be that insurers will be more
motivated to offer to settle an insured’s claim at the policy limit,
thereby limiting their potential liability and avoiding the risk of
an incorrect and un-appealable arbitration. This would positively
impact injured parties, resulting in more rapid UM compensation
but would however, result in higher costs for policy holders as
insurance companies raised rates to maintain steady margins.
However, both of these scenarios are less likely, especially if
insurers take the relatively inexpensive precaution of drafting
arbitration agreements that limit the authority and scope of
arbitration panels. As has been noted above, the primary function
of this case will be to incentivize insurers to craft narrow
arbitration agreements prior to submitting a dispute to
arbitration. If such narrow agreements are the result, the
outcomes should not only be more predictable, but also effectively
capped. Predictable and controllable outcomes available through
narrow arbitration should, if anything, help to lower or at least
stabilize insurance costs.
CONCLUSION
It would seem from this opinion that, except in very limited
circumstances, the decisions of arbitration panels are secure from
post-decision relief on the part of one of the parties. Further, the
Court affirmed the limited role of the judiciary in overturning
arbitration and upheld a narrow construction of the judiciary’s
role under the current statute. 48 The Court’s decision has placed
the responsibility on the parties entering arbitration to clarify and
specify those issues to be arbitrated. Additionally, the Court
effectively penalized attempts to utilize post-decision litigation to
avoid payment of arbitration decisions. Finally, this decision has
the potential to encourage insurers to avoid arbitration and settle
48.

Id. at 483–84.
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UM claims at policy limits or through court proceedings, though
such affect might cause an increase in premiums. However, the
most likely functional outcome is that insurers limit arbitration
panel’s authority by narrowly crafted arbitration agreements.
Todd Rose
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Civil Procedure. Vogel v. Catala, 63 A.3d 519 (R.I. 2013). Providence
County Superior Court entered a judgment in favor of a lender who sued a
borrower for breach of contract, breach of an implied-in-fact contract, and
failure to repay based on a book account. The Rhode Island Supreme Court,
unable to review this appeal in a meaningful way because the petitioner
failed to provide a transcript of the lower bench trial, affirmed the judgment
of the Superior Court.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On April 9, 2007, Juan G. Catala (“Catala”) called his friend
David S. Vogel (“Vogel”), asking him for a loan.1 Catala had lost
his money gambling in Las Vegas and needed additional funding
to recoup his losses.2 Vogel, then in Rhode Island, agreed to wire
$8,500 to Catala at The Bellagio Hotel in Las Vegas with the
understanding that Catala would repay the debt within two
weeks. 3
On October 18, 2007, as Catala had failed to repay his loan for
over six months, Vogel filed a complaint in Providence County
Superior Court alleging breach of contract, breach of an impliedin-fact contract, and failure to repay based on a book account.4
On April 23, 2009, Vogel moved for summary judgment,
attaching an affidavit in which he stated: “[Catala] called me to
request that I loan money to him[.] [Catala] said that he had lost
a substantial sum of money during his trip to Las Vegas and
needed to borrow money so that he might win back at least part of
what he had lost.” 5 With that, Catala amended his answer to
include the affirmative defense that the loan was void under G.L.
1956 § 11-19-17.6 Subsequently, on February 23, 2010, Vogel’s
motion for summary judgment was denied. 7
On November 4, 2010, the case was heard as a bench trial in
1. Vogel v. Catala, 63 A.3d 519, 520 (R.I. 2013).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Catala denied the breach of contract claims and stated that “he was
without sufficient information to admit or deny the book account claim[.]” Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 520–21 n.3 (citing in relevant part R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-19-17,
that “[a]ll . . . promises, given or made . . . for the repayment of money
knowingly lent for . . . betting, shall be utterly void.”).
7. Catala also motioned for summary judgment based on his
affirmative defense. Id. at 521. That motion was also denied. Id. s
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Superior Court and, on May 19, 2011, the trial justice issued a
written opinion, which concluded that the loan was not void under
§11-19-17. 8 The trial justice concluded that “Vogel’s testimony
was more credible than” Catala’s testimony and that the loan was
not extended for gambling purposes, but rather as a traditional
loan that would have to be paid back. 9 The justice ruled that to
conclude the loan was invalid under §11-19-17 would be an unjust
enrichment for Catala. 10 In accordance with that judgment,
Catala was ordered to repay the loan along with other costs. 11
Catala appealed the Superior Court’s holding to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court. 12 Catala’s appeal contended that the trial
justice erred in finding Vogel credible as a witness and that the
trial justice erred in not voiding the loan under §11-19-17 since,
according to Catala, Vogel knew that the loan would be used for
gambling purposes. 13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

In reviewing the lower court’s ruling, this Court “gives great
weight to the factual findings of a trial justice sitting without a
jury in a civil matter, and [] will not disturb such findings unless
they are ‘clearly erroneous or unless the trial justice misconceived
or overlooked material evidence or unless the decision fails to do
substantial justice between the parties.’” 14 Furthermore, even if
the Court’s review of the record indicated that a contrary
conclusion could have been reached, the Court does not substitute
its view for the lower court’s view when the evidence supports the
lower court’s findings.15
In this case, however, the Court was unable to conduct a
meaningful review of the lower court’s ruling because Catala
failed to provide the Court with a copy of the transcript from the
lower court. 16 Under the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 522 (citing Cahill v. Morrow, 11 A.3d 82, 86 (R.I. 2011)).
Id.
Id.
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Procedure, Catala, as the appellant, had a duty to provide a
transcript that was “complete and ready for transmission.” 17
Without a copy of the transcript, the Court held it could not
“engage in any meaningful review of the trial justice’s factual
determination that Vogel did not ‘knowingly’ lend the money at
issue in contravention of §11-19-17.” 18 The ultimate question to
be decided in this appeal was whether or not Vogel knew that the
money he was lending to Catala would be used for gambling. 19
This was a question of fact that was left for the trial justice to
answer and without a copy of the transcript, the Court was unable
to hold that the trial justice erred in his findings. 20
Justice Robinson dissented, contending that the Court had
enough evidence to hold that Vogel should not have been repaid
for his loan based on Vogel’s judicial admissions. 21 Within Vogel’s
complaint, he stated that “[Catala] needed to borrow money so
that he might win back at least part of what he had lost.” 22 For
Justice Robinson, the judicial admissions made by Vogel in his
complaint were enough to conduct a “‘meaningful review’ of the
trial court’s decision” and find that Vogel was not entitled to
repayment.23 Justice Robinson found that in Vogel’s complaint,
he “explicitly indicated the purpose of the loan at issue[,]” and
that loan was in direct contravention of §11-19-17.24
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled correctly in this case;
without a copy of the transcript from the lower court, it was
unable to conduct a thorough review of the trial justice’s
findings.25
The credibility of a witness is a factual finding, and a factual
finding made by a lower court trial justice will only be disturbed
17. Id. (citing Small Bus. Loan Fund Corp. v. Gallant, 795 A.2d 531,532
(R.I. 2002)).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 523 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
22. Id. (Robinson, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 524 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
24. Id. (Robinson, J., dissenting).
25. See id. at 522.
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when it is “clearly erroneous or unless the trial justice
misconceived or overlooked material evidence or unless the
decision fails to do substantial justice between the parties.” 26 It is
difficult, if not impossible, for the Court to make a determination
going to any of these tests without a copy of the transcript. 27
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Robinson does not see the
need to review the transcript at all. 28 In his view, Vogel’s own
complaint appears to contain an admission that he knew the loan
was for gambling purposes, and that should be enough to conduct
a “meaningful review of the trial court’s decision.” 29 However, the
affidavit on which Justice Robinson bases his dissent does not
indicate that Vogel knew with any certainty that Catala would use
the loan for gambling purposes, as required by §11-19-17. 30 The
affidavit, the only document available to the Court for review on
this appeal, does not unequivocally state that Vogel knew Catala
would be gambling with the loaned money. 31 The affidavit says
only that Catala “needed to borrow money so that he might win
back at least part of what he had lost.” 32 One can win back money
through efforts and investments not limited only to gambling.
Though perhaps intuitively apparent, there is no definitive
indication contained within the affidavit that Catala would use
the loan for gambling. 33 Without a copy of the transcript, the
Court had “no choice but to uphold the lower court’s finding.” 34
Furthermore, ruling in favor of a party that is unprepared for
its appeal would undermine the significance of the Supreme Court
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court was not prepared to
disturb the factual findings because Catala’s attorney failed to
provide it with the most basic of materials. Accordingly, an
unprepared appellate court is in no position to overturn a lower
court’s factual findings, regardless of any judicial admissions that
may appear to point in one direction or another.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
2004)).

Id. at 522 (citing Cahill, 11 A.3d at 86).
See id.
Id. at 524 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
See id. (Robinson, J., dissenting).
See id. at 523 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
See id. (Robinson, J., dissenting).
See id. (Robinson, J., dissenting).
See id. (Robinson, J., dissenting).
See id. at 522 (citing Berquist v. Cesario, 844 A.2d 100, 105 (R.I.
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Also, it appears that a substantial injustice would have been
done were Catala to escape responsibility and not be ordered to
repay the $8,500, especially considering that his legal team failed
to supply the Court with a copy of the transcript.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the lower court, holding that without a copy of the transcript, it
was unable to conduct a meaningful review of the trial justice’s
factual findings and upheld the judgment that the $8,500 loan
was not made in contravention of §11-19-17.
Michael Osterberg
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Constitutional Law. Reilly v. City of Providence ex rel. Napolitano, No.
10-461 S., 2013 WL 1193352 (D.R.I. March 22, 2013). Granting summary
judgment is inappropriate where a plaintiff has suffered an unconstitutional
violation of his or her First Amendment right to free speech but material
facts central to the apportionment of liability between individual and
municipal defendants remain in dispute. An individual defendant’s motion
for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity for his or her
alleged freedom of speech violation will only be granted where no dispute
exists that the defendant’s restriction of speech was both content-neutral and
acceptable in scope. Where a plaintiff argues for the purposes of summary
judgment that a genuine dispute of fact exists as to the content-neutrality of a
police officer’s suppression of plaintiff’s freedom of speech, the plaintiff is
precluded from a favorable summary judgment on the issue of municipality
liability for that officer’s employer until such dispute is resolved.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On February 2, 2010, Judith Reilly (“Plaintiff”) and a friend,
Oscar Lemus, attended the Providence State of the City address at
the Providence Career and Technical Academy (“PCTA”)
auditorium in order to distribute flyers criticizing Mayor David
Cicilline (“Mayor”) for his recent decision to re-appoint an official
accused of ethics violations to the City Planning Commission. 1
Although there was “no evidence that Plaintiff obstructed
pedestrian traffic” and such traffic was “relatively sparse,”
someone notified Chief Dean Esserman (“Chief Esserman”) of the
Providence Police Department (“PPD”) that either someone was
distributing flyers or obstructing the entrance to the PCTA. 2
Chief Esserman testified that based on this information he asked
Officer Paul Kennedy (“Officer Kennedy”) to “check out the
situation and address it.” 3
According to Officer Kennedy’s
testimony, he then told Officer Alyssa DeAndrade (“Officer
DeAndrade”) “if there are people blocking, move them,” while
Officer DeAndrade testified that Officer Kennedy told her to
1. Reilly v. City of Providence ex rel. Napolitano, No. 10-461 S., 2013
WL 1193352, at *1 (D.R.I. March 22, 2013).
2. Id. at *1–2. Testimony on this fact was unclear because Chief
“Esserman did not recall” whether someone “told him about flyers being
distributed or people obstructing the entrance.” See id. at *2 (emphasis
added).
3. Id. at *2.
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“move [Plaintiff and Lemus] from the front of the building.” 4 In
any event, Officer DeAndrade testified that she instructed her
patrolmen to “clear the sidewalk.” 5
As a result of this chain of orders, Plaintiff testified that she
was told by a PPD officer that “she could not distribute flyers
anywhere on the city block in front of the PCTA.” 6 Further,
Plaintiff testified that she was “again approached by a [PPD]
officer and threatened with arrest” after she “moved back towards
the entrance.” 7 According to Plaintiff’s testimony, after ignoring
the officers’ commands a third time, Officer DeAndrade “reiterated
that Plaintiff would be arrested if she continued to distribute
flyers in front of the [PCTA].” 8 The facts were in dispute as to the
extent of the PPD’s restrictions on where Plaintiff could distribute
her flyers, but the PPD at no time prevented Plaintiff from
distributing flyers completely. 9 Instead, Plaintiff’s ultimate claim
focused on whether the extent of PPD exclusion of Plaintiff’s flyer
distribution was an unconstitutional suppression of her First
Amendment right to freedom of speech.10
Plaintiff complied with PPD instructions and was never
arrested.11 However, after a formal civilian complaint to the PPD
yielded no response, Plaintiff commenced a civil action against
Chief Esserman, Officer Kennedy, and Officer DeAndrade, as well
as the City of Providence, alleging a violation of her freedom of
speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment. 12 The parties
subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
A. Plaintiff’s Alleged Violation of First Amendment Right to
Freedom of Speech
The parties agreed upon the first two prongs of the three-step
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2–3.
See id.
See id. at *1–2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1, *3.
Id. at *1, *12–13.
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test 14 laid out by the United States Supreme Court for assessing
whether or not a plaintiff’s First Amendment right to free speech
has been violated; specifically, that the Plaintiff’s act of
distributing leaflets was a constitutionally protected act of free
speech and that the area where plaintiff distributed leaflets was a
public forum. 15 Thus, the Rhode Island District Court for the
District of Rhode Island (“the court”) focused its analysis, and the
parties their arguments, on the third prong of the test: whether
the government’s restrictions on Plaintiff’s speech: “[were]
content-neutral, [were] narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest and [left] open ample alternative channels of
communication.” 16 If the government restrictions satisfied these
three elements, then restrictions on Plaintiff’s right to free speech
might have been constitutional. 17
1.

Content Neutrality

The government’s purpose for restricting Plaintiff’s speech
was the central focus of the content neutrality analysis and “[t]he
‘principal inquiry’ in assessing content-neutrality [was] ‘whether
the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of
disagreement with the message it conveys.’” 18
In this case, all three individual defendants submitted
testimony that they were unaware of the contents of Plaintiff’s
flyers when restricting where Plaintiff could distribute the
same.19 However, Plaintiff submitted the following five pieces of
circumstantial evidence to combat the individual defendants’
testimony: (1) that Oscar Lemus testified that he witnessed the
Mayor watching Plaintiff from a window; (2) the flyers distributed
14. To apply the three-prong test prescribed by the Supreme Court a
court must determine (1) whether the First Amendment protects the alleged
speech/conduct at issue; (2) whether the forum for such speech is public or
non-public; and (3) whether the justifications for exclusion of speech are
proper given the forum and other standards. Id. at *3 (citing Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985)).
15. Id. at *4 (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176–77 (1983)).
16. Id. at *4 (quoting Grace, 461 U.S. at 177) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
17. Id. at *4.
18. Id. at *4 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural
Comm’n, 100 F.3d 175, 183 (1st Cir. 1996)).
19. Id. at *4.
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by Plaintiff prominently displayed the Mayor’s name in large
lettering; (3) “the weakness of [individual defendants’] public
safety rationale for ordering Plaintiff to move”; (4) “the City’s
failure to process Plaintiff’s civilian complaint in the manner
required by PPD procedures”; and (5) the fact that Plaintiff was
never informed of the alleged public safety reasons for PPD
officers restricting the areas where she could distribute flyers. 20
The circumstantial evidence cited by Plaintiff allowed the court to
find that “a reasonable fact-finder could infer that [individual
defendants] acted because of the contents of the flyers,” and thus,
their actions were not content neutral.21
2.

Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government Interest

To justify their conduct, the individual defendants averred
that their actions “advanced the government’s interest in
maintaining the movement of pedestrian traffic on the sidewalk in
front of the PCTA” and that their actions furthered “the
government’s interest in ensuring that emergency exits are clear
in the event of a mass evacuation.” 22 Thus, individual defendants
in this case offered two alleged substantial government interests,
maintaining the movement of pedestrian traffic and maintaining
clear emergency exits, as justifications for their conduct. 23
The court rejected the first justification, maintaining the
movement of pedestrian traffic, on the grounds that Supreme
Court precedent “‘ha[d] dismissed the danger to traffic congestion
as a justification to ban leafleting’” because the act of handing out
leaflets did not lead to pedestrian traffic congestion. 24 The
Defendants’ second justification, maintaining clear emergency
exits from the PCTA, was similarly rejected by the court despite
testimony that Chief Esserman received a complaint about
Plaintiff obstructing the doors to the PTCA.25 Based on the
unsure testimony of Esserman, and the fact that such evidence
would be inadmissible as hearsay at trial, the court rejected the
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at *5.
23. Id.
24. Id. at *6 (quoting Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth.,
984 F.2d 1319, 1324 (1st Cir. 1993)).
25. Id.
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individual defendants’ justifications for their unconstitutional
conduct, thus finding that no substantial government interest was
served by their restriction of Plaintiff’s speech and that the
individual defendants’ violated the First Amendment. 26
3.

Ample Alternative Channels of Communication

The court found, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, that the Defendants’ conduct left ample
adequate alternative channels of communication that Plaintiff
could have utilized. 27 Regardless of the extent of PPD’s alleged
restrictions, Plaintiff could have distributed flyers across
Cranston Street from the PCTA near the Citizens Bank parking
lot or near the Central High School parking lot, both areas utilized
for parking by State of the City attendees. 28 For those reasons,
the court held that although, as was argued, Plaintiff was not able
to access all attendees of the Mayor’s speech, Plaintiff had access
to a portion of such attendees. 29
B. Qualified Immunity
In order to determine whether the individual defendants
could be held liable for violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment
right to free speech, the court looked to whether the doctrine of
qualified immunity applied. 30 As framed by the court, the
application of the qualified immunity doctrine turned on “whether
a reasonably competent police officer could have thought that the
restrictions imposed on Plaintiff’s speech were constitutional.” 31
The court then found that two disputes of material fact
precluded a favorable summary judgment for the individual
26. The court noted that hearsay evidence which would be inadmissible
at trial is also inadmissible for the purposes of a motion for summary
judgment. Id. at *6 (citing Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st
Cir. 1990)).
27. Reilly, 2013 WL 1193352, at *7.
28. Id. at *1, *7.
29. Id. at *7.
30. Id. at *8. In the context of this case, the doctrine of qualified
immunity shields police officers from civil liability so long as their conduct is
not in violation of a clearly established constitutional right of which a
reasonable police officer in their situation would have been aware of. Id.
(citing Diaz-Bigio v. Santini, 652 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2011)).
31. Id. at *9.
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defendants. 32 First, the court pointed to the previously discussed
issue in dispute of whether the individual defendants’ suppression
of the Plaintiff’s speech was content neutral.33 The court then
noted that if the content of Plaintiff’s speech did motivate the
individual defendants’ allegedly unconstitutional conduct, the
doctrine of qualified immunity would not shield the individual
defendants from liability. 34 The second factual issue precluding
the court from granting summary judgment on the individual
defendants’ qualified immunity defense was the dispute about the
scope of their orders to Plaintiff. 35 Plaintiff testified that the
individual defendants ordered her not to distribute her flyers
anywhere on the PCTA block, whereas the individual defendants
testified that their order was limited to the 170-foot stretch of
lower sidewalk in front of the steps leading to the PCTA
auditorium doors.36 The court found that a reasonable police
officer could have believed that the conduct the individual
defendants attested to was constitutional, and thus, although
Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were violated, the individual
defendants’ conduct could satisfy the standards for qualified
immunity. 37 Thus, if a fact-finder determined that the individual
defendants’ actions were content neutral and their restrictions on
Plaintiff’s speech were limited to the 170-foot stretch in front of
stairs to the PCTA, they would be protected by the doctrine of
qualified immunity and would face no civil liability for their
actions.38
C. Municipal Liability
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against the City of
Providence would be appropriate if the individual defendants’
actions on the night in question were in conformity with and
motivated by official PPD policy, in which case the PPD policy
could be the cause of the violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *9–10.
Id. at *10.
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rights. 39
Plaintiff cited numerous sources of evidence that the conduct
of PPD officers on the night in question was in conformity with
PPD policies.40 Thus, the court easily found that, although not
facially unconstitutional, the clearly established PPD policy,
which Chief Esserman knew to suppress citizen’s First
Amendment rights, may have been enough to hold the City liable
for the actions of PPD officers who acted in accordance with that
policy. 41 As such, the disposition of the case on the issue of the
City’s liability turned on, inter alia, a fact-finder’s determination
of the content-neutrality of the individual defendants’ conduct. 42
The court found that because Plaintiff argued that a genuine issue
of fact existed in regard to the content-neutrality of such conduct,
a summary judgment in Plaintiff’s favor on municipal liability was
improper. 43
COMMENTARY
This case implicates an individual’s right to distribute
leaflets, an issue about which the court is able to cite many cases
explaining why public safety and pedestrian traffic, both
legitimate government concerns, are often not sufficient
justifications for suppression of the right to distribute literature.44
39. Id. at *11–12.
40. See id. Plaintiff’s cited sources included testimony from Chief
Esserman that indicated that the PPD officers’ actions were in conformity
with their training, a fact that was further attested to by Officer DeAndrade
as well as by several officers serving under her control on the night in
question. Id.
41. Id. at *11–12.
42. Id.
43. Id. According to the court, provided that Chief Esserman made the
decision to order the restriction of Plaintiffs right based on the content of the
speech, Plaintiff could succeed on her claim against the city. This is because
it is essentially undisputed “that [Chief] Esserman possessed [the] final
authority with respect to PPD policy,” thus any decision by Chief Esserman
based on the content of Plaintiffs speech would constitute PPD policy and
thus expose the City of Providence to liability. Id. at *10–11 (citing Pembaur
v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
44. Id. at *5 (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 182 (1983);
Bays v. City of Fairborn, 668 F.3d 814, 823 (6th Cir. 2012); Saieg v. City of
Dearborn, 641, F.3d 727, 736–37 (6th Cir. 2011); Kuba v. 1-A Agric. Ass’n,
387 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2004); Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029,
1039 (7th Cir. 2002); Lederman v. United States, 291 F.3d 36, 45 (D.C. Cir.
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As the jurisprudence in this area is quite explicit, the court found
that at the State of the City address, with only several hundred
attendees, the pedestrian traffic flow concerns and the public
safety concerns were not sufficiently grave and apparent as to
justify summary judgment in favor of Defendants. 45
The judge also prudently denied Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment, while still finding that her First Amendment
rights had been violated, because the facts in dispute were central
to the determination of liability. 46 Summary judgment is only
appropriate where the facts are so clear and undisputed that no
reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-moving party, which
was clearly not the situation in this case. 47 Suppression of
constitutional rights, especially those held as dearly as the right to
free speech, is a serious matter, both for the victim of such
suppression and the alleged suppressor. Thus, in denying the
parties cross-motions for summary judgment in this case, the
court ensured that a fair and just decision will be arrived at, after
a weighing of the merits of the claims and defenses of the
respective parties. 48
CONCLUSION

Although the court found that individual defendants’ actions
were not narrowly applied to serve a legitimate government
purpose and were thus unconstitutional violations of Plaintiff’s
First Amendment rights, summary judgment was not appropriate
in favor of the individual defendants and the City of Providence or
Plaintiff because significant material issues of fact remain to be
resolved in order to justly apportion liability. 49
Jackson Raymond Schipke

2002)).
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at *1.
Id. at *12–13.
See id. at *3.
See id.
Id. at *12–13.
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Contract Law. Bucci v. Lehman Bros. Bank, FSB, 68 A.3d 1069 (R.I.
2013). The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a nominee of a mortgage
lender, who holds only legal title to the mortgage but does not hold the
accompanying promissory note, may exercise the statutory power of sale and
foreclose on the mortgage. 1
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In May of 2007, Anthony Bucci and his wife (“the plaintiffs”)
made arrangements to finance the purchase of a home.
Accordingly, they borrowed $249,900 from Lehman Brothers
Bank, FSB (“Lehman Brothers”), signed a promissory note that
evidenced the debt, and executed a mortgage on the property that
secured the loan. 2 However, although the promissory note was
made payable to Lehman Brothers, the mortgage was granted to
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS). 3 The
mortgage document provided that MERS was designated “as
nominee for the lender and the lender’s successors and assigns.” 4
In October 2008, the plaintiffs defaulted on the note by
ceasing to make loan payments.5 After the plaintiffs failed to cure
the default, MERS initiated foreclosure proceedings and scheduled
a foreclosure sale for July 10, 2009. 6 However, the day before the
1. Bucci v. Lehman Bros. Bank, FSB, 68 A.3d 1069, 1088–89 (R.I.
2013).
2. Id. at 1072. While only Anthony Bucci signed the note, both he and
his wife executed the mortgage; “[h]owever, this fact d[id] not affect [the
Court’s] decision in this case.” Id. at 1072 n.1.
3. Id. at 1072.
4. Id. at 1073. In 1993, MERS was developed by major participants in
the lending community “to form a national electronic registration system that
would track the transfer of ownership interests in residential loans.” Id. at
1072. According to MERS, prior to its creation, “the constant buying and
selling of mortgage-backed loans [on the secondary mortgage market] became
costly and time-consuming, because each transfer required that an
assignment of the mortgage be recorded in the local land evidence records.”
Id. at 1073. “In a typical MERS transaction, when a loan is made by a
member of MERSCORP [the parent company of defendant MERS], the
member will be designated as the lender in the promissory note, and MERS
will be named in the mortgage as the mortgagee.” Id. at 1073. This allows
members of MERS to transfer title to other MERS members without having
to re-record with each transfer because MERS remains as holder of the
mortgage. Id. at 1073.
5. Id. at 1072.
6. Id. at 1074.

BUCCI.SURVEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/20/2014 2:36 PM

874 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:873
foreclosure sale was set to take place, the plaintiffs commenced an
action seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in an
attempt to prevent MERS from exercising the power of sale
contained in the mortgage. 7 The plaintiffs presented a variety of
arguments asserting that MERS lacked the authority to
foreclose.8 The trial justice encapsulated the controversy in two
inquiries: first, whether MERS had the contractual authority to
foreclose under the note and mortgage, and second, whether
MERS had the statutory authority to foreclose.9 The trial justice
answered in the affirmative to both questions and entered
judgment on behalf of the defendants. 10 Plaintiffs appealed. 11
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The plaintiffs asserted a variety of errors on appeal. 12 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed each of the plaintiffs’
arguments after categorizing them based on whether they
contested the defendant’s contractual authority to foreclose or the
defendant’s statutory authority to foreclose. 13
A. Contractual Authority
First, the plaintiffs argued that the provision of the mortgage
that empowered the “Lender” to invoke the statutory power of sale
precluded MERS from having contractual authority to foreclose
and sell the property. 14 In agreement with the trial justice, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that this language did not
preclude MERS from foreclosing because another provision of the
7. Id. at 1074–75.
8. Id. at 1075–76.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1076–77.
11. Id. at 1077.
12. Id. at 1078–79.
13. Id. at 1079. In addition, the plaintiffs argued that this case was
moot because MERS had issued an internal policy change preventing MERS
from initiating future foreclosure proceedings. Id. However, the Court
concluded that this was “merely a voluntary cessation by MERS” because the
“plaintiffs have failed to provide . . . any indication that MERS ‘cannot
reasonably be expected to’ reinitiate foreclosure proceedings if this case were
dismissed as moot.” Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, the case before the
Court was not moot. Id. at 1081.
14. Id. at 1081.
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mortgage “specifically granted the Statutory Power of Sale” and
right to foreclose to MERS. 15 The Court noted that the language
that granted the “Lender” power to invoke the statutory power of
sale did not negate the previous language that explicitly granted
MERS the right to foreclose and sell the property.16
The plaintiffs’ second argument was that Lehman Brothers
never authorized MERS to act as its nominee because Lehman
Brothers did not sign the mortgage. 17 The trial justice had
dismissed this argument, reasoning that Lehman Brothers would
not have disbursed the loan proceeds to the plaintiffs if, in fact, it
did not intend to designate MERS as its nominee. 18 The Rhode
Island Supreme Court took a different route to reach the same
First, the Court noted that “[a] nominee
conclusion. 19
relationship is akin to that of a principle and agent,” and the
existence of such a relationship is a question of fact. 20 Before the
trial judge, the parties had agreed to the fact that MERS was the
nominee of the beneficial owner of the note. 21 Accordingly, the
Court concluded that because the existence of an agency
relationship is a question of fact, and the parties had previously
agreed to this fact, the plaintiffs had waived their agency
argument. 22
B.

Statutory Authority

The plaintiffs presented three arguments regarding the
statutory authority for MERS to foreclose and exercise the power
of sale. 23 First, the plaintiffs cited to § 18-10-1 and contended
15. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1077.
19. Id. at 1082.
20. Id. (citing Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb., 826 F. Supp. 2d
352, 370 (D. Mass. 2011)).
21. Id. at 1082–83. Before the trial justice, the parties had agreed to a
certain portion of the affidavit of Cheryl R. Marchant, Vice President of the
Aurora, the servicer of the loan. Id. at 1076, 1082. Within this agreed-upon
portion was a paragraph that provided that “MERS, in its capacity as a
mortgagee, is the nominee of the beneficial owner of the Note.” Id. at 1082–
83.
22. Id. at 1083.
23. Id.
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that because MERS was not a trust company, nor a national
banking association, this section precluded it from acting as a
nominee.24 The Court first provided that this argument was
waived because this statute was not raised before the trial
justice. 25 Nevertheless, the Court went on to conclude that even if
the argument had been raised below, the section has no effect on
MERS’s ability to act as a nominee. 26 The Court reasoned that
simply because the statute authorizes other entities to act in a
nominee capacity did not necessarily preclude MERS from doing
so. 27
The plaintiffs next argued that MERS may not exercise the
statutory power of sale contained in § 34-11-22 because MERS
was not a true mortgagee, but instead a “nominee mortgagee,”
which was not contemplated by any Rhode Island statute.28
However, the Court noted that the right to exercise the power of
sale in a mortgage is not derived from statute, but rather from
contract. 29 Therefore, in order to protect the liberty of contracting,
the agreement “shall be held valid and enforced in the courts[]
unless a violation of the law or public policy is clear and
certain.” 30 Given that the designation of MERS as grantee of the
mortgage was not a “clear and certain” violation of §34-11-22, the
Supreme Court held that MERS was the mortgagee. 31
The plaintiffs’ final assertion conceded that MERS was the
mortgagee, but provided that because it did not also hold the note,
it was implicitly prohibited from foreclosing or selling as
legislation regulating mortgagees required there be a unity in the
note holder and mortgagee. 32 As an initial matter, the Court
recognized that it is no longer the case that the mortgagee and
note holder are almost always the same entity. 33 The Court first
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1083–84.
26. Id. at 1084.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1085 (quoting Gorman v St. Raphael Acad., 853 A.2d 28, 38
(R.I. 2004) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
31. Id. at 1085.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1086. When the statutes were originally enacted, the
mortgagee and note holder were almost always the same entity, but due to
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found support within the definitions of nominee and note owner.
While a nominee “holds bare legal title,” the note owner “retains
the beneficial interest, or equitable title, in the mortgage.” 34
Citing the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the
Court noted that “[t]he law contemplates distinctions between the
legal interest in a mortgage and the beneficial interest in the
underlying debt. These are distinct interests, and they may be
held by different parties.” 35 Therefore, the Court concluded that
the note and the equitable interest in the mortgage remained
unified, as the lender retained equitable title to the mortgage and
passed that equitable title to each of its successors and assigns. 36
In addition, the Court noted that MERS was the holder of the
legal title to the mortgage, and has always acted as an agent of
the owner of the equitable title. 37 Accordingly, as the holder of
legal title, MERS may foreclose on behalf of the note owner, but
the proceeds from such a foreclosure sale are a part of the
beneficial interest belonging to the owner of the note. 38
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court rightfully concluded that a
nominee of a mortgage lender, without holding the accompanying
promissory note, may exercise the statutory power of sale and
foreclose on the mortgage. In an ever-changing world, the laws
must be able to adapt without allowing nonmaterial distinctions
to have a material impact. In reality, when a mortgagor defaults
on their loan, does it matter to the mortgagor whether the “Entity
A” or “Entity B” initiates foreclosure proceedings and invokes the
statutory power of sale?
The answer to that question is likely, “that depends.” If

the modernization of the world of lending, this is no longer the case. Id.
34. Id. at 1087.
35. Id. at 1087–88 (citing Culhane, 708 F.3d at 292) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
36. Id. at 1088–89.
37. Id. The Court noted a policy reason for finding this agency
relationship; citing the Restatement (Third) Property §5.4 cmt. e., it noted
that “Courts should be vigorous in seeking to find such a relationship, since
the result is otherwise likely to be a windfall for the mortgagor and the
frustration of [the note owners]’s expectation of security.” Id. at 1089.
38. Id.
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certain policies are followed, then aside from some initial
confusion for the mortgagor and perhaps different procedures to
follow based on which entity initiates foreclosure proceedings,
there may not be very much of an issue. Of course, as noted by
the Rhode Island Supreme Court, MERS does provide some
benefits, including the easier buying and selling of mortgagebacked loans in the secondary mortgage market. 39 Additionally, if
these nominee mortgagees were not permitted to exercise the
right to foreclose and statutory power of sale, this would allow for
some tremendous windfalls for mortgagors with MERS-type
lending transactions across the country. 40
However, when document-recording policies within MERS are
not followed or are otherwise insufficient, some significant
problems can surface. For example, in a bankruptcy case, due to
“issues surrounding [an] assignment from MERS,” Wells Fargo
was unable to prove how it acquired the note at issue, and as a
result, that it owned the note. 41 That case makes it evident that
strict adherence to recording regulations must be had; otherwise,
the MERS System will provide more troubles than its convenience
is worth.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the legal interest
and equitable interest in a mortgage may be held by different
parties without breaking the unity between the note holder and
mortgagee. Further, a nominee of a mortgage lender, who holds
only legal title to the mortgage, but who is not holder of the
accompanying promissory note, may exercise the statutory power
of sale and foreclose on the mortgage.
Aaron F. Nadich

39. Id. at 1073.
40. Id. at 1088.
41. See In re Mims, 438 B.R. 52, 56–57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Consequently, the court held that Wells Fargo did not have standing to bring
its claim. Id.
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Contract Law. The Law Firm of Thomas A. Tarro, III, et al. v. Maria
Checrallah, et al., 60 A.3d 598 (R.I. 2013). An attorney and law firm sued a
former client, alleging breach of contract, as the former client had retained
the attorney and law firm on a contingent fee basis to secure a settlement
agreement, but failed to pay the attorney. The Rhode Island Supreme Court
affirmed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
attorney and law firm.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In March 1989, Maria Checrallah (the “Defendant”), hired
Thomas A. Tarro (the “Plaintiff”) to “prosecute and settle all
claims for damage against [her father’s estate] and [her brother]
or others who shall be liable on account of the handling of [her
father’s estate] before and after his death.” 1 The Defendant
agreed to pay Plaintiff fifteen percent of any monies recovered in
prosecuting or settling her claims. 2 Plaintiff negotiated a
settlement of the Defendant’s claims with Victory Finishing
Technologies, Inc. (hereinafter “Victory”) for $2,390,000. 3 After
securing the settlement, Plaintiff set up a distribution between
the two beneficiaries of the estate (the Defendant and her
brother), and began to act as a collection agent for the Defendant. 4
At this point, the Plaintiff and Defendant agreed the Plaintiff
would continue his representation of the Defendant in any
matters relating to the estate and the settlement. 5
Over the next decade, Victory made payments on the
settlement; pursuant to their agreement, fifteen percent of each
payment went to Plaintiff as his fee. 6 After 1999, Victory entered
into receivership, and the estate filed claims in the receivership
proceeding in an effort to secure the payment of the settlement. 7
As a part of the receivership proceeding, in February of 2002,
Plaintiff served Victory’s receiver with notice of his attorney’s lien
for the amounts still owed to the Defendant.8
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Tarro v. Checrallah, 60 A.3d 598, 599 (R.I. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 599–600.
Id. at 600.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In July of 2002, the Defendant discharged the Plaintiff from
his duties as her attorney and retained new counsel.9 Three years
later, in 2005, the Defendant and successor counsel made a final
settlement agreement with Victory regarding the promissory
note. 10 The Defendant accepted a payment of $1,250,000 as
payment of her claim, with $100,000 payable within ninety days of
the agreement, and the balance due by August 2007.11 An
amendment to the final settlement mandated $200,000 be paid by
August 2006, with the balance being due by August 2007.12
The Plaintiff moved to enforce his attorney’s lien and received
fifteen percent of this $200,000 payment, initially deposited
within the Registry of the Court, later released to the Plaintiff by
the Superior Court.13 It is undisputed that the final payment of
$950,000 was made to the Defendant in time, and that the
Plaintiff never received a portion of either the initial $100,000
payment or the final $950,000 payment. 14
Accordingly, the Plaintiff filed suit alleging breach of contract
and other related actions against the Defendant, requesting
fifteen percent of the $100,000 and $950,000 payments. 15 The
Defendant responded, filing a counter claim that the Plaintiff had
breached his representation agreement by failing to provide
“effective and zealous representation,” as well as alleging
malpractice; these counterclaims were disposed of by summary
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff.16 The Plaintiff then moved for
summary judgment on its own claims. 17
At a Superior Court hearing on the summary judgment
motion, the Defendant argued that the Plaintiff was not entitled
to a contingency fee for the receivership settlement, as he was
discharged prior to the negotiation of that settlement and recovery
should be limited under quantum meruit for the value of services
rendered.18 The Superior Court then granted summary judgment
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. n.4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 600–01.
Id.
Id. at 601.
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for the Plaintiff, holding that the Plaintiff earned fifteen percent
of any amounts recovered by the Defendant when the 1989
settlement was negotiated. 19 Plaintiff was awarded fifteen percent
of the receivership settlement negotiated by successor counsel as
well as prejudgment interest. After the entry of final judgment,
the Defendant appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.20
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviews the Superior
Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, affirming “only if,
after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party” the Court concludes that “no genuine
issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” 21 The non-moving party cannot
rely upon allegations or denials in pleadings and must prove the
existence of disputed facts by competent evidence.22 The
Defendant contended that although the material facts of the case
were not disputed, the Plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, because the successor counsel actually negotiated
the final settlement after Victory entered receivership. 23
Additionally, in the event the Plaintiff succeeded, the Defendant
urged the Court to limit the Plaintiff’s recovery under quantum
meruit, allowing recovery only for the value of services rendered.24
The Rhode Island Supreme Court began its review noting that
clients have the right to discharge their attorneys at will,
although in doing so clients may be subject to consequences for
breach of contract.25 The Court held that the major distinction
between recovery in contract and recovery under quantum meruit
lies in the amount of performance of attorney’s services completed
prior to discharge. 26 Recovery for the reasonable value of services
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.; see Great American E & S Insurance Co., 45 A.3d 571, 574 (R.I.
2012).
22. Tarro, 60 A.3d at 601; see Narragansett Improvement Co. v.
Wheeler, 21 A.3d 430, 438 (R.I. 2011).
23. Tarro, 60 A.3d at 602.
24. Id.
25. Id.; see Lake v. Winfield Fuller Co., 173 A. 119, 120 (R.I. 1934).
26. Tarro, 60 A.3d at 602.
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rendered under quantum meruit is always allowable after
discharge without cause; specifically, recovery is limited to this
form when an attorney is discharged without cause prior to the
full performance of all duties contemplated in an agreement. 27
Where an attorney has substantially performed the duties set
forth in an agreement though, the appropriate remedy is in
contract and will be found in the expected benefit of the bargain.28
This expectancy can only be satisfied if the agreed contingent fee
is paid in full. 29
Turning to the facts of this matter, the Court found that there
was no dispute, as the Plaintiff agreed to represent the Defendant
in the probate proceedings for her father’s estate, and he would
receive fifteen percent of any amount recovered. 30 The Court
examined the retainer agreement and concentrated on the express
provision that the Plaintiff would be paid “[f]ifteen (15%) [p]ercent
of whatever may be recovered from said claim by suit, settlement
or any other manner.” 31 The Court then found that when the
Plaintiff reached the original probate settlement, he had
performed his duties to the Defendant under the agreement and
became entitled to his full contingent fee; the discharge of his
services after this point did not affect his right to the full fee. 32
The Court concluded by dismissing the Defendant’s contention
that separate collection efforts conducted by successor counsel
diminished the Plaintiff’s right to his fee and affirming the
Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment to the Plaintiff. 33

27. See id.; Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 10 (Cal. 1972).
28. Tarro, 60 A.3d at 602.
29. Id. The Court noted that other jurisdictions have also held that if an
attorney substantially performs under a contingent fee agreement, then the
contract remedy of the expected benefit of the bargain is the correct remedy.
Id. at 603; see also Zaklama v. Mount Sinai Medical Center, 906 F.2d 650,
652–53 (11th Cir. 1990); McCullough v. Waterside Associates, 925 A.2d 352,
355–57 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007); MacInnis v. Pope, 285 P.2d 688, 689–90 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1955).
30. Tarro, 60 A.3d at 603.
31. Id. (emphasis in original).
32. Id.
33. Id.
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COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reached the correct result
in this case. The Defendant sought to deny the Plaintiff a
contracted fee after the Plaintiff had completed the duties
contemplated by their agreement. To reach another result would
be to deny the Plaintiff a vested right under the terms of the
agreement between the parties. Additionally, to rule in favor of
the Defendant would lead to parties retroactively altering the
terms of a contingent fee agreement, which would undermine the
integrity of any contingent fee arrangement. Parties should not
be allowed to alter fees already earned as the appropriate time for
such negotiation is during the period in which a retainer
agreement is created.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decision is founded on
traditional contract principles, and the Court’s affirmation of
summary judgment, a “drastic remedy” that is dealt with
cautiously, 34 sends a clear message—the integrity of contingent
fee agreements will be respected. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court was most interested in upholding the retainer agreement as
written and signaled it may have gone even further than the
Plaintiff requested by awarding damages in excess of what the
Superior Court awarded. 35 The material facts not being in
dispute, the Court faced a choice between upholding a traditional
right to recovery, or the de facto abrogation of an agreement.
Affirming the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment made
it clear that the Court will not encourage parties to seek judicial
rewriting of substantially performed retainer agreements.
The enforcement of contracts is critical to commerce and
personal transactions of all sizes and shapes.36 Altering in any
way the agreed terms of the parties would destroy a deal arrived
at by equals and consonant with well established contract law.
34. Tarro, 60 A.3d at 601 (citation omitted).
35. See Tarro, 60 A.3d at 603–04 n.6.
36. See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, ON CONTRACTS §1.1 (Richard A.
Lord ed., West 4th ed. 2007) (“Contract law is designed to protect the
expectations of the contracting parties. It is intended to enforce the
expectancy interests created by the parties’ promises so that they can allocate
risks and costs during their bargaining.”); 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, ON
CONTRACTS 6 (Aspen, 3d ed. 2004) (“Exchange is the mainspring of any
economic system that relies as heavily on free enterprise as does ours.”).
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The Defendant did not allege anything beyond a failure to
perform. The Court correctly granted summary judgment because
there were no facts whatsoever indicating an actual controversy
about whether performance was made by the Plaintiff. This
judgment made it clear that contracting parties cannot avoid their
obligations on bare allegations unsupported by fact.
The case does, however, raise legitimate concerns. The Court’s
decision here means that prospective clients seeking to retain
counsel need to be aware, in advance of signing any agreement,
that there is little doubt it will be judicially enforced if necessary.
The Court’s decision made clear that, when balancing the
interests of an attorney being paid for work performed and a
client’s desire to limit payment to value received, the client’s
interests will be overcome by the need for certainty in contract
enforcement.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an attorney who
has substantially performed duties under a retainer agreement is
entitled to the full fee assigned to him by that agreement, even if
he is subsequently discharged. The Court determined that
subsequent alteration of a settlement agreement by a successor
counsel does not affect the original attorney’s rights to their full
fee.
Matthew Provencher
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Criminal Law. State v. Brown, 62 A.3d 1099 (R.I. 2013). A defendant
contended that it was an error for the trial court justice to decline to (1)
conduct a post-trial evidentiary hearing to determine whether or not the jury
was racially biased and if this was an improper extraneous influence as well
as if the jurors engaged in misconduct, (2) allow all fifteen members of the
jury to participate in deliberations, and (3) permit jury instructions that a
defense to disorderly conduct charges could be found if police were
excessively aggressive. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, except
for under rare circumstances, jurors’ racial bias does not constitute
“extraneous prejudicial information” calling for review as prescribed by
Rule 606(b).
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In July of 2003, the Narragansett Indian Tribe (“the Tribe”)
and the Rhode Island State Police engaged in an altercation as a
result of which seven Tribe members, including Hiawatha Brown
(“Brown”), were arrested. 1 Brown was charged with one count
each of simple assault, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct. 2
At the trial court level, the jury originally consisted of sixteen
individuals: three racial minorities and thirteen non-minorities.3
A minority juror, however, became ill and was subsequently
discharged from service, leaving only two minority jurors on a
panel totaling fifteen individuals.4 Upon the completion of
testimony, the trial justice denied Brown’s motion requesting that
the jury instructions provide that disorderly conduct is defensible
if state actors used excessive force during the altercation. 5
Brown requested that all members of the jury be allowed to
participate in deliberations, or alternatively, if only granted a
twelve panel jury, that both minorities be guaranteed members. 6
The State objected to these requests. 7 The trial justice denied
both of Brown’s requests, reasoning that she neither had the
authority to allow all fifteen jurors to deliberate if the State

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

State v. Brown, 62 A.3d 1099, 1102 (R.I. 2013).
Id. at 1102.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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objected nor to provide a guaranteed slot on the empaneled jury
for the minorities.8 Once the twelve-person jury was assembled,
only one minority remained. 9
During the course of jury deliberations, the trial justice
received a series of three notes from the jury. 10 The first
expressed concern over a juror who refused to find any defendant
guilty due to the state police’s actions; the second, sent hours
later, informed the judge that the jury was deadlocked on the
majority of the charges and requested that she clarify the law
regarding self-defense; the third stated that the jury was hung
regarding all sixteen charges. 11
Upon close of deliberations that day, the deputy sheriff saw a
group of jurors “lagging behind . . . speaking” quietly. 12 He
approached them and informed them that they were not allowed
to discuss the case unless all jurors were present, as he felt that
one of the jurors was pushing his opinion on the others. 13 Due to
the deputy’s suspicions, the judge individually interviewed several
jurors who had been observed taking part in the conversation.14
Each denied that they were discussing the case, but rather
admitted to speaking about motivations, frustrations, dispositions,
and personality conflicts. 15 After receiving a “pep talk” from the
judge, the jury convicted Brown of disorderly conduct and simple
assault but acquitted Brown of the charge of resisting arrest. 16
Approximately one month later, Brown moved for a new trial
stating that, subsequent to the close of trial, he discovered
8. Id. at 1102–03.
9. Id. at 1103.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1103–04. As a result, Brown made two motions: (1) for a
mistrial, reasoning that jury deliberations had broken down, or in the
alternative, (2) for the removal of the juror who was pressuring his opinion on
the other jurors outside of deliberations. Id. at 1104. The State objected to
both motions based on the statements from the jurors that they had not
discussed the case except during deliberations. Id. The trial justice, relying
on statements from the jurors and the fact that he sheriff had only seen the
jurors talking, but had not heard the content of their conversation, found that
she had no proper basis from which she could either declare a mistrial or find
that one juror had “tainted” the others. Id.
16. Id. at 1104–05.
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evidence that his right to a fair trial was obliterated as
misconduct occurred during juror deliberations.17 In support of
this motion, Brown submitted three affidavits discussing juror
hostility from three jurors. 18 These jurors had contacted Brown’s
counsel after trial. 19
The first affidavit, from juror one, the self-identified minority
juror, expressed concern that two other jurors had a “joint agenda”
and that jurors were biased against Brown and his codefendants. 20 The juror pointed to several incidents to
substantiate her claim.21 For example, she noted that the jury
foreperson sent the first note to the judge without asking for
“input or approval” from any of the other jurors. 22 Additionally,
when the Tribe’s Chief was testifying, a juror questioned, “Why
did they stand up? He’s nothing.” 23 Further, another juror asked
during jury deliberations, “Who are those people to touch a police
officer?” 24
Juror two was afraid that two other jurors spoke about the
case outside of deliberations, although she admitted to not having
heard any discussions and, thus, her apprehension was based
solely from watching their behavior throughout the course of the
trial. 25 Juror two reiterated the claims made in the first affidavit,
that a juror referred to the defendants as “those people” in regard
to the statement made about touching a police officer and that the
foreperson sent the judge a note without first consulting her. 26
Juror two also stated that when the jury reached a verdict, one of
the two jurors whose conduct was allegedly questionable banged
two water bottles together like he was playing a “tom-tom”

17. Id. at 1105. This motion was made pursuant to Rule 33 of the
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure by which a defendant can move
for a new trial based on new evidence discovered up to three years after
judgment is entered. Id.
18. Id. For the rest of this survey, these jurors will be referred to as
jurors one, two, and three, respectively.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1106.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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drum. 27
Juror three stated that the two jurors whose conduct was in
question had a disrespectful disposition toward the defendants but
“never used any racial epithets.” 28 Juror three noted that he
remembered the tom-tom incident and found it disrespectful; he
noted that the jury was not consulted regarding the content of the
first note the foreperson sent to the judge. 29 Juror three also
speculated that the two jurors in question discussed the case
outside of deliberations. 30
In June of 2008, the trial court held a hearing on Brown’s
motion for a new trial to determine if an evidentiary hearing was
needed. 31 Brown argued that the affidavits evidenced juror bias,
contained comments that “could be determined to be racially
motivated,” and proved misconduct; an evidentiary hearing was
therefore necessary. 32 The State, however, opposed the hearing,
insisting that Brown’s motion was grounded in “speculation” and
mere “interpretations” of other jurors’ actions (but not racial bias
or epithets), and thus did not show any extraneous information
had compromised the jury deliberation process. 33 Accordingly, the
State argued that the affidavits were inadmissible as evidence
pursuant to Rhode Island Rules of Evidence 606(b). 34 The trial
justice denied Brown’s motion for a new trial, agreeing with the
arguments advanced by the State. 35 However, she noted that
“this Court’s precedent provided little guidance on the issue of
whether the affidavits constituted a sufficient showing of racial
bias to warrant an evidentiary hearing,” but ultimately concluded
27. Id.
28. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1106. This rule prohibits a juror from testifying to any
statement, matter, or to anything upon their or another juror’s mind or
emotions which influenced them to assent or dissent from the indictment or
verdict, or to their mental processes, which occurred during jury
deliberations, during any inquiry conducted regarding the validity of an
indictment or verdict; it further prohibits a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a
juror’s statement regarding any matter from which they would be precluded
from testifying to be used for such purposes. Id.
35. Id. at 1107.
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that the conduct included in the documents was ambiguous and
did not grant the motion. 36 In July of 2008, Brown appealed to
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, arguing that the trial court
should have conducted the evidentiary hearing, granted his
request to allow of the jurors to deliberate, and provided the jury
with his proffered instruction regarding disorderly conduct. 37
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
A.

Juror Misconduct

A juror may, pursuant to Rule 606(b), testify regarding jury
deliberations
regarding whether “extraneous prejudicial
information” or “any outside influence” played an improper role on
influencing any juror, despite the general protections afforded to
the secrecy of the deliberative process.38 The Court noted that
although the rule was enacted to advance termination for the
litigation process as well as finality to judgments, these policies
must be balanced against a defendant’s right to a verdict based
exclusively on the evidence presented within the context of the
trial and courtroom.39
In the course of such review, an issue of first impression for
the Court arose: whether the racial bias of jury members
constitutes “extraneous prejudicial information” or “outside
influence” which may properly be testified to under Rule 606(b). 40
Thus, the Court deferred to federal case law for guidance and
agreed with the First and Tenth Circuits that a juror’s racial bias
does not fall within the rule’s prescribed definition of “extraneous
prejudicial information” or “outside influence.” 41 However, the
Court agreed with the First Circuit that occasionally juror
testimony should be admitted to resolve the question of whether
the defendant received a fair trial where ethnic or racial prejudice
is involved.42
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1107–08.
38. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1109–10 (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 1110. Contrarily, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that “jury perfection” was unrealistic, and as features of
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The Court held that the decision as to whether such an
inquiry should be conducted is within the discretion of the trial
judge, who is most familiar with the facts and circumstances of
the case and those participating in the process. 43 The Court
determined that, because the jury (1) acquitted each of Brown’s
codefendants on at least one charge and (2) convicted Brown while
acquitting him of one charge, the evidentiary hearing was
needless as the jury must have scrutinized the circumstances
surrounding each individual charge to produce such outcomes,
obliterating Brown’s allegation of a biased jury. 44 The Court
categorized the jurors’ conduct as “impolite” and “ambiguous” but
lacking a definite “racist undertone” sufficient to substantiate
Brown’s argument that his conviction was a result of his racial
background as it was “capable of different interpretations.” 45
Further, as none of the jurors openly articulated racial slurs or
recommended that Brown’s race or ethnicity should play a role in
their analysis, the Court agreed with the trial judge’s
determination that an allegation of racial bias was speculative at
best. 46
The Court also addressed two instances of non-racially related
juror misconduct which include the note that was sent to the trial
justice without the knowledge of the other jurors and the
discussion of the case outside of the context of deliberations by two
jurors. 47 The Court affirmed the denial of Brown’s motion for a
new trial based on these allegations of misconduct because they
did not advance any indication that jury deliberations were
polluted with banned extrinsic evidence, and the trial justice
ignored the note upon receipt. 48
B.

Selection of Deliberating Cohort of Jurors
Brown argued on appeal that the trial court committed

the litigation process serve to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial, the
need to allow evidence of post-verdict testimony from jurors to protect that
right is non-existent. Id. at 1109 (citation omitted).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1110–11.
46. Id. at 1111.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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reversible error in denying his request to allow all fifteen
members of the jury to participate in deliberations as well as in
failing to demand that the State provide a “race-neutral reason”
for objecting to a jury deliberation panel of fifteen individuals.49
The Court reasoned that a defendant in a criminal case does not
have a right to any specific individual on a jury. 50 Additionally,
pursuant to Rule 24(c)51 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure, only twelve jurors proceed to deliberations unless the
parties can agree upon another number, and in this case, the
State did not agree.52 The Court noted that its objection makes
sense considering that the verdict must be unanimous, and the
State has the burden of proof.53 Since the jurors who proceed to
deliberations are chosen randomly, the Court held that no special
race-sensitive protections are necessary as the process is
inherently “color-blind.” 54 Accordingly, the Court rejected both of
Brown’s arguments regarding the juror cohort.
C.

Proposed Jury Instructions

Finally, Brown contended that he was entitled to a jury
instruction that he could not be found guilty on the charge of
disorderly conduct if the jury found that the police were the party

49. Id.
50. Id. at 1112.
51. The pertinent portion of the rule states:
The court in its discretion may direct the impaneling of a jury not to
exceed sixteen (16) members, all having the same qualifications and
impaneled and sworn in the same manner as a jury of twelve (12). If
a juror is excused after he or she has been sworn but before any
opening statement is begun, another juror may be impaneled and
sworn in his or her place. All the jurors shall sit and hear the case,
but the court for cause may excuse any of them from service provided
the number of jurors is not reduced to less than twelve (12) or such
other number stipulated to under Rule 23(b). If more than such
number remain at the conclusion of the court's charge, the clerk in
the presence of the court and the parties shall put the names of the
remaining jurors in a box and from it shall draw twelve (12) names,
or such other number stipulated to by the parties, to determine the
issues.
RI SUPER. R. CRIM. P. RULE 24.
52. Brown, 62 A.3d at 1112.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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responsible for initiating the altercation which ultimately led to
his arrest. 55 The Court failed to identify any precedent that
supported Brown’s assertion, and therefore concluded that the
trial justice did not err in denying to administer such an
instruction.56
COMMENTARY
While it is shameful that racial and ethnic prejudice may still
be a rampant issue today, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in
handling this issue on first impression, has rightfully expressed
legitimate concerns regarding the introduction of evidence of
racial bias as extraneous prejudicial information on a jury verdict
while recognizing the importance of ensuring the federally and
state guaranteed right to fair trial.
Examples of extraneous influences upon a jury that are
admissible
into
post-verdict
testimony
regarding
jury
deliberations include “jurors reading news reports about the case,
jurors communicating with third parties, bribes, and jury
tampering.” 57 All of these share the characteristic of constituting
affirmative actions, posing a clear distinction from possessing a
racial bias, which does not necessarily have a blatant active
component. Simply because one does not openly express a
prejudice does not mean it does not exist.58 In a world of arguably
increasing racial tension, there has been a push by some to allow
evidence of racial bias to be presented before an evidentiary
hearing to ensure a defendant’s right to a fair trial has not been
violated;59 this view can be summarized as embodied by a
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1112–13.
57. Pond, Note, Juror Testimony of Racial Bias in Jury Deliberations:
United States v. Benally and the Obstacle of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b),
BYU L. REV. 244 (2010).
58. See Richard Gabriel, Race, bias and the Zimmerman jury, CNN (July
16, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/16/opinion/gabriel-bias-zimmerman/.
59. See Amanda R. Wolin, Comment, What Happens in the Jury Room
Stays in the Jury Room . . . but Should It?: A Conflict Between the Sixth
Amendment and Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), 60 UCLA L. REV. 262, 289–
93 (2012); See Circuit Split: Ensuring Racial Bias Is Not A Basis For The
Jury’s Deliberations, FED. EVIDENCE REV. (Mar. 19, 2013), http://
federalevidence.com/blog/2013/march/ensuring-racial-bias-not-basis-jurysdeliberations-draft.
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statement made by D. Grayson Yeargin, Washington, D.C.’s cochair of the ABA Section of Litigation’s Criminal Litigation
Committee’s: “You have to look under the hood now and then to
make sure the jury is functioning as it should.” 60
However, this view is not shared by all. Many courts still
refuse to make an exception to Rule 606(b) for evidence of racial
bias. Further, issues would arise regarding other prejudices, such
as how the disabled would fit into such an analysis of exceptions.
A concern seems to be a line drawing problem: if racial bias
becomes an external as opposed to internal distinction, what
would stop any inappropriate comments or actions occurring
during deliberations from being classified as external, thus
becoming admissible, 61 and thereby destroying the longstanding
principle of the jury as a black box? 62 Despite the process of voir
dire, it is impossible to truly determine the inner thoughts and
prejudices which a person harbors unless they explicitly manifest
outward actions to project such feelings. Additionally, allowing a
probative venture into one’s possible racial prejudice would
essentially sponsor an exploratory mission into the mental
processes of a juror, which violates the widespread notions of
deference to a rendered verdict. As such, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court’s hesitance in this area appropriately betokens its
acknowledgment of the vast difficulties presented by the
possibility of allowing racial bias evidence to be considered under
a Rule 606(b) review of a verdict that the judiciary may not
currently be logistically nor ideologically suited to handle.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the trial court’s
determination that a juror’s racial bias does not fall within Rule
606(b)’s definition of “extraneous prejudicial information” or an
“outside influence.” However, the court concluded that jurors’

60. Jannis E. Goodnow, Investigating a Juror’s Claim of Racial Bias,
LITIGATION NEWS: FROM THE ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION (July 18, 2013),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/mobile/article-racialbias.html.
61. See Pond, supra note 57, at 244.
62. See Jessica L. West, 12 Racist Men: Post-Verdict Evidence of Juror
Bias, 27 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 165, 176–77 (2011).
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racial bias may be admissible under rare circumstances when
necessary to ensure that a defendant received a trial void of a jury
which was not impartial but instead biased against him due to his
race or ethnicity, that only twelve jurors are to deliberate unless
the parties can agree, and that provoking a defendant does not
entitle him to a jury instruction of defense to disorderly conduct.
Dana N. Weiner

DEROBBIO.SURVEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

SURVEY SECTION

4/20/2014 2:49 PM

895

Criminal Law. State v. DeRobbio, 62 A.3d 1113 (R.I. 2013). In an
unprecedented interpretation of the Edward O. Hawkins and Thomas C.
Slater Medical Marijuana Act, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a
dismissal of charges under the Act is premature absent an evidentiary
hearing at which each defendant has the burden of proving that he was in
possession of an amount of medical marijuana that conforms to the limits set
forth in the Act.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On January 21, 2010, Cranston police detectives surveilled
defendant Dean DeRobbio’s (“DeRobbio” or “Defendant”) home
prior to executing a search warrant. 1 When DeRobbio and coDefendant, Joseph Joubert (“Joubert” or “co-Defendant”) exited
the home, a Cranston police officer was directed to stop their
vehicle. 2 At this time, the officer notified the Defendants that he
had a warrant to search DeRobbio’s home.3 Both Defendants then
presented the officer with registry identification cards that were
issued to them under the Edward O. Hawkins and Thomas C.
Slater Medical Marijuana Act, G.L.1956 chapter 28.6 of title 21
(“the Act”). 4 The identification cards listed DeRobbio as a patient
and Joubert as his primary caregiver. 5 Joubert’s identification
card indicated that DeRobbio was his only patient. 6
After searching DeRobbio’s home, Cranston police discovered
“thirty-three marijuana plants; thirty-nine marijuana seedlings
without any visible buds; 31.8 grams of marijuana in a plastic
container in [DeRobbio’s] freezer; thirty-nine and six-tenths grams
of marijuana in a plastic freezer bag in the bedroom, two and fourtenths grams of marijuana in a sandwich bag; [and] twelve and
one-tenth grams of ‘burnt’ marijuana in a prescription bottle.” 7
1. State v. DeRobbio, 62 A.3d 1113, 1114 (R.I. 2013).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1114–15. Under the Act, a “registry identification card” is a
document issued by the Rhode Island Department of Health that identifies a
person as a registered qualifying patient or a registered primary caregiver.
Id. at 1115 n.3.
5. Id. at 1115.
6. Id.
7. Id. Police also found 40 Vicodin tablets throughout DeRobbio’s
home. See id. The legality of this search was not challenged by Defendants on
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Police reports stated that the mature marijuana plants and
seedlings were found in two separate “grow rooms” located in
DeRobbio’s basement.8 A total of eighty-five and nine-tenths
grams of marijuana was found in DeRobbio’s home, which is
equivalent to approximately 3.03 ounces of usable marijuana. 9
Police also found another registry identification card in
DeRobbio’s home that was issued to Joubert’s mother, Marie
Joubert (“Mrs. Joubert”), and listed her as DeRobbio’s primary
caregiver. 10 Police contacted Mrs. Joubert in reference to the
marijuana found in DeRobbio’s home and, according to police, she
stated that she knew about the marijuana plants located in
DeRobbio’s home and that twenty-four of the plants belonged to
her, though she could not specify which ones because she had not
actually witnessed them growing, nor had she ever been inside of
DeRobbio’s home. 11 She indicated that she was growing the
marijuana for two of her patients, DeRobbio and another whose
name she could not remember. 12
On June 7, 2010, as a result of the search of DeRobbio’s home,
Defendants were charged with possessing marijuana with intent
to deliver in violation of Rhode Island’s Uniform Controlled
Substance Act (“CSA”), G.L.1956 § 21-28-4.01(a)(4)(i),
manufacturing marijuana in violation of the same provision, and
conspiracy to violate the CSA. 13 On January 5, 2011, DeRobbio
moved to dismiss all counts, citing the affirmative defense and
dismissal provision set forth in the Act.14
Enacted in 2006 “to protect patients with debilitating medical
conditions, and their physicians and primary caregivers, from
arrest and prosecution, criminal and other penalties, and property
appeal. Id. at 1115 n.4.
8. Id. The two rooms were windowless and contained “fans, timers,
high-wattage lights, humidifiers, a ventilation system, filters, and a calendar
with a schedule indicating when to care for the plants.” Id.
9. Id. at 1115 n.5. This translation is relevant because the Act
quantifies “usable marijuana” in terms of ounces, not grams. Id.
10. Id. at 1115.
11. Id.
12. Id. Mrs. Joubert was not charged in connection with this matter. Id.
13. Id. at 1114. DeRobbio was also charged with committing a crime of
violence while having an available firearm in violation of § 11-47-3 and with
unlawful possession of Vicodin in violation of § 21-28-4.01(c)(2)(i), both of
which are not discussed in this case. Id.
14. Id. at 1115. Joubert later joined in this motion. Id.
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forfeiture if such patients engage in the medical use of
marijuana,” 15 the Act allows certain individuals identified by the
Rhode Island Department of Health (“DOH”) as qualifying
patients to possess “an amount of marijuana that does not exceed
twelve (12) mature marijuana plants and two and one-half (2.5)
Qualifying
ounces of usable marijuana” for medical use. 16
patients under the Act must have been diagnosed by “certain
medical practitioners as having a debilitating medical condition”
and must be issued a registry identification card by the DOH. 17
The Act also allows such patients to possess “a reasonable amount
of unusable marijuana, including up to twelve (12) seedlings”
which are not counted towards the limits laid out in the Act. 18
Under the Act, primary caregivers 19 may also possess “an
amount of marijuana which does not exceed twelve (12) mature
marijuana plants and two and one-half (2.5) ounces of usable
marijuana for each qualifying patient to whom he or she is
connected through the [DOH’s] registration process.” 20 However,
though a primary caregiver may assist up to five qualifying
patients, at no time may he or she possess more than twenty-four
marijuana plants or five ounces of usable marijuana for those
patients. 21 Further, a qualifying patient may have no more than
two primary caregivers. 22
The affirmative defense and dismissal provision of the Act
provides that a defendant may assert medical use of marijuana in
a motion to dismiss criminal charges of possessing marijuana. 23
The Act provides that the charges shall be dismissed following an
evidentiary hearing at which the defendant must show: (1) that
his or her practitioner has determined in his or her professional
opinion, and after having done a thorough assessment of the
patient’s health history and current medical condition, that the
15. Id.at 1115–16.
16. Id. at 1116 (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Primary caregivers are
defined under the Act as “a natural person at least twenty-one years of age
who has been issued a registry identification card from the DOH.” Id.
20. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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benefits of using marijuana for medical purposes would likely
outweigh the risks, and, (2) that the patient and the patient’s
primary caregiver, if any, were “collectively in possession of a
quantity of marijuana that was not more than what is permitted
under” the Act. 24
Citing this affirmative defense and dismissal provision,
Defendants argued that the amount of marijuana found in
DeRobbio’s home did not exceed what is collectively allowed under
the Act between a patient (DeRobbio) and his two caregivers
(Joubert and Mrs. Joubert). 25 Refuting the State’s argument that
the three collectively possessed three greater seedlings than
allowed under the Act with regard to useable marijuana, 26
Defendants argued that photographic evidence provided by the
State did not clearly identify which plants would constitute as
seedlings and which were simply “dead leaves.” 27 Further, the
Defendants argued that the Act does not specify a limit to the
amount of usable marijuana apart from seedlings, but rather only
requires the amount of usable marijuana that is possessed aside
from seedlings be “reasonable.” 28
In objecting to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the State
argued 29 that Defendants violated the possession limits set forth
under the Act because the Act does not allow for collective
possession of marijuana among qualifying patients and primary
caregivers. 30 As such, the State contended the entire amount
marijuana grown and found at DeRobbio’s home must be ascribed
solely to DeRobbio and could not be split up between DeRobbio,
Joubert, and Mrs. Joubert or viewed as being possessed
collectively by the three. 31 Accordingly, the amount DeRobbio
24. Id. at 1116–17.
25. Id. at 1117.
26. The Act allows for 12 seedlings per person, so collectively the
Defendants and Mrs. Joubert could lawfully possess a total of 36 seedlings.
However, 39 seedlings were found in DeRobbio’s home. Id at 1115.
27. Id. at 1117.
28. Id. DeRobbio and Joubert further argued that the language
“collectively in possession” was ambiguous, and, citing precedent from the
Court, argued that in cases where a criminal statute is deemed ambiguous,
the criminal information should be dismissed. Id.
29. The State conceded that both Defendants were valid medical
marijuana cardholders. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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possessed placed him in violation of the limits set forth in the
Act. 32 The State also argued that none of the plants could be
attributed to Mrs. Joubert as a primary caregiver because she
could not specifically identify which of the plants in DeRobbio’s
home were hers, she did not actually grow or care for any of the
plants, and she told police she had never been inside DeRobbio’s
home.33
On May 4, 2011, in a bench decision before the Superior
Court, the hearing justice granted the Defendants’ motion to
dismiss as to the criminal charges, interpreting the Act as
allowing collective possession among the Defendants and Mrs.
Joubert, and thus determining that the Defendants “lawfully
possess[ed] an authorized amount of marijuana plants and usable
marijuana.” 34 An order dismissing the charges was entered on
May 16, 2011. 35 The State filed a timely appeal. 36
On appeal, the State abandoned its argument that the Act
does not provide for collective possession among qualifying
patients and caregivers, but rather focused on the contention that,
even assuming collective possession was allowed, the Defendants
were still in violation of the limits allowed under the Act because
none of the marijuana found in DeRobbio’s home could be
attributed to Mrs. Joubert. 37 Consequently, according to the State,
the Defendants “could lawfully have possessed only twenty-four
mature plants,” when in fact thirty-three were discovered in
DeRobbio’s home. 38 The State applied the same line of reasoning
to Defendants’ possession of the seedlings, arguing that their
possession exceeded the limits set forth in the Act because none of
the seedlings could be properly attributed to Mrs. Joubert. 39
The Defendants responded to the State’s argument separately

32. Id. The State ascribed the same line of reasoning to Joubert,
arguing that because possession could not be split up amongst the three
individuals, he too was in violation of the limits set forth in the Act. Id. at
1117–18.
33. Id. at 1118.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.

DEROBBIO.SURVEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/20/2014 2:49 PM

900 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:895
on appeal. 40 Joubert argued that, assuming there were multiple
plausible interpretations of the statute, the hearing justice
“correctly interpreted the Act to defendants’ benefit.” 41 DeRobbio
relied on a similar argument of lenity and added that an
imposition of criminal liability under the Act would be
unconstitutional because it does not provide a fair warning to
criminal defendants.42 The Act, DeRobbio argued, does not
clearly or unambiguously prohibit collective growth of marijuana,
nor does it specify the level of involvement or participation that
each qualifying patient and primary caregiver must provide to
comply with the Act.43
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In determining whether the Superior Court erred in granting
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court looked to the plain
language of the affirmative defense and dismissal provision of the
Act, noting that the hearing justice was “bound by the terms of
that provision.” 44 Considering the terms of the provision to be
“abundantly clear,” 45 the Court determined that the charges
brought in a prosecution involving marijuana should only be
dismissed “following an evidentiary hearing,” that the defendant
has the burden of requesting, and at which the defendant has the
burden of proving that the requisite elements of the provision
have been met.46
The Court reasoned that because no evidence regarding the
requisite elements was presented by either of the parties at the
Superior Court’s hearing on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, no
evidentiary hearing was held, thus, the hearing justice’s decision
to dismiss the charges was “in contravention of the plain terms of
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1119.
44. Id. at 1119–20. The Court also recognized that a Constitutional
question may be at issue in this case regarding whether the Act is preempted
by a federal statute prohibiting the manufacture, distribution or possession of
marijuana even if it is being used for medical purposes. However, since
neither party raised the issue at the lower level or on appeal, the Court
declined to consider whether the Act would survive preemption. Id. at 1119.
45. Id. at 1120.
46. Id.

DEROBBIO.SURVEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

SURVEY SECTION

4/20/2014 2:49 PM

901

the Act.” 47 Regarding the dismissal as “premature,” the Rhode
Island Supreme Court vacated the judgment entered by the
Superior Court and instructed the hearing justice to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 48
COMMENTARY
The Court rightfully concluded that the plain language of the
affirmative defense and dismissal provision of the Act required the
Defendants to request an evidentiary hearing and prove at the
hearing that the requisite elements of the provisions have been
satisfied, thus warranting dismissal of criminal charges associated
with the possession of marijuana. What this decision fails to
address, and perhaps rightfully so, as it is not the issue before the
Court, is the clear ambiguity in the language of the provision. The
hearing justice recognized the ambiguity of the provision when he
granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, stating that the Act “is a
poorly-drafted statute . . . [and] a defendant [should not] be
criminally liable for inartful draftsmanship.” 49
A further indication of the ambiguity of the statute is the
State’s shift in focus on its arguments between the trial and
appellate levels. On appeal, the State abandoned one of its initial
contentions that the Act was not intended to allow collective
possession of marijuana amongst qualifying patients and primary
caregivers. Abandoning this argument suggests that the State’s
own understanding of the statute was at best questionable.
The State’s argument on appeal raises another point of
ambiguity latent in the affirmative defense and dismissal
provision of the Act that Defendants’ response on appeal also
addresses: assuming collective possession is allowed under the
provision, what level of involvement must a defendant show to
properly attribute possession to a qualifying patient or primary
caregiver? Must a qualifying patient and primary caregiver plant,
grow, care for, and harvest the marijuana for possession to be
properly attributed to him or her? Or is being registered as a
patient’s primary caregiver enough? These questions, though

47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1118.
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recognized in the Court’s opinion, remain unanswered following
this decision.
The decision does, however, provide precedent on an
important procedural aspect of the Act by irrefutably requiring
that any defendant seeking to invoke the defense and dismissal
provision of the Act request an evidentiary hearing, and
subsequently prove at the hearing that the requisite elements of
the provision have been met. Though seemingly apparent from
the plain language of the provision, there was obviously some
question as to the necessity of the evidentiary hearing if the
Rhode Island Supreme Court had to speak on the issue. Following
this decision, that question has been affirmatively resolved.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the plain
language of the affirmative defense and dismissal provision of the
Edward O. Hawkins and Thomas C. Slater Medical Marijuana Act
provides that dismissal of charges in prosecution involving
marijuana is only appropriate after an evidentiary hearing at the
request of the defendant, and at which, each defendant has the
burden of proving that the two requisite elements of the
affirmative defense and dismissal provision have been met.
Meghan L. Kruger
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Criminal Law. State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479 (R.I. 2013). The Rhode
Island Supreme Court concluded that under the Firearms Act statutory
definition, for an instrument to qualify as a “firearm,” it must either be
capable of expelling a projectile or be readily convertible to do so. The
defendant in this case, Adrian Hazard, was found to be in violation of his
probation due to possession of a firearm and attempting to elude the police.
As the revolver found in the defendant’s car was not within the antiquefirearms exemption allowed under the Firearms Act and could be readily
converted to expel a projectile, it qualified as a “firearm” under the Act.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On the evening of December 30, 2009, the Providence Police
received information that there would be a firearm inside of a gold
Volkswagen within their patrol area.1 Sometime later that night,
officers spotted a vehicle matching the earlier information
obstructing the flow of traffic. 2 When the officers put on their
cruiser lights and approached the vehicle it attempted to flee the
scene. 3 This gave way to a brief chase that ended with the vehicle
being cut off by another police cruiser.4
Upon stopping the vehicle, the officers found the defendant,
Arian Hazard (“Defendant”), in the driver’s seat with Carlos
Washington (“Washington”) in the passenger seat. 5 The two men
were taken into custody, and the officers later found a replica
Remington 1858 .44-caliber black powder revolver on the floor of
the vehicle. 6
At the time of his arrest, Defendant was on probation. 7 His
actions on the night of December 30, 2009 gave rise to a probation-

1. State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 482 (R.I. 2013).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
Defendant was on release from prison following a plea
agreement entered on November 8, 1996, where he plead guilty to one count
of manslaughter and one count of carrying a pistol without a license. As a
result, Defendant “was sentenced to thirty years for the manslaughter count,
with fifteen years to serve and the balance suspended, with probation, and a
consecutive ten-year term, suspended, with probation, for the firearms
conviction.” Id.
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violation hearing.8
At the hearing, Defendant, along with
Washington and Defendant’s close friend Camille Stokes
(“Stokes”), gave testimony on the events of the 30th. 9 They
claimed, among other things, that a police officer had approached
the car with his weapon drawn and that the gun in the car
belonged to Washington, who brought it unbeknownst to
Defendant.10 However, Washington’s testimony was in stark
contrast with the statement that he made earlier to Detective
Thomas Rawnsley, immediately following his arrest. 11 There
Washington acknowledged that the gun belonged to the
Defendant.12 Ultimately, the trial justice did not find these
witnesses to be credible based on “inconsistencies within each of
their statements” and “each hav[ing] a strong motivation to lie
based on their close relationships with [D]efendant.” 13
Accordingly, the lower court discerned that the revolver
belonged to the Defendant. 14 The trial justice next had to
determine whether the revolver fit within the definition of either
“firearm” or “pistol” under the Firearms Act (“Firearms Act” or
“the Act”), chapter 47 of title 11. 15 First, the trial justice found
the gun did not qualify as an antique firearm unsuitable for use
under § 11-47-25. 16 Next, the trial justice was satisfied that the
revolver could “be readily converted to expel a projectile,” which
qualified it as a “firearm” and “pistol” under the Act. 17 After
announcing that Defendant had violated his probation, the trial
justice ordered Defendant to serve ten years of the prior
suspended sentence. 18
Seeing as Defendant was still facing prosecution for recklessly
operating a motor vehicle, carrying a revolver without a license,

8. Id.
9. Id. at 482–83.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 483.
12. Id.
13. Id. The trial justice described Washington’s testimony as “a
perjurious effort to take the onus off his half[-]brother.” Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11–47–2(3) (2012); § 11–47–2(8)
16. Hazard, 68 A.3d at 483. Antique firearms, as defined, are “outside
the ambit of the [A]ct.” Id.
17. Id. at 484.
18. Id.
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and possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a crime
of violence, the state requested the trial justice revisit his earlier
interpretation of the Act. 19 Through a motion in limine, the state
asked the trial justice to construe the Act such that a weapon need
not be able to, or be readily convertible, to expel a projectile to
qualify as a “pistol” under § 11-47-2(8) and that a pistol is a per se
“firearm” under 11-47-2(3). 20 Also, the state wanted a ruling that
a “mere frame or receiver,” regardless of whether it can expel a
projectile or readily be converted to do so, constituted a “firearm”
under the Act. 21 The trial justice denied this motion, holding that
his initial interpretation of the Act at the probation-violation
hearing was correct. 22
Both Defendant and the state appealed, on separate grounds,
to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, assigning error to the trial
justice’s rulings in each of the underlying cases.23 On appeal, the
Court had to decide whether there had been error in (1) the trial
justice’s interpretation of the Firearms Act or (2) in the conclusion
that Defendant had violated his probation. 24
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Court took a two-pronged approach to the appeals, first
addressing the trial justice’s interpretation of the Firearms Act
and then turning to Defendant’s probation violation. 25
A. The Interpretation of the Firearms Act
The Court first addressed the state’s challenge to the trial
justice’s interpretation of the term “firearm,” as defined by § 1147-2(3). 26 The trial justice interpreted the language of the statute
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 484, 499.
26. Id. at 484. The Act defines a “firearm” as “any machine gun, pistol,
rifle, air rifle, air pistol, ‘blank gun,’ ‘BB gun,’ or other instrument from which
steel or metal projectiles are propelled, or which may readily be converted to
expel a projectile, except crossbows, recurve, compound, or longbows, and
except instruments propelling projectiles which are designed or normally
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to mean that the phrase “from which steel or metal projectiles are
propelled, or which may readily be converted to expel a projectile”
should apply to all of the preceding instruments. 27 The state
contended that under the last antecedent rule (“LAR”), which
required that qualifying words and phrases be applied solely to
the last antecedent in the statute, the qualifying phrase only
applied to the term “other instrument” rather than all the
instruments listed. 28
The Court “review[s] questions of statutory interpretation de
novo.” 29 The “ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the
act as intended by the Legislature,” by looking to the entire
statutory scheme to interpret an ambiguous terms or those terms
that, when looked at with “myopic literalism,” do not coincide with
the purpose of the statute as a whole. 30 Particularly, when
interpreting ambiguities in penal statutes it must be done in a
way that will “favor . . . the party upon whom a penalty is to be
imposed.” 31
Here, the Court viewed the state’s reliance on the LAR as
“sensible as a matter of grammar” but not dispositive of the
interpretation issue.32 In the one previous case where the Court
had invoked the LAR, it did so as an aid in reaching its final
decision, not as a standalone rule.33
When applied to the present case, the Court found that the
state’s position failed on three grounds. First, the Court found
that the trial justice’s interpretation was the most consistent with

used for a primary purpose other than as a weapon. The frame or receiver of
the weapon shall be construed as a firearm under the provisions of this
section.” R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11–47–2(3).
27. Id. at 485.
28. Id. at 485–86.
29. Id. (citing Campbell v. State, 56 A.3d 448, 454 (R.I. 2012)).
30. Id. (citing Alessi v. Bowen Court Condominium, 44 A.3d 736, 740
(R.I. 2012); Mendes v. Factor, 41 A.3d 994, 1002 (R.I. 2012); In re Brown, 903
A.2d 147, 150 (R.I. 2006)).
31. Id. (citing State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558, 571 (R.I. 2009) (quoting
State v. Smith. 766 A.2d 913, 924 (R.I. 2001)). This is referred to as the “rule
of lenity.” Id. at 492.
32. Id. at 487 (describing the LAR as flexible).
33. Id. (citing State v. Brown, 486 A.2d 595, 600 (R.I. 1985) (using
“intent and purpose of th[e] statute” to determine the terms in their correct
context)).
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the structure of the entire statute. 34 Second, the Court reasoned
that since the General Assembly chose to include the word “other”
in the last antecedent “other instrument,” it appeared to have
wanted to include all the delineated instruments in a subset to
which the qualifying phrase would apply.35 If, as the state
contends, the qualifying clause was only meant to apply to “other
instruments” then the Legislature could have chosen to include a
second “or,” one to conclude the first subset and another to which
the qualifying phrase would apply. 36 Finally, the Court held that
the legislative history of the Act implied that the General
Assembly intended to make the possession and use of weapons
that could fire a projectile illegal, and the subsequent history
showed no intent to broaden this initial thrust.37
However, although the state’s LAR argument could not “alone
carry the day” the Court did find that the statute, § 11-47-2(3),
was ambiguous as it presented two reasonable interpretations.38
Since the statute in question, the Firearms Act, is penal in nature,
the rule of lenity compels the Court to resolve any ambiguity in
favor of the party facing punishment under its application. 39 If,
as the state contended, the General Assembly had intended the
Act to include weapons which could not expel a projectile then “it
34. Id. at 487. The modifying clause “from which steel or metal
projectiles are propelled, or which may readily be converted to expel a
projectile” is found at the end of a single “integrated list” of instruments, and
as the modifier applies to at least one of the antecedents, it is “more
plausible” “that it in fact applies to all” of the instruments and not only the
last antecedent, “other instrument.” Id. See also United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336, 337 (1971) (holding that the qualifying phrase “in commerce or
affecting commerce” would apply to all the antecedent terms “receives,
possesses, or transports,” not only the last antecedent). The Court here relied
upon this reasoning. Id. at 487.
35. Id. at 489.
36. Id. The court compared the present case with State v. Brown, 486
A.2d 595 (R.I. 1985): there, where the Court applied the LAR, the General
Assembly had included the term “or” twice to create two categories of offenses
that constituted racketeering activity making the invocation of the LAR
“perfectly consistent with the thrust of the statutory language.” Hazard, 68
A.3d at 489 (citing Brown, 486 A.2d at 600).
37. Hazard, 68 A. 3d at 491. Looking back at the amendments that have
been made to the Act, the Court commented that “there is nothing . . . that
suggests [an] inten[t] to extend the . . . prohibitions to instruments that can
neither fire a bullet nor be readily converted to do so.” Id.
38. Id. at 491–492.
39. Id. at 492 (citing State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558, 571 (R.I. 2009)).
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was incumbent upon [them] to express that intent clearly and
unambiguously.” 40 Here, because the General Assembly had not
done so and the rule of lenity required the Court to interpret the
statute in favor of a criminal defendant, non-firing weapons had to
be excluded.41
Beyond the LAR argument, the state advanced two ancillary
arguments in support of its position. First, that the interpretation
by the trial justice, as it relates to pistols, created a prerequisite
that the Legislature had deliberately avoided, and second, that
the last sentence of § 11-47-2(3) was inconsistent with the trial
justice’s interpretation of the first sentence.42
As to the first argument, the definition the state relied on in §
11-47-2(8) was silent on the issue of whether a “pistol” need be
able to fire a projectile. 43 In light of this, the Court reasoned that
the definition found in § 11-47-2(8) was meant to supplement,
rather than supplant, the definition found in § 11-47-2(3).44 The
Court was in “full agreement with the trial justice” in determining
that that “any pistol that cannot expel a projectile or is not readily
able to be converted to expel a projectile is not covered under the
statute.” 45
Secondly, the state contended that the second sentence of §
11-47-2(3), which provides that “[t]he frame or receiver of the
weapon shall be construed as a firearm,” does not conform with
the trial justice’s requirement that a pistol must be “operable or be
readily converted to operability.” 46 However, the Court viewed
the idea of allowing the second sentence to control the

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 492–93. The last sentence reads that a “frame or receiver of
the weapon shall be construed as a firearm under the provisions of this
section.” R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-2(3).
43. Id.
44. Hazard, 68. A.3d at 493.
45. Id. at 493–94. This interpretation was in line with the Court’s
jurisprudence found in State v. Benevides; there, a pistol that was discarded
was found to have broken upon being ejected from a vehicle and there the
state needed to prove the operability of the pistol prior to its ejection as an
essential element. 425 A.2d 77, 79–80 (R.I. 1981). Since the state had to
prove operability there, it must be required under § 11-47-2(3). Hazard, 68
A.3d at 495.
46. Id. at 495.
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interpretation of the first as a “backwards approach.” 47
The Court addressed one final aspect of the trial justice’s
interpretation requiring that under § 11-47-2(3) “a frame or
receiver of a weapon must either be capable of expelling a
projectile or be readily convertible to do so in order to qualify as a
‘firearm.’” 48 The state asserted that the language was “clear and
unambiguous” with relation to whether a frame or receiver will be
a weapon. 49 Ultimately, the Court did not agree with the state’s
proposed interpretation, looking to the fact that the limited text
the state presented from the Act does not define “the weapon.” 50
The Court reasoned that the term “weapon” was defined by the
first sentence of § 11-47-2(3). 51 Therefore, the trial justice was
correct in determining “that the frame or receiver must either be
able to expel a projectile or be readily convertible to do so in order
to qualify as a firearm.” 52
B.

Defendant’s Probation Violation

Defendant asked the Court to vacate the trial justice’s
determination that he had violated the conditions of his probation
and remand the matter with instructions for a lesser sentence. 53
To do this the Court would have to overturn both findings that the
possession of a firearm was a violation of Defendant’s probation
and that the eluding charge was sufficient to violate the terms and
conditions of Defendant’s probation. 54
With respect to the Firearms Act violation, the Defendant
contended that the pistol in question qualified as an “antique

47. Id. The lack of the operability clause in the second sentence does not
apply to the items listed in the first. Id.
48. Id. at 496.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 496. “The frame or receiver of the weapon shall be construed
as a firearm under the provisions of this section.” R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-472(3).
51. Hazard, 68 A.3d at 498.
52. Id. The Court relied upon the federal case of United States v.
Wonschik, which was also interpreting a firearms statute to read that the
frame or receiver must fall within the aforementioned definition. See 353
F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2004); Hazard, 68 A.3d at 498.
53. Hazard, 68 A.3d at 499.
54. Id. at 499, 501.
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firearm” as defined in § 11-47-25. 55 However, although both sides
stipulate that the pistol is an “antique firearm” as defined by 18
U.S.C § 921, which the General Assembly incorporated in § 11-472(1), the Act also required that to be exempt the antique firearm
must be “unsuitable for use.” 56 Here, the testimony of multiple
parties at trial supported the notion that the revolver could,
without difficulty, be made suitable for use. 57 Thus, the revolver
was a suitable “firearm” and “pistol” under the Act, supporting the
trial justice’s determination that the revolver was removed from
the antique firearms exemption.58
As the firearm was outlawed by the Act, the trial justice found
that Defendant had been the one in possession of the revolver. 59
The determination that Washington was lying when he claimed
possession of the revolver was supported by his previous
statement to a detective following his arrest. 60 Accordingly, there
was substantial evidence to uphold Defendant’s probation
violation, and the Court affirmed both the trial justice’s
determination that the revolver was not exempted by the Act and
that it was in Defendant’s possession at the time of his arrest. 61
Laslty, as a trial justice has wide discretion in sentencing, the
Court found that the justice here was within his purview in
sentencing Defendant to ten (10) years. 62
Justices Flaherty and Indeglia filed an opinion both
concurring in part and dissenting in part. 63 In the opinion, they
concur with the majority’s opinion on the probation issue, but they
dissent from the Court’s stance on the interpretation issue.64
They believed that the statute was unambiguous and presented
policy arguments suggesting that not all the instruments
55. Id. at 499. If a firearm qualifies as an “antique firearm” under the
Act then it is exempt from its regulations. Id. at 500.
56. Id. at 500.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 500–01.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 501 (reviewing the trial justice’s determination under an
“arbitrary or capricious” standard). The Court also affirmed the trial justice’s
finding that Defendant had eluded police intentionally and that this alone
was a violation of Defendant’s probation. Id.
62. Id. (citing State v. Roberts, 59 A.3d 693, 697 (R.I. 2013)).
63. Id. at 501 (Flaherty, J. & Indeglia J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 502–04 (Flaherty, J. & Indeglia J., dissenting).
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enumerated in that Act need to be able, or readily convertible, to
expel a projectile to fall within the legislative intent. 65
COMMENTARY
The Court made a reasonable interpretation of the relevant
language within the Firearms Act while properly upholding
Defendant’s probation violation and subsequent sentencing. With
respect to the Act, the Court found a well-based rationale both in
the legislative history and by looking to the statutory scheme as a
whole to uphold Superior Court Associate Justice Krause’s
diligent interpretations. Moreover, the Court put little credence
in Defendant’s argument for vacating the results of his probation
violation. In fact, Defendant himself seemed unsure of his
position, arguing different theories in his papers and at oral
arguments.66
In the dissenting opinion, Justices Flaherty and Indeglia
made a compelling argument for a contrary finding on the
interpretation issue of whether a firearm needs to be operable or
readily convertible to do so. 67 Perhaps the most compelling of the
arguments advanced by the dissent was the idea that, as it relates
to felons, the Act was not meant to include that the “firearm” be
operable since there is a significant policy concern in keeping
dangerous weapons out of the hands of felons. 68
The dissent illustrates this disparity with an example of a
bank robbery in which a blank gun is used. 69 One cannot
rationally expect the victim to discern whether the gun can is
capable of shooting bullets or merely a blank gun. Also, the
possibility for the use of deadly force is still quite high as
responding police officers or the victim could mistake an
inoperable weapon for a functioning one and respond
accordingly. 70

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. (Flaherty, J. & Indeglia J., dissenting).
See id. at 499.
Id. at 501–04 (Flaherty, J. & Indeglia J., dissenting).
Id. at 503 (Flaherty, J. & Indeglia J., dissenting).
Id. (Flaherty, J. & Indeglia J., dissenting).
Id. (Flaherty, J. & Indeglia J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed both the trial
justice’s interpretations of the Firearms Act as well as his
conclusion that Defendant had violated the terms of his probation,
resulting in a ten year sentence. 71
Wm. Maxwell Daley

71.

Id. at 501.
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Criminal Law. State v. Moten, 64 A.3d 1232 (R.I. 2013). A defendant who
wishes to appeal an evidentiary ruling must have raised and articulated the
issue at trial through more than a general objection in order to preserve that
issue for appellate review; if the defendant fails to raise the issue at trial,
then that issue is waived. However, a narrow exception exists regarding the
“raise or waive” rule, which allows the error as long as the error is more than
harmless and originates from a novel rule of law that counsel could not have
reasonably known about during trial. The novel rule of law requirement is
narrowly construed and may arise from a single case The application of the
novel rule does not need to be cemented at the time; it is enough that the
novel rule was established in a single case.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Nashya Moten (“Nashya”), the child of Amie Costa (“Ms.
Costa”) and Defendant Jeffrey Moten (“Moten”), was almost five
months old when the events of November 23, 2005 occurred. 1 Ms.
Costa, Moten, and Nashya lived in an apartment in Providence
with three dogs. 2 That morning, Ms. Costa left Nashya at the
apartment with Moten and went to work. 3 When Ms. Costa
returned to the apartment after work around 3:30 that afternoon,
Nashya made “weird scream/cry” sounds and when Ms. Costa
picked her up, Nashya’s “eyes were stuck in the [upper right]
corner of her head not moving, not following any verbal sounds.” 4
Ms. Costa called her pediatrician who recommended that Ms.
Costa immediately take Nashya to the hospital. 5
On November 23, Dr. Nancy Harper (“Dr. Harper”) was on
call at the hospital when a resident telephoned her because the
resident was “very worried” about Nashya who was currently
experiencing “seizures and a headache” and her “eyes were
straight upwards and not moving.” 6 Dr. Harper became “quite
concerned” when she examined Nashya’s CAT scan and observed
1. State v. Moten, 64 A.3d 1232, 1235 (R.I. 2013).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Dr. Harper is a board-certified pediatrician and a fellow in the Child
Protection Program at R.I. Hospital; Dr. Harper also testified at trial as both
a fact and expert witness in the field of child pediatrics and child abuse
pediatrics. Id. at 1235–36.
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“too much fluid around the brain, which is concerning for subdural
hemorrhages.” 7 Dr. Harper consulted with other physicians
throughout
her
treatment
of
Nashya,
including
an
ophthalmologist who was on duty that night and performed a
“dilated eye exam” on Nashya which found that Nashya had
“extensive retinal hemorrhages that covered the entire back of the
eye” which could cause blindness. 8 Later that night, Dr. Harper, a
mandatory reporter of child abuse and neglect, contacted the
Department of Children, Youth and Families to report the
incident.9 Moten was charged with felony child abuse.10
Moten gave a statement to police later that night at 12:40
a.m. 11 He stated that he and Nashya took a nap together later
that afternoon and when he woke up he used the bathroom,
leaving Nashya in the bed. 12 While in the bathroom, he stated
that he heard the dogs moving around and then heard Nashya fall
out of the bed and scream. 13 Moten told police that Nashya did
not bleed nor did she have any marks or bruises. 14 When Ms.
Costa came home from work, Moten told her “that the dogs did
it.” 15
At trial, Dr. Harper testified as a fact witness and also as an
expert witness. During Dr. Harper’s testimony concerning the
ophthalmologist’s report to her, defense counsel objected, which
the trial judge immediately sustained.16 The prosecutor then
continued his questioning of Dr. Harper:
“Q: In other cases, you’ve reviewed eye exams with
7. Id. at 1236–37.
8. Id. at 1237.
9. Id. at 1236.
10. Id. at 1234 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 11-9-5.3(b)(1)–(c)(4) which
defines child abuse as “a person having care of a child . . . knowingly or
intentionally . . . inflicts upon [that] child serious bodily injury”). Serious
bodily injury is further defined as “physical injury that . . . [e]vidences
subdural hematoma, intercranial hemorrhage and/or retinal hemorrhages as
signs of ‘shaken baby syndrome’ and/or ‘abusive head trauma.’” Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Specifically, Dr. Harper described the exam the ophthalmologist
performed on Nashya and stated “[h]e completed the evaluation and came
and talked with me and reported to me that [Nashya] had . . .” when defense
counsel objected. Id. at 1236.
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ophthalmologists, correct?
“A: That is correct.
“Q: And do you need this information for a complete
assessment of Nashya?
“A: Yes
“Q: And did you need it to further your information for
the treatment of Nashya, as well as the diagnosis?
“A: Yes.
“Q: And what did he tell you.
“DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY: Objection
“THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer” 17
Dr. Harper then testified about details of Nashya’s condition
as being “consistent with abusive head trauma” and that there
was “no medical, organic or other [reason] for her injuries other
than inflicted injury.” 18
On December 5, 2006, the jury found Moten guilty of first
degree child abuse. 19 Moten’s motion for a new trial was denied,
and on May 10, 2007, he was sentenced to twenty years, eighteen
to serve and two years suspended with probation, plus one
hundred hours of community service. 20 Moten appealed, claiming
that the State violated his constitutional right of confrontation
when Dr. Harper testified about the ophthalmologist’s report to
her. 21 Moten claimed this testimony was testimonial evidence,
and therefore, Dr. Harper should not have been allowed to testify
about the ophthalmologist’s report because Moten did not have an
opportunity to cross-examine the ophthalmologist. 22

17. Id. at 1236–37.
18. Id. at 1237.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1237–38. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and
Article 1, Section 10 of the R.I. Constitution “guarantee individuals accused
of criminal charges the right to confront and cross-examine any adverse
witness who testify against them.” Id. (citation omitted).
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Supreme Court reviewed Moten’s appeal de novo because
of its evidentiary nature and applied its “long adhered to” rule of
“raise or waive,” denoting that “an issue that has not been raised
and articulated previously at trial is not properly preserved for
appellate review.” 23 In order to be a properly raised evidentiary
appeal, “a general objection is not sufficient . . . assignments of
error must be set forth with sufficient particularity to call the trial
justice’s attention to the basis of the objection.” 24
Moten’s sole issue raised on appeal was that he was denied
his constitutional right of confrontation.25 Moten argued that
when defense counsel objected the second time during trial, that
objection was based on Moten’s “inability to confront [Dr.
Harper].” 26 The Court, however, did not find this argument
persuasive because defense counsel merely offered a general
objection and based on the “raise or waive” rule, “an objection
without explanation is insufficient to preserve an issue on
appeal.” 27
Nevertheless, the Court noted that it has established a
“narrow exception” to the “raise or waive” rule. First, for the
exception to apply “the alleged error must be more than harmless,
and the exception must implicate an issue of constitutional
dimension derived from a novel rule of law that could not
reasonably have been known to counsel at the time of trial.” 28
Moten argued that the novel rule of law in contention here was
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Crawford v. Washington which established a new approach to
Confrontation Clause challenges stating that “[w]here testimonial
evidence is at issue, the Sixth Amendment demands . . .
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” 29
Here, the Court found that Crawford could not be a novel rule of
law applied to Moten’s case because Crawford was decided more
23. Id. at 1238.
24. Id. (quoting Union Station Associates v. Rossie, 862 A.2d 185, 192
(R.I. 2004)).
25. Id. at 1238.
26. Id. at 1239.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1240 (quoting State v. Breen, 767 A.2d 50, 57 (R.I. 2001)).
29. Id. at 1240–41 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124
(2004)).
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than two-and-a-half years before Moten’s trial. 30
Nonetheless, Moten argued that Crawford was not the novel
rule of law, but that two cases decided after Crawford were
“intervening decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
[that] established a novel constitutional doctrine.” 31 MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts held that affidavits from analysts at a state
laboratory relating to a defendant’s drug charge were “testimonial
evidence” under Crawford; Bullcoming v. New Mexico held that
the admittance into evidence of a certified blood alcohol
concentration report through the testimony by a scientist who had
not conducted the actual analysis of the defendant’s blood alcohol
concentration was testimonial evidence. 32 Moten argued that
both subsequent cases expanded the rule announced in Crawford
by defining lab reports as “testimonial evidence.” 33 However, the
Court disagreed with Moten’s argument and found that MelendezDiaz and Bullcoming simply applied the rule established in
Crawford, and therefore, did not constitute a novel rule of law.34
The Court further noted that Moten’s argument confused a novel
constitutional rule of law with a recognized rule of law applied to a
novel fact pattern.35 Moten argued in his brief that “an objective
witness [would] reasonably believe that the resident’s statements
would be available for use at a later trial,” and that these
statements were recognized as testimonial evidence subject to the
Confrontation Clause test as established in Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming.36 However, the Court dismissed this argument
because that exact contention was formulated in Crawford, and
therefore, Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming simply applied the rule
already recognized in Crawford. 37
Justice Flaherty and Justice Indeglia dissented in part and
concurred in part.38 The Justices concurred in the final holding
majority: that Dr. Harper’s testimony did not violate the
30. Id. at 1241.
31. Id. (referring to Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305
(2009) and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1242.
36. Id.
37. Id. (Flaherty, J., & Indeglia, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 1243. (Flaherty, J., & Indeglia, J., dissenting).
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Confrontation Clause. 39 However, the Justices disagreed with the
analysis the majority employed; the Justices argued that
Crawford, while it established a new rule of law, left much to be
determined. 40 They further argued that the holding in Crawford
was vague and did not establish “the precise contours of what is
and what is not ‘testimonial evidence.’” 41 Justice Flaherty
reasoned that the full application of Crawford was not known
until after it had been applied in the subsequent cases of
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. 42 Therefore, Morten could not
have reasonably known at trial the full extent of Crawford’s
application to his case. 43 Accordingly, the Justices argued that
this evidentiary issue “employed novel applications to an
unsettled rule of law” and suggested the majority should have
applied the primary purpose test to Morten’s case to determine if
the statements the ophthalmologist made to Dr. Harper were
testimonial.44 In their analysis of the ophthalmologist’s report,
the Justices found that the primary purpose of the report was to
“resolve an ongoing medical emergency—to wit, damage to the
baby’s eye sight and the potential threat of blindness.” 45 The
dissenting justices ultimately found the ophthalmologist’s report
was not testimonial, and Dr. Harper’s testimony concerning the
report did not violate the Confrontation Clause.46
COMMENTARY
In holding that Moten did not fall within the parameters of
the narrow exception of novel rule of law to the “raise or waive”
rule, the Court construed the exception even more narrowly. 47
The Court’s interpretation of “novel” is extremely restrictive. The
result of the Court’s interpretation of “novel” will be a drastic
limitation in the number of cases that are preserved for appeal
through the novel rule of law exception. The purpose behind the
novel rule exception to the “raise or waive” rule is fairness. Here,
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. (Flaherty, J., & Indeglia, J., concurring).
Id. at 1244. (Flaherty, J., & Indeglia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Flaherty, J., & Indeglia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Flaherty, J., & Indeglia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1245. (Flaherty, J., & Indeglia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1245–46. (Flaherty, J., & Indeglia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1248. (Flaherty, J., & Indeglia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Flaherty, J., & Indeglia, J., dissenting).
Id at 1240.
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the effect of the Court’s opinion puts fairness aside in favor of
efficiency.
An attorney now has to have the foresight to predict the
application of the novel rule of law to his current set of facts. In so
doing, the Court has drastically narrowed an attorney’s ability to
appeal and thus, has infringed on the fairness that the “raise or
waive” rule purports to embody. Apparently, now, a lawyer has to
anticipate the application of a novel constitutional rule to his
specific case before the rule is actually applied in a subsequent
case in order to preserve the issue for appeal. Yes, Crawford was
announced two years before Moten’s case came to trial, but both
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming were important and decisive
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence that clarified the
meaning of “testimonial evidence.” 48 These two cases not only
clarified the rule announced in Crawford but expanded the rule to
include certified forensic and analyst reports with the requirement
that the person testifying to the reports was the person who also
conducted the tests. This definition of “testimonial evidence” was
not established law at the time of Moten’s trial, and therefore,
would have been a novel rule of law.
The dissenting justices pointed out that, at the time of
Moten’s trial, the rule set forth in Crawford was “unsettled” and
that such an unsettled rule of law is synonymous with a novel rule
of law. 49 The purpose of the novel rule exception to “raise or
waive” is that an attorney cannot possibly be held to make a
particularized objection at trial to a rule that was not known at
the time of trial. The Court’s decision in Moten confines the idea
of “novel” to a completely undeveloped area of law, thereby
effectively nullifying the “novel rule of law” appeal preservation.

CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an issue or
objection raised at trial must be articulated and more than a mere
general objection is required in order to preserve that issue or
objection for appeal.50 A party who fails to particularize an
48.
49.
50.

Id at 1244 (Flaherty, J. & Indeglia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1245 (Flaherty, J. & Indeglia, J., dissenting).
Id at 1238.
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objection at trial is deemed to have waived that issue. 51 Also, the
Court held that the narrow exception to “raise or waive” rule
states the error must be more than harmless and derive from a
novel rule of law that counsel could not have reasonably known at
trial. 52 The Court further held the exception does not apply when
the defendant is merely applying a novel fact to an established
rule of law. 53
Melissa Wood

51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id at 1240.
Id.
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Criminal Law. State v. Poulin, 66 A.3d 419 (R.I. 2013). The Rhode Island
Supreme Court addressed whether pleading nolo contendere to a felony
charge and then, afterward, successfully completing a term of probation was
a “conviction” for the purposes of the sealing statutes, specifically R.I. Gen.
Laws §12-1-12 and §12-1-12.1. The Court held that pleading nolo
contendere to a felony charge followed by a successfully completed term of
probation did not constitute a “conviction” for the purposes of sealing
records regarding subsequent dismissed misdemeanor complaints.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In January of 1996, Doris E. Poulin (“defendant”) pleaded
nolo contendere to one felony count of possession of a controlled
substance.1 In exchange for her plea, defendant was placed on a
two year probation and was required to fulfill specific conditions,
all of which she undisputedly complied with.2 Defendant was
subsequently charged with a misdemeanor offense, which was
dismissed in July of 1996. 3 Years later, in December of 2009,
defendant was arrested and charged with an additional
misdemeanor offense, which was dismissed in February of 2010. 4
In accordance with R.I. Gen. Laws §12-1-12.1, defendant moved to
have the records related to her two misdemeanor offenses sealed,
as well as the law-enforcement records relating to these offenses
destroyed. 5 The Sixth Division District Court denied defendant’s
sealing motions and concluded that “the prior drug offense for
which defendant was placed on probation was, for the purposes of
§12-1-12.1, a conviction”; therefore, defendant was barred from
having her two misdemeanor offenses expunged from her record. 6
1. State v. Poulin, 66 A.3d 419, 421 (R.I. 2013).
2. Id. Along with defendant’s two-year probation, the plea bargain
conditions required defendant to complete a substance abuse program and to
perform 100 hours of community service. Id.
3. Id. Defendant was charged with the misdemeanor offense of
operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license. Id.
4. Id. Defendant was charged with the misdemeanor offense of driving
under the influence. Id.
5. Id. at 421–22; see R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-1-12.1(a) (2002) (providing that
“[a]ny person who is acquitted or otherwise exonerated of all counts in a
criminal case, including, but not limited to, dismissal or filing of a no true bill
or no information, may file a motion for the sealing of his or her court records
in the case, provided, that no person who has been convicted of a felony shall
have his or her court records sealed pursuant to this section”).
6. Poulin, 66 A.3d at 422; see R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-1-12.1(a) (2002). “The
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In April of 2013, defendant filed a petition for certiorari to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court against the State of Rhode Island
(“State”). 7 The defendant sought review of a decision from the
District Court, which denied her motions to seal records relating
to two dismissed misdemeanor offenses.8
The Rhode Island Supreme Court granted the defendant’s
petition for certiorari in order to decide “whether a plea of nolo
contendere to a felony charge followed by a successfully completed
term of probation constituted a conviction for the purposes of the
sealing statutes,” specifically §12-1-12 and §12-1-12.1.9 The
defendant advanced several arguments in support of her
The defendant argued “that the plain and
contentions.10
unambiguous language of the relevant statutes” dictated her
entitlement to have the court files from her dismissed
misdemeanor offenses sealed and all the records relating to those
offenses destroyed.11 The defendant also argued that because the
sealing and expungement statutes are “separate and distinct in
both purpose and design” the court should treat each statute
unrelated to the other. 12 Additionally, the defendant asserted
that the sealing statute does not conflict with the recording
statutem because the recording statute, alone, imposes a duty of
record keeping on the Attorney General. 13 Comparatively, the
State argued that pleading nolo contendere to a felony charge
followed by probation “constitutes a felony conviction” and, thus,
bars a defendant from receiving any benefits of the sealing
statute.14 In support of its argument, the State asserted that “the
trial judge explained that it would not be logical for the definition of
‘conviction’ to differ as between the sealing and expungement statutes,”
especially when the two statutes were “somewhat intertwined.” Poulin, 66
A.3d at 422 (internal quotation marks omitted).
7. Id. at 421.
8. Id.
9. Poulin, 66 A.3d at 422; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-18-3(a) (2002)
(providing that “[w]henever any person shall be arraigned before the district
court or superior court and shall plead nolo contendere, and the court places
the person on probation pursuant to §12-18-1, then upon the completion of
the probationary period, and absent a violation of the terms of the probation,
the plea and probation shall not constitute a conviction for any purpose”).
10. Poulin, 66 A.3d at 422.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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plain wording and statutory structure of chapter 1 of title 12” led
to its conclusion, which also was supported by the Rhode Island
Supreme Court’s precedent regarding the meaning of conviction.15
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s review of a case granted
on “certiorari is limited to an examination of ‘the record to
determine if an error of law has been committed.’” 16 In examining
a record for judicial error, the Court reviews the entire record in
order to determine if there is legally competent evidence to
support the justice’s findings.17 The Court “reviews questions of
statutory construction and interpretation de novo.” 18 In addition,
the Court interprets statutes “literally and gives the words their
plain and ordinary meanings,” especially when such statutes
contain clear, unambiguous language.19
The Court pointed out that, although at their most basic level
sealing and expungement statutes relate to the destruction or
elimination of certain criminal records and/or convictions, the
actual provisions of the two statutory schemes differ in obvious
ways. 20 The Court noted that sealing motions, under §12-1-12
and §12-1-12.1, are made “with respect to an acquittal and in
cases that have been dismissed in circumstances amounting to an
exoneration,” while expungement motions relate to criminal
dispositions and are available only to first offenders.21
Furthermore, “[b]y enacting separate and distinct statutory
15. Id. at 422–23. Specifically, the State argued that chapter 1 of title
12 leads to the conclusion that a plea of nolo contendere followed by a
probation does in fact constitute a conviction for the purposes of the sealing
statute. Id.
16. Id. at 423 (quoting State v. Greenberg, 951 A.2d 481, 489 (R.I.
2008)).
17. See id.; Brown v. State, 841 A.2d 1116, 1121 (R.I. 2004) (quoting
Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 787 A.2d 1191, 1193 (R.I.
2002)).
18. Poulin, 66 A.3d at 423.
19. Id. See also State v. Briggs, 58 A.3d 164, 168 (R.I. 2013) (clarifying
that the Court must consider the entire statute as a whole and that,
furthermore, individual sections are considered in the content of the entire
statutory scheme); Curtis v. State, 996 A.2d 601, 604 (R.I. 2010) (noting that
“it is generally presumed that the General Assembly ‘intended every word of
a statute to have a useful purpose and to have some force and effect’”).
20. Poulin, 66 A.3d at 423–24.
21. Id. at 424; see R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-1-12, 12.1(a)(2002).
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provisions, the Legislature plainly elected to treat these cases
differently.” 22
Correspondingly, §12-18-3(a) states that when an individual
pleads nolo contendere to a felony charge and, in return, receives
probation, “the plea and probation shall not constitute a conviction
for any purpose.” 23 In essence, the statute forbids the State from
preventing the sealing of records in a dismissed misdemeanor
offense case. 24 Furthermore, nothing in §12-1-12 or §12-1-12.1
states that a plea of nolo contendere followed by probation should
be deemed a conviction. 25 Moreover, “a plea of nolo contendere
followed by probation does not preclude a defendant from sealing
his or her records.” 26 In addition, the Court summarized the
underlying policy by stating that, “in the sealing context, the
affected person has been acquitted or exonerated, whereas a
person seeking to have his or her records expunged has not. Thus,
sealing should be more widely available to those individuals than
to those seeking to have their records expunged.” 27
Here, the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere and
successfully complied with the conditions of her probation
sentence.28 Accordingly, the Court found that this plea did not
constitute a conviction for the purpose of the sealing statute. 29
COMMENTARY
This case presents an example of how the interpretation of
statutes can vary greatly amongst individuals. The Court reached
a fair decision regarding the intent of the legislature in creating
and enacting separate and distinct statutes, one for expungements
and another for sealings. The Court reasoned that the intent of
the legislature in creating and enacting separate and distinct
statutes was to treat such statutes, and the coinciding cases that
they will concern, differently. The Court recognized that each
statute provides its own set of individual rules, regulations, and
qualifications, and, if they were to be interpreted similarly, such
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id. at 425 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-18-3(a) (2002)).
Poulin, 66 A.3d at 425.
Id.; see R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-1-12, 12.1(a) (2002).
Poulin, 66 A.3d at 425.
Id.
Id. at 426.
Id. at 425.
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interpretation would eliminate the purpose of having two distinct
statutes. Furthermore, the Court indicated that, although at a
fundamental level the two statutes may be confused with one
another, by examining the two statutes in-depth, the difference
between the two becomes both evident and significant. 30
Finally, the Court clarified the proper meaning of conviction
within the statutes at issue. In clarifying the meaning of
conviction, the Court provided the necessary guidelines in order
for a defendant to obtain relief under each statute when sought.
Now, under the rationale of the Supreme Court, if an individual
pleads nolo contendere to a felony charge, followed by a
successfully completed term of probation, such actions do not
constitute a conviction for the purposes of the sealing statute, and,
furthermore, that individual may still get the records pertaining
to his or her dismissed misdemeanor offenses sealed.
CONCLUSION
The Court concluded that defendant had not been convicted of
a felony for purposes of the sealing statutes, met all of the
statutory requirements of the statutes, and, therefore, was
entitled to the benefits provided for in those enactments.31
Accordingly, the Court found that it was an error “to deny the
defendant’s motion to seal all records pertaining to her two
dismissed misdemeanor arrests.” 32 The Court concluded that the
judgment of the District Court was overruled by asserting that it
be “quashed.” 33
Alexsa Marino

30. Id. at 424 (clarifying that “a motion to seal is made with respect to
an acquittal and in cases that have been dismissed, while a motion for
expungement relates to a criminal disposition”).
31. Id. at 425–26.
32. Id. at 426.
33. Id.
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Criminal Law. State v. Santos, 62 A.3d 314 (R.I. 2013). A police officer
possessing specific and articulable facts that justify a reasonable belief that a
suspect is armed and dangerous is justified in conducting a pat-down frisk.
Similarly, where a police officer has a reasonable belief based on specific
and articulable facts that a non-arrested suspect is dangerous and may gain
immediate control of a weapon from a vehicle, the officer may conduct a
limited search of the vehicle for weapons under the protective-search
doctrine. An investigatory detention, distinct from an arrest, may involve
handcuffing and placing a suspect in the back of a police cruiser, should
such an intrusion be reasonable under all of the facts and not a ruse to justify
a search.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On April 24, 2010, Officer Bethany Dolock of the South
Kingstown Police Department pulled over defendant-appellant
Gary Santos, who was traveling about twenty miles per hour over
the speed limit. 1 Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Dolock
noticed “several loose bullets in an ashtray to the left-hand side of
the steering wheel.” 2 She “called for backup from the South
Kingstown Police Department on a radio on her lapel when she
first observed the bullets . . . ” 3 Officer Dolock then “asked the
driver if he had a weapon; he responded that he did not.” 4 She
reported that she then “detected a strong odor of alcohol
emanating from the vehicle” and observed “that the driver was
looking around the car and intentionally looking away from her.” 5
Officer Dolock again asked the driver if he had a weapon, which
he answered in the negative. 6 Officer Dolock stated that the
driver then turned towards the passenger side of the vehicle, and,
as she could no longer see his hands, she feared for her own
safety. 7 She partially drew her service weapon, directed the

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

State v. Santos, 62 A.3d 314, 317 (R.I. 2013).
Id.
Id. n.3.
Id. at 317.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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driver to “put his hands where she could see them,” and told him
to get out of the vehicle. 8 Santos complied.9 Upon Santos exiting
the vehicle, Officer Dolock reported “a strong odor of alcohol
coming from Santos’ breath,” and that Santos had “bloodshot,
watery eyes and a slight sway in his stance.” 10
Officer Dolock conducted a cursory pat-down of Santos’ outer
clothing for a weapon and found a small pocket knife in one of his
pockets. 11 Officer Dolock asked Santos whether there were any
more weapons; he said there were not, though he appeared
hesitant as he looked at his vehicle. 12 She placed Santos in
handcuffs while explicitly informing him that he was not under
arrest.13 At that time, Trooper Marc Lidsky of the Rhode Island
State Police passed by the scene and stopped to assist. 14 Santos
did not answer Officer Dolock’s further questions, saying that “he
would only speak to the trooper because he was in charge.” 15
Two South Kingstown officers arrived as backup as Officer
Dolock led Santos to her cruiser.16 As soon as she secured Santos
in the rear of her cruiser, Officer Dolock searched Santos’ vehicle
for weapons while Trooper Lidsky kept an eye on Santos. 17
Officer Dolock first searched the front passenger’s side of the
vehicle, where she observed several more loose bullets and what
appeared to be the butt of a gun. 18 She tilted the passenger seat
forward and discovered a loaded revolver on the floor. 19 Still in
the cruiser, Santos did not respond to Officer Dolock’s questioning
about documentation for the revolver. 20 Santos was escorted out
of her cruiser where he refused to submit to standard field
sobriety tests. 21 Officer Dolock then arrested Santos for suspicion

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. n.2.
Id. at 317.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of driving under the influence of intoxicants; she again placed him
back in her cruiser to transport him to the South Kingstown police
station for processing.22
Santos was charged with carrying a weapon while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs (“Count 1”);
carrying a firearm in a motor vehicle without a license (“Count 2”);
and unlawfully operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor (“Count 3”). 23 The trial judge
granted Santos’ Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal as to
Count 1 and Count 3, but denied Santos’ motions to suppress the
revolver and bullets as “fruits of an illegal search” as to Count 2. 24
Following Santos’ renewed motion to suppress, the trial justice
determined that the search could not be justified as a “search
incident to arrest,” as “[Santos] was neither free nor mobile and
was not within reaching distance of the passenger compartment of
the vehicle.” 25 The trial justice found, however, that “there was
sufficient probable cause to search the vehicle for hidden weapons,
given the time of night [(8:30 p.m.)], the discovery of bullets in
plain view, the furtive movement by [Santos], and his purposeful
failure to look directly at Officer Dolock.” The trial justice further
reasoned that, even if probable cause did not exist, the revolver
would be “inevitably discovered during an inventory search.” 26
On November 18, 2010, a jury entered a verdict of guilty on Count
2; Santos was sentenced to five years imprisonment, including one
year to serve and the remainder suspended, with probation.27
Santos appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.28
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court initially identified four legal
theories to determine whether Santos’ motion to suppress the
revolver should have been granted. 29 The theories examined,
respectively, were whether the facts could justify a finding of (1)
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 317–18.
Id. at 318.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 319.
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reasonable suspicion under the protective-search doctrine, (2)
probable cause under the “automobile exception,” (3) inevitable
discovery during an inventory search, and (4) search incident to
arrest.30 The state focused on the protective search rationale,
and, alternatively, contended that the revolver would have been
inevitably discovered as the result of a search incident to arrest.31
The trial court’s findings of facts are overturned only when clearly
erroneous. 32 Alleged violations of a defendant’s Constitutional
rights are independently examined, while evidence in the record is
viewed in the light most favorable to the state. 33
As neither the defense nor the state “support[ed] the rationale
of the trial justice, which was based on a finding of probable
cause,” 34 the Court found that the trial justice “erred in stating
that these facts had to rise to the level of establishing probable
cause, when the protective-search doctrine only requires
reasonable belief.” 35
Declining to further examine the
“automobile exception,” 36 the Court proceeded to analyze the
protective search theory, under its “authority to affirm on grounds
other than those relied on by a trial justice, and because a
protective search is permitted under a standard that is less
rigorous than probable cause.” 37
The Court found that Officer Dolock’s pat-down was
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, as she “was reasonable in
her belief that Santos might be armed and dangerous.” 38 The
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 318–19.
33. Id. at 319.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 319–20.
36. Id. at 319. The Court stated “we do not express any opinion on the
parties' arguments concerning inevitable discovery pursuant to an inventory
search, search incident to arrest, or the automobile exception.” Id. at 323 n.7.
37. Id. at 319 (citing State v. Quaweay, 799 A.2d 1016, 1018 (R.I.2002)
as to the Court’s authority to affirm on grounds other than those relied on by
a trial justice).
38. Id. at 320 (citing State v. Aubin, 622 A.2d 444, 445 (R.I.1993); State
v. Collodo, 661 A.2d 62, 64–65 (R.I. 1995)).
The Court noted the
circumstances which justified Officer Dolock’s belief, including “observation
of loose bullets—combined with Santos’ furtive movements, intentional
avoidance of eye contact, and positioning of his hands in such a way that the
officer could not see them—as well as the fact that it was approximately 8:30
p.m., Officer Dolock was alone, . . . ” Id.
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exact circumstances and size of the small knife found through the
pat-down were not discussed. The Court likewise noted that “an
officer may conduct a limited search of an automobile for weapons
when the police officer ‘has an articulable suspicion to believe that
the suspect may be armed and dangerous’ and that the suspect
has the ‘present ability to obtain a weapon.’” 39 Given the
circumstances previously mentioned, including the discovery of a
small knife in Santos’ pocket when he repeatedly stated that he
did not have a weapon, the Court found that “Officer Dolock
possessed specific and articulable facts that justified her decision .
. . to conduct a limited sweep of Santos’ vehicle for weapons.” 40
The Court next examined Santos’ argument that “even if
there was a reasonable belief that he was armed and dangerous,
there could be no reasonable belief that he had a present ability to
obtain a weapon because he was handcuffed and secured in Officer
Dolock’s cruiser.” 41 The Court found that the “present ability to
obtain a weapon” element of a protective search of a vehicle was
satisfied under the rationale of Michigan v. Long. 42 The Court
cited the United States Supreme Court in Long, which stated that
“a suspect could break away from the officer and retrieve a
weapon in the vehicle or may be permitted to re-enter the vehicle
before the investigation is over and gain access to a weapon.” 43
The Court applied this logic to Santos: “In addition to the danger
that Santos might break away before the conclusion of the field
sobriety tests, there was also a possibility that Santos would
return to his vehicle and secure the revolver if Officer Dolock
elected to release him after administering the tests to him.” 44
The defense presented two alternative arguments that the
Court rejected. 45 First, Santos argued that being handcuffed and
placed in the back of Officer Dolock’s cruiser transformed the
39. Id. (citing State v. Milette, 727 A.2d 1236, 1239–40 (R.I.1999) and
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983)).
40. Id. at 321.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Long, 463 U.S. at 1047, 1051–52).
44. Id. (citing Milette, 727 A.2d at 1239 “when a police officer compels
the exit of an individual from a vehicle in order to conduct a Terry frisk, the
officer remains vulnerable to the possibility that the individual, if not
arrested, will be free to retrieve any weapons within his car”).
45.
Id. at 322.
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investigatory stop into a “de facto arrest, which required probable
cause.” 46 The Court stated that the applicable standard is
“whether a detention is an investigative detention or an actual
arrest depends on the reasonableness of the intrusion.” 47 The
Court found that Santos was secured to the extent reasonable
under the circumstances and only long enough for Officer Dolock
to conduct the search of Santos’ vehicle. 48 Second, Santos argued
that Officer Dolock’s decision to conduct a Terry search, instead of
placing him under arrest for driving under the influence, suggests
improper manipulation of the circumstances to justify the
search. 49 The Court also rejected this argument, finding that
“Officer Dolock acted reasonably, and did not deliberately wait to
arrest Santos.” 50 Finally, the Court concluded that there was
“sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt” 51 that
Santos “knowingly possessed the revolver and intentionally
exercised control over it.” 52
COMMENTARY
The Court correctly found that Officer Dolock had an
“articulable suspicion to believe that the suspect may be armed
and dangerous” for the purpose of a “brief pat-down.” 53 The Court
also correctly determined that Officer Dolock’s handcuffing and
placing of Santos in the back of her police cruiser was reasonable
and did not transform the investigatory detention into a de facto
arrest.54 However, the Court may have improperly expanded
upon the holdings of Milette and Long, contrary to the rationale of
Gant, under the facts of the instant case. 55
In Gant, the United States Supreme Court emphasized the
importance of protecting individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights
46.
Id. (emphasis in original).
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
50.
Id. at 323.
51.
Id. at 324.
52.
Id. at 323.
53.
Id. at 320.
54.
Id. at 322.
55.
See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 342–47 (2009); Milette, 727 A.2d
at 1239–40; Long, 463 U.S. at 1033.
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during automobile searches.56 The U.S. Supreme Court explicitly
stated in Gant that the Long exception for protective searches
“permits an officer to search a vehicle’s passenger compartment
when he has reasonable suspicion that an individual [] is
‘dangerous’ and might access the vehicle to ‘gain immediate
control of weapons.’” 57 Long’s protective searches are permitted in
a narrow set of circumstances discussed in Gant; to expand
protective searches beyond such narrow circumstances may
infringe on Fourth Amendment protections of individual rights. 58
In discussing the dangers of police overreach in conducting
searches incident to arrest, the majority in Gant approvingly
quoted concerns for individual rights voiced in Justice Scalia’s
concurrence in Gant: “although it is improbable that an arrestee
could gain access to weapons stored in his vehicle after he has
been handcuffed and secured in the backseat of a patrol car, cases
allowing a search in ‘this precise factual scenario . . . are
legion.’” 59
In the instant case, Officer Dolock no longer had a reasonable
suspicion that Santos “might access the vehicle to gain immediate
control of weapons” once he was handcuffed, placed in the back of
the cruiser, and three other officers arrived on the scene to help
control the one suspect. At this time, a field sobriety test could
have been conducted without the risk of Santos gaining access to a
weapon stored in his vehicle. While the United States Supreme
Court in Long reasoned that “if the suspect is not placed under
arrest, he will be permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will
then have access to any weapons inside,” Officer Dolock stated
that she had not yet decided whether to arrest Santos. 60 Officer
Dolock ultimately arrested Santos after his refusal to submit to
field sobriety tests for “suspicion of driving under the influence of
56.
Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest
only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment
at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains
evidence of the offense of arrest. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 351. When these
justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee's vehicle will be
unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception
to the warrant requirement applies. Id.
57. Gant, 556 U.S. at 346–347.
58. See id. (citing Long, 463 U.S. 1032).
59. Id. at 342.
60. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1052; Santos, 62 A.3d at 317.
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intoxicants.” 61
Unlike a scenario in which Officer Dolock
remained the lone officer, or had decided not to arrest Santos, a
search of the vehicle was not apparently necessary for protection.
Therefore, a better approach would have been for the Court to
decline application of the protective search exception.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an officer with a
reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous,
based on specific and articulable facts, may conduct a brief patdown. The protective-search doctrine likewise justified a limited
search of a vehicle for weapons where an officer had a reasonable
suspicion justified by specific and articulable facts that a suspect
was dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon from
the vehicle. A suspect may be considered under “investigatory
detention,” as opposed to under arrest, if intrusions such as
handcuffs and placement in the back of a police cruiser are
reasonable under all of the facts and not a ruse to justify a search.
Jeremy Rix

61.

Santos, 62 A.3d at 317.
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Family Law. Boyer v. Bedrosian, 57 A.3d 259 (R.I. 2012). Participants in
the Family Court’s Truancy Court Diversion Calendar Program brought suit
claiming that through the administration of the Truancy Court their
constitutional rights were being violated. The Supreme Court of Rhode
Island found that the recently issued Family Court Administrative Order
2010-2 coupled with current law rendered the plaintiffs’ constitutional
challenges moot. Further, the Court held the case was not subject to an
exception of the mootness doctrine.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In September of 1999, the chief judge of the Family Court
founded the Truancy Court Program to allow “Family Court
magistrates to conduct court sessions at schools with frequently
truant children.” 1 The Family Court intended the Truancy
Program “to facilitate collaboration between the Family Court,
schools, and service providers” in order to guarantee that parents
and children were able to receive services efficiently and
effectively in their own communities.2
In March of 2010, the fifteen students and their parents who
participated in the Family Court’s Truancy Court Diversion
Calendar Program (collectively “the plaintiffs”), brought suit in
Superior Court against the chief judge, five magistrates, and two
administrators of the Family Court, as well as five municipalities
and the public school districts for those five municipalities (“the
defendants”). 3 The plaintiffs alleged that all of the defendants
were operating the Truancy Court in violation of the law. 4 The
1. Boyer v. Bedrosian, 57 A.3d at 259, 265 n.9 (R.I. 2012) (explaining
“[a] determination of truancy qualifies a child as ‘wayward.’ R.I. GEN. LAWS
1956 § 14-1-3”).
2. Id. at 260, 265.
3. Id. at 263–64. In the “initial complaint, Jeremiah S. Jeremiah was
the Chief Judge of the Family Court. After Chief Judge Jeremiah retired,
plaintiffs amended the complaint to substitute the then-acting and now
presiding chief judge of the Family Court, Chief Judge [] Bedrosian.” Id. at
260 n.1. For an additional, more detailed factual background regarding the
particular events that lead to the plaintiffs’ bringing suit, see Boyer v.
Jeremiah, No. 2010-1858, 2010 WL 4041812 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 8, 2010).
4. See id. at 266. The plaintiffs alleged that the operation and
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plaintiffs’ complaint alleged ten constitutional violations.5 The
plaintiffs brought the lawsuit as a proposed class action and civil
rights lawsuit; they demanded declaratory and injunctive relief.6
Subsequently, in May of 2010, the defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint and moved to strike three of the plaintiffs’
claims. 7 The trial justice heard oral arguments on defendants’
motions to dismiss and motion to strike. 8 Before the trial judge
ruled on the motion, the Chief Judge of the Family Court, Judge
Bedrosian, issued the Family Court Administrative Order 2010-2
(“the Order”). 9 The Order laid out “written procedures that
dramatically reformed the Truancy Court Diversion Calendar
Program.” 10 For example, the Order “mandated that ‘all truancy
petitions shall be referred to the RI Family Court Intake
Department for a preliminary investigation,’” and if the
department determined, following the preliminary investigation,
that there was insufficient evidence to bring the student within
the Truancy Court’s jurisdiction, then the petition would not be
administration of the Truancy Court violated “the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and article 1,
section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution, the Rhode Island General Laws,
the Family Court Rules of Juvenile Proceedings, and the Supreme Court
Rules of Judicial Conduct.” Id.
5. Id. at 272. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants:
(1) did not provide sufficient notice of conduct that would result in a
child's referral to Truancy Court; (2) deprived children of a
preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the truancy petition;
(3) failed to serve summonses and copies of truancy petitions; (4)
failed to properly arraign children; (5) improperly permitted children
to waive their constitutional rights; (6) deprived children of a right to
counsel; (7) issued orders without personal jurisdiction; (8) did not
transcribe or record the Truancy Court proceedings; (9) deprived
children of a meaningful opportunity to be heard by not appointing
interpreters; and (10) deprived children of a meaningful opportunity
to be heard by engaging in ex parte communications with school
officials.
Id.
6. Id. at 266 (seeking declaratory relief as provided for under § 9-30-1
and injunctive relief as provided for under Rule 65 of the Superior Court
Rules of Civil Procedure).
7. Id. at 267.
8. Id. The administrative and judicial defendants filed separate
motions to dismiss, but only the judicial defendants filed a motion to strike.
See id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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authorized.11 The Order “also added a threshold requirement that
a student must ‘[have] . . . 10 days of absences and/or . . . [be]
habitually late or absent from school’ before the Intake
Department could refer a case to the truancy calendar.” 12 Despite
the after-enacted order, the trial justice denied the defendants’
motions to dismiss without prejudice.13 The defendants filed
petitions for writ of certiorari, which the Rhode Island Supreme
Court granted on December 10, 2010. 14
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On writ of certiorari, the Court analyzed whether the claims
were justiciable; to be justiciable, a “court must have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the issues raised in the complaint,
plaintiffs must have standing, and the issues must not be moot.” 15
Initially, the Court assumed that the Superior Court had subjectmatter jurisdiction, that the plaintiffs had standing to sue when
the initial complaint was filed, and that the defendants were not
immune from suit. 16 The Court focused its analysis on whether
the plaintiffs’ claims were moot. 17 The Court noted that a
plaintiff must retain a personal stake in the outcome of a case
throughout the litigation or the controversy will become moot, and
thus, the case will no longer be justiciable. 18 The Court also noted
that “the passage of a new law or an amendment to an existing
law may moot a case.” 19 The Court focused on how the ten alleged
constitutional violations pertained to the issue of mootness.20

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 268.
14. Id. at 268–69.
15. Id. at 270.
16. Id. at 270–71 (citing in relevant part Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317
F.3d 45, 58 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[S]tanding is based on the facts as they existed at
the time the complaint was filed.”)).
17. See id.
18. Id. at 271.
19. Id. at 272 (citing Midwest Media Property, L.L.C. v. Symmes
Township, Ohio, 503 F.3d 456, 460 (6th Cir. 2007)).
20. Infra note 6; id. at 270.
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Mootness

The Court found that the Order mooted the issue of notice
because by setting a minimum number of ten truancies before a
student could be brought before the Truancy Court, the Order put
a person of average intelligence on notice about the number of
absences that it would take to result in a referral to the truancy
program. 21 Further, the Order detailed how and when a child and
his or her parent would receive notice; it provided that “if the
Intake Department determine[d] a petition is suitable for the
Truancy calendar, then the petition ‘w[ould] be assigned to the
appropriate school location,’ and ‘written notice’” would be
provided.22 While “an intake investigation [was] not required as a
step in an accusatory proceeding of delinquency or waywardness,”
the intake investigation serve[d] to protect the juvenile from
“‘arbitrary bureaucratic actions.’” 23 The Order provided for
procedures to “safeguard children from arbitrary bureaucratic
action” by mandating a preliminary investigation. 24 Thus, the
Court found the Order mooted the issue of depriving the child of
preliminary investigation. 25
The Court also determined that the issue of a summons was
21. See id. at 273–74. “Vagueness challenges under the [D]ue [P]rocess
[C]lause rest principally on lack of notice . . . [A] statute is unconstitutionally
vague if it compels ‘a person of average intelligence to guess and to resort to
conjecture as to its meaning and/or as to its supposed mandated application.”
See id. at 272–73 (quoting Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565, 582–83 (R.I.
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
22. Id. at 273. The written notice:
informs the parents that the child [was] referred to the Family Court
on a wayward status offense of truancy[,] . . . that the child has been
prescreened to enter the Truancy Diversion Program[,] . . . [and]
[t]he notice explains that the parents will have the opportunity to
provide valid excuses for absences . . . at the hearing. Finally, the
notice briefly describes the Diversion Program and sets the location,
time, and date of the initial meeting with a magistrate.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id. at 274.
24. See id. The Order provides that “all truancy petitions shall be
referred to the RI Family Court Intake Department for a preliminary
investigation[,]” and the Order also clarifies how the Intake Department shall
determine if sufficient evidence and documentation exists in order to bring
the juvenile in the jurisdiction of the Family Court. Id. at 274.
25. See Administrative Order 2010-2 Intake Department-Duties § 8-1022; Bedrosian, 57 A.3d at 274.
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moot, as the Order directed that a child could “choose” to
participate in the Truancy Program, and thus, the child’s
appearance would be voluntary, so a summons would not be
required. 26 The Court noted the Order elaborated that if the child
or parent did not appear at the Truancy calendar, then the Court
could issue a summons; further, if the parent and child did not
each agree to participate in the Truancy Diversion Program, then
they would be referred to the formal juvenile calendar and the
Court would issue a summons.27
On review, the Court found that the after-enacted Order set
forth substantive procedural requirements for the arraignment
that mirrored the arraignment procedures of Rule 9 of the Family
Court Rules of Juvenile Proceedings.28 Thus, the Order mooted
the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants violated their due process
rights by failing “to provide adequate information regarding
individual rights at the arraignment, as is required by Rule 9 of
the Family Court Rules of Juvenile Proceedings.” 29 Prior to the
issuance of the Order, each child who participated in the Truancy
Program was required to sign a “Waiver of Rights Form,” which
waived the child’s right to a trial, “‘right to an appeal to the
Supreme Court from any decision or finding of delinquency or
waywardness,’” and right to appeal any sentence imposed by the
Court after such finding or admission of sufficient facts. 30 The
Court determined, after the Order, a child needs to sign only the
“Participant Guidelines” form as in the Order there is no reference
to the “Waiver of Rights” form; today, “no child is required to sign
26. See Bedrosian, 57 A.3d at 275 (citing Theta Properties v. Ronci
Realty Co., 814 A.2d 907, 912-13 (R.I. 2003)).
27. Id. at 275.
28. See id at 276. The Order identifies the arraignment as the first
meeting between the parent, child, and magistrate. Id. The Order states
that, at the “arraignment,”
“the Magistrate will read the truancy petition and will explain the
Rhode Island compulsory school attendance laws as well as the
requirements of the Truancy Diversion Program consistent with the
document entitled Participant Guidelines. The Magistrate also will
explain the child’s right to trial as well as the option for the Truancy
Diversion program consistent with the form entitled Participant's
Forum Choice.”
Id. (emphasis in the original).
29. See id. at 276–77.
30. Id. at 277 (citing in relevant part § 14-1-16; Rule 6(e)).
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such a form.” 31 Accordingly, the Court held that the Order
mooted the issue of impermissibly allowing children to waive their
constitutional rights. 32 The Order directed magistrates to advise
the child and parent “of their right to hire an attorney” and
illustrated “how the child or parent [may] obtain assistance of
counsel.” 33 The Court was satisfied that the Order addressed the
plaintiffs’ concerns about the method used to inform Truancy
Court participants of the right to counsel; thus, the Order mooted
the issue of depriving children of a right to counsel. 34
The Order specified “that participation in the Truancy
Diversion Calendar [was] voluntary” and that “the magistrate
must ‘explain the child’s right to trial, as well as the option [to
participate in] the Truancy Diversion Program.’” 35 If any
participant contests jurisdiction, then the case would be referred
to the formal juvenile calendar and a summons would be issued. 36
Consequently, the Court held that the Order remedied any
failings existent in establishing personal jurisdiction within the
Truancy Court over participants, and thus, mooted the issue.37
Further, the Order required that “‘[all] Truancy Diversion
Programs hearings will be recorded;’” [and] the Court determined
audio recording was sufficient. 38 The Order made it perfectly
clear that the Truancy Court would record all hearings, and
therefore mooted the plaintiffs’ challenge about failing to
transcribe or record the proceeding.39 The Order also clarified
that magistrates have discretion to determine when the Truancy
Court ought to make an interpreter available for a child who may
not be sufficiently fluent in English. 40 As this Court has held, the
trial justice is given wide discretion to determine when an
31. Id. at 277.
32. Id. at 278.
33. See id. at 277–78. The Order laid out that if the parent “[could not]
afford an attorney, the case [would] be scheduled on the formal juvenile
calendar,” and in this event the child could be referred to the services of the
public defenders or court-appointed counsel. Id. at 278.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 278 (citation omitted).
36. Id.
37. See id. at 279.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 279.
40. Id. at 280.
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interpreter is appropriate; 41 thus, this Court held that the Order
provided for constitutional access to interpreters and that the
complainants’ constitutional challenge was moot. 42 As to the final
constitutional challenge, while the Order did not address the issue
of ex parte communication, the Court was confident “that the
judicial officers of the Family Court [would be] faithful to the law
on ex parte communication.” 43 The earlier Truancy Court
procedures were not affecting any ongoing truancy petitions;
therefore, the Court held that the “plaintiffs’ request that the
Superior Court declare the previous [Truancy Court] procedures
unconstitutional and enjoin the Family Court from enforcing the
prior procedures ha[d] become moot” because the plaintiffs did not
have a stake in a continuing controversy. 44
B.

Exceptions to Mootness

While the Court held that the Order and existing law mooted
and/or obviated the plaintiffs’ ten constitutional challenges, that
did not end the Court’s analysis. 45 The Court then discussed if
the Truancy Program was subject to any exception to the
mootness doctrine, as the Court “will review an otherwise moot
case only when the issues are ‘of extreme public importance,
which are capable of repetition but which evade review.’” 46 If the
issue in this case (students’ and parents’ rights allegedly being
violated by a program aimed at helping them) was one of extreme
public importance, then the chief judge of the Family Court
addressed the issues by issuing the Order, which contained proper
procedures for the Truancy Court to protect participants’ rights. 47
41. Id. at 280 (citing State v. Ibrahim, 862 A.2d 787, 798 (R.I. 2004)).
42. See id.
43. Id. at 280. “Under the Administrative Procedures Act, Department
of Human Services (DHS) hearing officers were prohibited from engaging in
ex parte communications concerning adjudicatory facts with DHS staff
members and outside resources about medical assistance applicants’ pending
cases without giving applicants an opportunity to challenge the information
gleaned through such communications.” See also id. at 280 n.35 (citing
Arnold v. Lebel, 941 A.2d 813, 819–21 (R.I. 2007)).
44. Id. at 280, 283.
45. Id. at 280.
46. Id. at 281 (citation omitted) (quoting Campbell v. Tiverton Zoning
Board, 15 A.3d 1015, 1022 (R.I. 2011)).
47. Id.
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While there may be an exception to the mootness doctrine “if there
is a substantial likelihood that the challenged statutory language
will be reenacted,” here, the Court found that the defendants did
not show any intention to reenact the earlier administrative
language;48 therefore, the Court held that the defendants’
injunctive and declaratory relief are mooted. 49 The Court noted
that the plaintiffs offered “no reason to expect that the Family
Court would repeat the alleged constitutional violations that were
superseded by the Order, 50 and the Court reasoned that even if
the matter is capable of repetition it would not evade review as
the rulings of the Truancy Court are reviewable as a matter of
law. 51 The Court found that this case was not subject to any
exception to the mootness doctrine, and therefore, this Court could
not decide this case on its merits. 52
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly acknowledged that
justiciability is a threshold issue that must be satisfied before a
court can decide a case on the merits. 53 Here, the after-enacted
Order undoubtedly had an effect on the plaintiffs’ stake in the
case. Prior to the Order, there was no clear standard for the
number of absences from school that were required to potentially
incur liability for truancy, a child facing truancy charges had to
sign a “Waiver of Rights Form,” 54 and a child had no guarantee
that the Intake Department would perform a preliminary
investigation or that the Truancy Program hearings would be
recorded. 55 However, in the wake of the Order, the Family Court

48. Id. “‘When a party challenges an ordinance and seeks injunctive
relief, a superseding ordinance moots the claim for injunctive relief.’” Id. at
282 (quoting Covenant Christian Ministries, Inc. v. City of Marietta, Georgia,
654 F.3d 1231, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011)).
49. Id. at 281.
50. Id. at 282.
51. See id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 8-10-3.1 (d), (e) (West)).
52. Id. at 282.
53. Id. at 271–72 (citation omitted).
54. See id. at 273. In the “Waiver of Rights Form,” the child waived his
right to a trial by a judge and right to appeal a guilty verdict or any sentence
imposed. Id. at 277.
55. Id. at 274, 279.
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took care of these and other alleged procedural problems within
the administration of cases in Truancy Court; the Order clarified
the role of the Truancy Diversion Program, the duties of the
Intake Department, magistrates, and administrators, and the
options available to the parents and children invited to participate
in the Truancy Diversion Program. 56 Thus, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court was right to focus on the issue of mootness.
From the holding, it appears that the Court has faith in the
Family Court and trusts them not to reenact the questionable
procedures that were in place before the issuance of the Order. 57
The Court noted that if a Government’s “self-stop” of allegedly
illegal conduct appears genuine, then it provides a safe basis for a
dismissal based on mootness. 58 Perhaps the Court trusted the
magistrates also because the Court wanted to support the Truancy
Program as even the Order sets forth a laudable goal for the
program. 59 If the Court found the Truancy Court procedures
inadequate because the procedures did not address ex parte
communication, then it could have undermined a program that is
aimed at providing children the ability to receive necessary
services within their community. 60
Also, the Court was aware that in the plaintiffs’ initial
complaint, the plaintiffs sued six municipalities; all of the
municipal defendants except Providence agreed to stop
participating in the Truancy Program. 61 Consequently, in the
amended complaint, the plaintiffs added four more municipal
defendants. 62 If the Court was not to analyze the justiciability of
the plaintiffs’ claims and allowed the case to continue in Superior
Court, then it is possible that more municipalities would agree to
stop participating in the Truancy Program as a result of the
56. See id. at 268, 274, 280.
57. Id. at 282.
58. Id. at 281 (citing Bench Billboard Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 674 F.3d
974, 981(6th Cir. 2012)).
59. The Order set forth that “[t]he purpose of the Rhode Island Family
Court Truancy calendar [was] to reduce truancy statewide,” and “ensure that
students not only attend[ed] school but also receive[d] the rehabilitative
services and educational services that [would] help to assure school
attendance and academic success.” Id. at 265.
60. See id. at 263.
61. Id. 264 n.5.
62. Id. at n.5.
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suit.63 As the Truancy Program is aimed at reducing truancy and
providing truant children with needed services, ceasing to offer
the Truancy Program would harm children and the Rhode Island
education system.64 Lastly, the Court stressed in its analysis of
many of the constitutional challenges that participation in the
Truancy Diversion Program is voluntary, and the Order specified
that a magistrate, at an arraignment, will inform the child and
parent of their option to participate in the program, or if they do
not wish to participate in the program, the case will be referred to
the formal juvenile calendar. 65 Correctly, the Court may have
been eager to end this case because the new procedures contained
in the Order addressed the constitutional challenges, and
municipalities deciding as a result of this case to stop offering the
option for truant children to participate in the Truancy Program,
detracts from the Rhode Island diversion and development
programs intended to benefit delinquent children. 66
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court quashed the Order of the
Superior Court and remanded the record to that tribunal, with
directions to enter a final judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ civil
action as moot, because the issuance of Family Court
Administrative Order 2010-2 coupled with other existing law
removed any controversy in which the plaintiffs have a stake.
Alicia Bianco

63. See id.
64. See “Truancy Court,” Official Website of the City of Warwick, Rhode
Island;http://www.warwickri.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl
e&id=845&Itemid=176 (last visited Nov.16, 2013).
65. See Bedrosian, 57 A.3d at 275.
66. See Juvenile Justice in RI: Issue Brief RHODE ISLAND KIDS COUNT 1,
1, 8 & 9 (July 2009), available at http://www.tapartnership.org/events
/webinars/webinarArchivespresentationSlides/20100811_juvenileJusticeIb.pd
f (Discussing how Rhode Island development and diversion programs benefit
juveniles in Rhode Island).
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Family Law. McCulloch v. McCulloch, 69 A.3d 810 (R.I. 2013). In a
divorce action, a trial justice must determine the value of a closely held
corporation before assigning portions to the parties. In assigning a minority
share of a closely held corporation, a trial justice must apply a minority
discount or a discount for lack of marketability.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On February 14, 1989, Hope Billings McCulloch (“Hope”) and
James Robert McCulloch (“James”) were married. 1 On June 16,
2006, following a separation in early 2005, Hope filed a complaint
for an absolute divorce.2 Thereafter, on May 7, 2007, James filed
an answer and counterclaim.3 Both parties listed “irreconcilable
differences which caused the irremediable breakdown of the
marriage” as grounds for divorce. 4
On October 17, 2008, Hope and James entered into a consent
order that incorporated numerous agreements and stipulations
the parties agreed to during prior proceedings. 5 The consent
order set the valuation date of marital assets “as of the date of
trial” and stated neither party can challenge any valuation based
on the date of the valuation (or appraisal) or “any change in
circumstances surrounding the valued assets . . . unless such
change of circumstances is determined by the trial justice to be an
extraordinary change in circumstances that could not have been
contemplated by the parties.” 6
1. McCulloch v. McCulloch, 69 A.3d 810, 813 (R.I. 2013).
2. Id. at 813–14.
3. Id. at 814.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. The Court noted the following “pertinent” provisions of the
consent order:
31. Neither party shall challenge: a) the date of valuation of any
appraisal of real estate, equipment, machinery or the parties'
possessions by any expert after October 1, 2007, or b) the date of the
valuation of Microfibres, Inc. by any expert after October 1, 2007.
32. For purposes of the rule that marital assets should be valued as
of the date of trial unless there are compelling circumstances
warranting a deviation, and by agreement of the parties, the dates of
appraisals and valuation referenced in paragraph 31 above shall be
considered as if they were appraised on the date of trial. 33. Nothing
in paragraphs 31 or 32 above shall impair or prejudice the rights of
either party to challenge any valuation or appraisal on the merits,
other than based on: 1) the date of the valuation or appraisal, or 2)
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The core issue throughout the proceedings in the Family
Court was the distribution of the stock of Microfibres, Inc.
(“Microfibres”) and Microfibres Partnership Limited (“MPL”).7
James is the president and chief executive officer of Microfibres,
which manufactures fabric, and MPL, which is an affiliated
company that owns certain equipment and real estate in North
Carolina.8 At trial, the chief financial officer of Microfibres, Mary
Ann Beirne, testified that Microfibres planned to purchase a
controlling interest in a company in China (“the China venture”),
and if the plan “were to fall through,” Microfibres would be
devastated. 9
In order to determine the value of Microfibres and MPL, three
experts testified at trial. 10 First, on behalf of Hope, Peri Ann
Aptaker (“Aptaker”), a certified public accountant (“CPA”),
testified that as of December 31, 2007, the fair market value of
Microfibres was $126,365,000.11 Aptaker further testified she
could not value the China venture because she had no data to
calculate an impact, if any, the venture would have on
Microfibres. 12 The second expert was John Brough, Jr. (“Brough,
Jr.”), CPA, and testified on behalf of James.13 Contrary to
Aptaker, Brough, Jr. concluded Microfibres was worth
$106,000,000, but similarly testified there was no information to
place value on the China venture, which was not closed as of

Id.

any change in circumstances surrounding the valued assets from
February to May 27, 2008, unless such change of circumstances is
determined by the trial justice to be an extraordinary change in
circumstances that could not have been contemplated by the parties,
provided, however, that the party in possession of any asset shall not
claim, contend or urge that any such extraordinary change of
circumstances shall have occurred with respect to any such asset
unless he or she has disclosed such change of circumstances
promptly and in no event more than three business days after the
change in circumstance having occurred.

7. Id. at 813.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 814. More specifically, the company in China performed
printing and dyeing. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 815.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 814.
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December 31, 2007.14 The last expert, Jay Fishman (“Fishman”),
was a neutral, court-appointed expert. 15 Fishman testified that
since the December 31, 2007 valuation date, there had been a
collapse in the financial market that impacted consumer spending
and the loss of millions of jobs. 16 Fishman also concluded that,
like Aptaker and Brough, Jr., he received insufficient information
to value the China venture and, therefore, as of December 31,
2007, he was also unable to value the China venture. 17
On April 9, 2009, James submitted a post-trial memorandum
in which he argued the trial justice could not reasonably place a
value on Microfibres based on the experts’ testimony at trial
regarding the downturn of worldwide economy that occurred after
the valuation date contained in the consent order. 18 James
contended the economic crisis was “an extraordinary circumstance
that was not anticipated by the parties” and therefore, the
“arbitrary valuation date” should not be utilized. 19 On August 7,
2009, while conducting a hearing on an unrelated motion, the trial
justice informed the parties he planned “to order a re-valuation of
Microfibres as of a more current date.” 20 In response, on August
21, 2009, Hope filed an “objection to and motion for
reconsideration of the trial justice’s decision to revalue
[Microfibres].” 21 On August 27, 2009, the trial justice held a
hearing on Hope’s motion, denied the motion, and ordered the
companies to be revalued as of September 1, 2009. 22 However, on
January 19, 2010, the trial justice ordered the parties to suspend
their revaluation efforts because “he had decided to equitably
distribute the stock of the companies without placing a value on
them.” 23
On August 17, 2010, the trial justice issued his written
decision granting the parties an absolute divorce.24 After
awarding Hope and James joint custody of Lucas, their son, the
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 815.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 824.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 815.
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trial justice focused on the equitable assignment of the marital
property.25 Excluding Mircofibres and MPL, the trial justice first
examined each factor 26 set forth in G.L. 1956 § 15-5-16.1(a) and
then awarded each party fifty percent of their bank and
investment accounts and divided the property. 27
The trial justice then turned to the “knotty” issue of the
equitable distribution of Microfibres and MPL.28 The trial justice
declared that the stock in Microfibres is a marital asset, but only
49.9967 percent of MPL was marital property since the remainder
had been gifted to James. 29 Rather than valuing the companies
and assigning a portion of that value to each party, the trial
justice ordered an in-kind distribution 30 of stock of Microfibres
25. Id.
26. Under § 15-5-16.1(a):
In determining the nature and value of the property, if any, to be
assigned, the court after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party
shall consider the following:
(1) The length of the marriage;
(2) The conduct of the parties during the marriage;
(3) The contribution of each of the parties during the marriage in the
acquisition, preservation, or appreciation in value of their respective
estates;
(4) The contribution and services of either party as homemaker;
(5) The health and age of the parties;
(6) The amount and sources of income of each of the parties;
(7) The occupation and employability of each of the parties;
(8) The opportunity of each party for future acquisition of capital
assets and income;
(9) The contribution by one party to the education, training,
licensure, business, or increased earning power of the other;
(10) The need of the custodial parent to occupy or own the marital
residence and to use or own its household effects taking into account
the best interests of the children of the marriage;
(11) Either party’s wasteful dissipation of assets or any transfer or
encumbrance of assets made in contemplation of divorce without fair
consideration; and
(12) Any factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and
proper.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1(a) (2013).
27. McCulloch, 69 A.3d at 815–816 n.3 (citing § 15-5-16.1(a)).
28. Id. at 817.
29. Id.
30. An in-kind distribution refers to the allocation of a portion of the
actual asset, as opposed to the sum of money representing the value of the
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and an in-kind distribution of a partnership interest in MPL.31
The trial justice stated he was unable to accurately place a value
on the companies and found the fair and equitable method was to
assign Hope a portion of the corporate stock, rather than a sum of
cash. 32
In deciding what portion of stock to assign to Hope, the trial
justice examined Hope’s “contribution” to the companies and the
factors announced in § 15-5-16.1.33
[T]he trial justice found that Hope made little or no
contribution to [Microfibres or MPL]. It was a family
business in the family of [James] for multiple
generations. * * * Notwithstanding th[e] finding [that
Microfibres was a marital asset], [Hope] ha[d] in no
significant way done anything to contribute towards the
acquisition, preservation or appreciation or the corporate
assets. 34
The trial justice continued, stating the “limit” of Hope’s
contribution was decorating a property owned by the corporation,
but Hope “served as a homemaker and as such [wa]s entitled to a
share of the marital assets.” 35 Nevertheless, the trial justice
continued, declaring “it would be completely inequitable” for Hope
to receive a portion of Microfibres equal to James, “whose blood,
sweat and tears and contributions by his family ha[d] been the
reason for both the past success and what hopefully w[ould] be the
future success of th[e] company.” 36 Thereafter, the “trial justice
awarded Hope 25 percent” of the stock in Microfibres and 25
percent of that portion of MPL determined as marital property,
leaving the remainder 75 percent of those assets to James. 37

asset. See Stephen W. Schlissel, The Hazards of “In-Kind” Distributions of
Closely-Held Stock in Divorce Actions, 17 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Lawyers
381, 383 n.11 (2001).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 818.
34. Id.
35. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Supreme Court consolidated Hope and James’s appeals
from the Family Court decision. 38 Hope’s appeal presented eight
reasons the trial justice erred in his decision.39 The Court began
with Hope’s contention that the trial justice incorrectly
determined the percentage of MPL that was marital property. 40
Because it was undisputed that Microfibres owned 10 percent of
MPL and James conceded 49.9967 percent of MPL is marital
property, it was the remaining 40.0033 percent of MPL at issue. 41
Applying the abuse of discretion standard, the Court upheld the
trial justice’s finding that James owned 20 percent of MPL before
marriage, and thus was not part of the marital estate, since the
record supported the finding. 42 Specifically, the Court stated the
trial justice’s finding regarding the 20 percent interest “was
perhaps not as explicit as it could have been,” but there was no
error because the trial justice chose to accept James’s testimony
that James had a 20 percent interest in MPL prior to marriage. 43
Regarding the remaining 20.0033 percent of MPL at issue, the
38. Id.
39. Id. at 819–20. Hope’s eight reasons were the following:
(1) in his determination of the percentage of MPL that was marital
property; (2) by declining to place a value on Microfibres before
dividing the marital estate; (3) by disregarding the consent order
that set forth the date as of which the marital property was to be
valued; (4) by assigning Hope 25 percent of Microfibres, thereby
making her a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation; (5)
by declining to award Hope alimony; (6) by awarding Hope only
$1,000 per week in child support; (7) by declining to award Hope fees
for her attorneys, experts, and the supervisor of James's visits with
Lucas; and (8) by declining to order the disclosure of certain
documents and information concerning James's will, trusts, and
estate plans.
Id.
40. Id. at 819. The Court notes the three-step procedure for the
equitable distribution of property in a divorce action. Id. at 820 (stating the
three steps, “(1) determining which assets are marital property; (2)
considering the factors set forth in G.L. 1956 § 15-5-16.1(a); and (3)
distributing the property”).
41. Id. at 820.
42. Id. at 819–20. The Court grants the trial justice “broad discretion”
regarding the equitable distribution of marital assets and the Court will not
overturn the distribution unless the trial justice abused his or her discretion.
Id. at 818–19.
43. Id. at 820–21.
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Court applied the abuse of discretion standard and found no error
in the trial justice’s finding that James’s father gifted the 20.0033
percent to James, and therefore, that portion was not marital
property.44 The Court relied on the existence of three documents,
within the record, that were labeled as deeds of gift. 45
Additionally, the Court noted that the record was without
evidence to disprove the transfer of the 20.0033 percent interest
was a gift. 46
Hope’s second argument considered on appeal was whether
the trial justice erred in assigning percentages of Microfibres and
MPL before placing a value on them.47 While the Court did not
accept Hope’s argument that § 15-5-16.1 required a value to be
placed on all marital property before the property was assigned,
the Court nevertheless held the trial justice abused his discretion
when he failed to value Microfibres and MPL before assigning
them. 48 The Court reasoned, first, that Microfibres and MPL
“constitute such an enormous portion of the marital estate.” 49
Relying on the parties’ experts, the Court explained the value of
the companies as of December 31, 2007 was between $106 million
and $126 million.50 Additionally, even though the value of
Microfibres and MPL may have swayed since that date, it could
not be disputed that the companies created “the vast majority of
the marital estate.” 51
“More importantly,” the Court held the trial justice abused his
discretion when he did not “place a value on the specific portions
of Microfibres and MPL that he assigned to the parties” because
“he assigned the parties unequal percentages, thereby rendering
Hope a minority shareholder of a closely held corporation.” 52 The
Court explained that without knowing the values of the portions
assigned to each party, it could not review whether the entire
44. Id. at 821.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 822.
Hope argued § 15-5-16.1(a) creates a “statutory
obligation” that a trial justice to measure the worth of all marital property
before it is assigned. Id. at 821.
49. Id. at 822.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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distribution was equitable. 53 The Court recognized “assignment
of stock in a closely held corporation, which makes one spouse a
minority shareholder, is generally disfavored and should be
avoided whenever possible.” 54 By not placing value on Microfibres
and MPL before assigning them to each party when the trial
justice assigned Hope 25 percent of the Microfibres and MPL, a 25
percent minority share would “likely not be the equivalent of 25
percent of the total value of the company.”55 The reason for this
discrepancy was twofold: (1) because the stock in a closely held
corporation lacks liquidity since there is no established public
market for the stock; and (2) because a minority shareholder lacks
control over the company and thus, the value of stock “is diluted in
comparison to that of a majority shareholder.” 56 Therefore, the
Court continued, a minority discount or a discount for lack of
marketability were “appropriate, and even necessary, when
valuing an in-kind distribution of a minority share of a closely
held corporation in a divorce action.” 57 Alternatively, the Court
stated the trial justice could award Hope the cash equivalent of
the equitable ownership interest in the companies, and such
discounts would not be required. 58
Without the value determinations of the companies, the Court
declined to address Hope’s assertion that an assignment of 25
percent of Microfibres and MPL was inequitable since the value
could not be compared to the remainder of the marital estate. 59
Because the Court was unable to fully review the distribution of
the marital estate, the Court further declined to review Hope’s
contentions regarding alimony and child support. 60
Turning to Hope’s argument that the trial justice erred when
he ignored the October 17, 2008 consent order, in which the
parties agreed to a valuation date for the marital property, the
Court held “the manner in which the trial justice made his
53. Id.
54. Id. However, the Court takes note that it is not always error when
the distribution of stock in a closely held corporation results in one spouse as
a minority shareholder. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 822–23.
57. Id. at 823.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at n.6 (noting the analysis for both issues depends on the trial
justice’s assignment of marital property on remand).
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decision to disregard the valuation date was error,” but the error
did not require the matter be remanded for a rehearing. 61
Pursuant to paragraph thirty-three of the consent order, James
challenged the valuation date based on a change in
circumstances. 62 However, the trial justice never formerly ruled
on James’s posttrial memorandum, but rather “deviated from the
terms of the consent order,” constituting error. 63 Nevertheless,
the Court reasoned that remanding the matter would not likely
change the trial justice’s decision to abandon the valuation date
contained in the consent order. 64
The Court next turned to Hope’s argument regarding
reimbursement of fees based on James’s conduct in the case. 65
Interpreting Hope’s request for attorney fees as a sanction on
James, the Court noted such a remedy is only available in three
narrow instances, of which only the third applies here: “when a
party has ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons.’” 66 Applying abuse of discretion review, the
Court reasoned Hope failed to show that James “acted in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” 67
Regarding Hope’s argument that James should be required to
reimburse the marital estate for the hired experts and for the
costs of the supervised visits between James and their son, the
Court found no error.68
In response to Hope’s last argument that the trial justice
erred when he denied her request that James disclose certain
documents about his will, trusts, and other estate plans, the Court
61. Id. at 825.
62. Id.
63. Id. (noting the sanctity the law confers upon consent orders).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 826.
66. Id. (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991)).
The other two narrow circumstances in which the Court has exercised its
“inherent power to fashion an appropriate remedy that would serve the ends
of justice” are: “(1) pursuant to the ‘common fund exception’ that ‘allows a
court to award attorney’s fees to a party whose litigation efforts directly
benefit others[,]’* * *; (2) ‘as a sanction for the willful disobedience of a court
order[,]’ * * *.” Id. The Court states Hope did not argue these two
circumstances exist. Id.
67. Id. at 826–27 (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45–46).
68. Id. at 827 (reasoning Hope did not cite a case or legal authority to
support her argument).
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found no abuse in the trial justice’s discretion. 69 The Court
reasoned the trial justice was within his broad discretion to deny
Hope’s discovery request for James’s will and estate plans. 70
Moreover, review of the trial justice’s denial of Hope’s motion to
compel disclosure of James’s trusts was premature because the
Court was already requiring a new equitable distribution of the
marital estate. 71
Lastly, turning to James’s protective and conditional crossappeal, the Court upheld the trial justice’s finding that the
transfer of stock of Microfibres was a sale, not an inheritance. 72
Responding to James’s contention that he and his father intended
the transfer of stock as an inheritance, the Court stated, “[w]hen a
contract is unambiguous, * * * the intent of the parties becomes
irrelevant.” 73 The evidence documenting the transfer of stock
used the terms “purchase” and “sale” and “included all indicia of a
sale,” thereby making the parties’ intent irrelevant. 74 Thus, the
Court concluded, “the transfer of Microfibres stock was, in fact, a
sale.” 75
COMMENTARY
At a glance, requiring the trial justice to place a value on “an
in-kind distribution of a minority share of a closely-held
corporation in divorce action,” precluded the Rhode Island
Supreme Court from considering whether the trial justice’s
distribution was truly equitable.76 However, the Court’s ultimate
holding, that required a trial justice to place a value on the closely
held corporation before portions of it were assigned to each spouse,
presented equitable goals. The Court held that a trial justice’s
assignment of unequal percentages (of a closely held corporation),
which rendered a spouse a minority shareholder, was an abuse of
69. Id. at 827–28.
70. Id. at 828.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 829 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. (quoting Vincent Co. v. First National Supermarkets, Inc., 683
A.2d 361, 363 (R.I. 1996)).
74. Id. at 830.
75. Id. at 829.
76. See id. at 823 (stating, “because we are satisfied that this case
required these value determinations, we decline to address Hope’s contention
that an assignment of only 25 percent of Microfibres and MPL to her was
inequitable . . . ”).
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discretion.77 This line of reasoning stemmed from the equitable
precept that a minority share of a closely held corporation was
likely not the equivalent percentage of the total value of the
company.78 The case illustrates this point: if Hope was assigned
a 25 percent minority share in the company, then she would be
assigned illiquid assets with no ready market and left with no
control over the company. 79 Essentially, the Court rejected the
trial justice’s assignment because it was inequitable—though the
Court does not use this term—and, therefore, mandated
application of a minority discount or a discount of marketability. 80
On the other hand, by remanding the case to determine
values of the companies before portions are assigned, the Court’s
decision avoided the analysis of equitable factors in § 15-516.1(a). 81 While review of the trial justice’s application of the
enumerated factors would be premature, the Court’s disregard for
the analysis beckons questions relating to the notions of fair and
equitable distribution of marital assets. 82 For instance, when the
trial justice applied the factors from § 15-5-16.1(a), he “awarded
each party 50 percent of their bank and investment accounts and
50 percent of one of their country club memberships.” 83 Further,
other assets were divided fairly equally, as Hope was assigned one
home and its contents, two automobiles in her possession, and all
jewelry in her possession, and James was assigned two homes and
their contents, two vacant lots, a remaining golf club membership,
and the jewelry in his possession.84 While the trial justice
assigned other assets equally, he awarded Hope only 25 percent of
the stock in the companies.85 The discrepancy begs the question
of what else the trial justice considered beyond the enumerated
factors in § 15-5-16.1(a).
The trial justice’s statements provide a backdrop for factors
77. Id. at 822.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 823.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (noting the Court cannot review whether Hope’s 25 percent
assignment is equitable in comparison with James’s 75 percent until value is
placed on the companies).
83. Id. at 817.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 818.
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he considered outside of those enumerated in § 15-5-16.1(a). 86
Specifically, the trial justice mentioned the fact that Microfibres
“was a business in the family of [James] for multiple generations”
and “that it would be completely inequitable” for Hope to receive
an equal portion of the companies as James, “whose blood, sweat
and tears and contributions by his family ha[d] been the reason
for both the past success and what hopefully w[ould] be the future
success.” 87 Therefore, the trial justice’s statements provided two
considerations outside of those enumerated in the statute: (1) the
fact that the companies were family businesses; and (2) which
party’s family the businesses were associated with. 88 It could be
inferred that the trial justice’s contemplation of the fact
Microfibres and MPL were James’s family businesses led him to
award Hope 25 percent of the stock in the Microfibres and MPL
since, after consideration of the statutory factors, he divided other
marital assets fairly equally.89
The Court’s opinion did not confront the trial justice’s analysis
of § 15-5-16.1(a), thereby tacitly allowing the family courts to
apply both the enumerated factors therein, but also any other
considerations the trial justices see fit. 90 The trial justice
recognized Hope contributed to the couple’s income and that she
“played the role primarily of homemaker,” but found that Hope
“made little or no contribution to [Microfibres or MPL]” and
subsequently awarded Hope only 25 percent of the stock in the
companies, while dividing other marital assets equally. 91
Further, the trial justice undermined Hope’s contributions as
homemaker when he considered the fact that James hired a nanny
or household help “in order to reduce the homemaker’s
responsibilities” and that James also contributed to the cooking
and child care.92 The trial justice’s analysis inferred that Hope
did not contribute enough, whether as homemaker or to the
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. This analysis focuses on Hope’s assignment of 25 percent in the
companies in comparison to the equal distribution of other marital assets,
rather than the value of the 25 percent assignment itself.
90. McCulloch, 69 A.3d at 823 (stating, “this case required value
determinations” and thus declining to review whether the assignment was
equitable).
91. Id. at 816, 818.
92. Id. at 816.
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companies, to entitle her to an equal portion in the companies as
James. Perhaps, if James did not hire a nanny, or, if Hope
performed all of the family’s cooking, the trial justice’s assignment
would have been different. It may be possible the trial justice
merely believed James was entitled to a substantially larger
portion of the companies because they began through his family.
Despite these speculations, the Court remanded the case in order
to place a value on Microfibres and MPL and trial justices are
thus left to choose how much weight to give to the factors in § 155-16.1(a) and whether to give weight to outside factors.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held a trial justice must
value a closely held corporation before assigning portions to the
parties in a divorce action.93 Further, in a divorce action, a
minority discount or a discount for lack of marketability must be
applied in the distribution of a minority share of a closely held
corporation or the spouse receiving the minority share would be
assigned “illiquid assets that have no ready market” and “left with
no control of the companies.” 94
Sydney Kirsch

93.
94.

Id. at 822–23.
Id. at 823.
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Insurance Law. American States Ins. Co. v. LaFlam, 69 A.3d 831 (R.I.
2013). Contractual provisions in uninsured/underinsured auto insurance
policies that attempt to limit the period in which the insured has to file a
claim against the insurer to a period lesser than the statutory period and start
the limitation from the date of the accident are unenforceable because they
are against public policy.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Joann LaFlam (“LaFlam”) claimed that she suffered serious
injuries when she was involved in an automobile accident on April
25, 2007. 1 The car that LaFlam was driving was insured through
her employer with a policy from American States Insurance
Company (“ASIC”). 2 The policy included coverage for up to one
million dollars in protection from uninsured (“UM”)/underinsured
motorists (“UIM”). 3 Within the policy was a time-bar clause that,
in part, stated that any legal actions brought under the policy
must be brought within three years from the date of the accident. 4
On April 3, 2008, LaFlam sent notice to ASIC that she may
have a claim under the UIM coverage.5 ASIC then asked LaFlam
for information regarding the claim and made several similar
information requests through May of 2009.6 LaFlam was
contractually obligated to seek authorization from ASIC before
settling her UIM claim. 7 So on January 25, 2010, she sent the
authorization request, which was approved by ASIC on February
18, 2010.8 LaFlam then settled her claims against the UIM
tortfeasors.9 On May 19, 2010, LaFlam demanded one million
dollars from ASIC as payout for her UIM coverage. 10
Rather than simply denying the claim, on August 25, 2010,
ASIC filed an action in the United States District Court for the

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

American States Ins. Co. v. LaFlam, 69 A.3d 831, 832–33 (R.I. 2013).
Id. at 833.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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District of Rhode Island for declaratory-judgment. 11 ASIC sought
a declaration stating that any legal claim LaFlam may have
against ASIC under the policy was time-barred because it was
now over three years since the date of LaFlam’s accident which
was April 25, 2007. 12 The parties each submitted a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, the main issue of which was whether
the time-bar clause was enforceable or not based on public policy
grounds. 13 The District Court found that the time-bar clause did
not violate public policy and was, therefore, enforceable under
Rhode Island law. 14
LaFlam appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit and moved for certification of two questions to
the Rhode Island Supreme Court.15 The first question was
whether or not a three-year time limit to bring a claim under
UM/UIM coverage violated public policy. 16 The second question
was whether or not the time limit to bring an UM/UIM claim
begins before the insured knows for certain she will make an
UM/UIM claim. 17 The First Circuit decided that the two questions
were interrelated because a short time limit may bar a person
from filing a claim since time may run out before the person
knows that she even has a claim.18 The Court of Appeals,
therefore, combined the two questions into one, certifying them to
the Rhode Island Supreme Court by asking if under “the UM/UIM
statute and Rhode Island public policy, would Rhode Island
enforce the two provisions of the contractual limitations clause in
this case?” 19
The Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed to answer the
question which essentially asked whether ASIC’s requirement
that LaFlam initiate legal action within three years from the date
of the accident was enforceable and in accordance with Rhode
Island Public Policy. 20
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 833–34.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 833 n.5.
Id.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 834, 838.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Court held that the time-bar clause included in ASIC’s
UM/UIM coverage was unenforceable because it was against
public policy.21 The Court came to this holding by first examining
the purpose of the RI Statute requiring insurers to offer UM/UIM
protection as well as the history of rulings surrounding the statute
in order to get a better picture of the public policy considerations
involved in this case. 22 The Court then examined the effects of a
time-bar clause that begins running on the date of an accident,
and how it would work against those policy considerations.23 The
Court concluded by making it clear that the three-year time-bar
clause was unenforceable because it began to run before LaFlam
had a cause of action against ASIC and because it shortened the
statutory limitations period.24
A. The Public Policy of UM/UIM Coverage
The Court began its exploration of public policy by stating the
purpose and limitations of the statute requiring insurers to offer
UM/UIM coverage. 25 The Court cited several cases that have
explained the legislature’s primary purpose in enacting the
statute was that insured motorists are indemnified when involved
in an accident with an underinsured or uninsured motorist.26 The
Court went on to explain that these UM/UIM contracts should be
interpreted with respect to the public policy considered by the
legislature.27 Accordingly, if contract provisions work to restrict
coverage, those contract provisions will be void.28 That is not to
say that all limitations to recovery are void, however, reasonable
limitations that work to protect insurers have been upheld. 29
21. Id. at 845.
22. Id. at 835–38.
23. Id. at 835–45.
24. Id. at 845.
25. Id. at 835 (referring to R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2.1).
26. Id.; see also Henderson v. Nationwide Insurance Co. 35 A.3d 902, 906
(R.I. 2012); Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Viti, 850 A.2d 104, 107 (R.I.
2004); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Graziano, 587 A.2d 916, 917, 919 (R.I.
1991).
27. LaFlam, 69 A.3d at 839.
28. Id. at 836.
29. Id. at 836–37.
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B. Effects of a Time-Bar Clause That Accrues at the Date of
Accident
The Court then turned its attention to what it found to be the
most troubling part of ASIC’s time-bar clause: the date the
limitations period begins. 30 There were no Rhode Island cases
specifically on point as to when UM/UIM cause of actions accrue,
so the Court first addressed ASIC’s argument that starting the
limitation period on the date of the accident was analogous to
prior Rhode Island case law that established that prejudgment
interest on UM/UIM claims begin to accrue on the date of the
accident. 31 If the insurer’s contractual duties began to run at that
date, ASIC argued, the limitations period should begin at that
date as well.32 The Court rejected the analogy by distinguishing
the “very different” issues of the date when prejudgment interest
begins accruing and when UM/UIM causes of action accrue.33
The Court then examined the law in other jurisdictions as to
when the limitation period starts to run and made the decision to
adopt the majority approach. 34 The majority of jurisdictions have
held that the limitations period began on the date the insurer
denied coverage benefits. 35 This makes sense, because, as
accepted by the Court, UM/UIM claims are actions in contract. 36
They concluded that the limitations period should, therefore,
begin to run at the time of injury of the insured by the insurer,
and the insurer does not injure the insured until a breach of the
insurance contract occurs. 37
ASIC attempted what the Court called a “doomsday scenario”
argument by arguing that an insured could simply put off filing
the claim for years while prejudgment interest accrued. 38 The
Court quickly rejected this argument by recognizing that
insurance companies have the means to protect themselves from
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 838–39.
Id. at 839.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 840.
Id. at 841.
Id.
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stale claims. 39 Further, the Court found it unlikely that an
injured person would want to put off getting “fully compensated
any longer than necessary.” 40
As a last-ditch effort, ASIC then argued that the time should
begin ticking on the time-bar clause when the insured finds out
the limit of the tortfeasor’s insurance policy coverage.41 ASIC
explained that it was at this point an insured would know if the
UM/UIM coverage would be invoked. 42 The insured could then
file suit against the insured and have the proceedings stayed until
after a settlement or judgment is rendered against the
tortfeasor. 43
The Court explained that such a scheme would be inefficient
and may not always work because an insured might end up being
awarded more than initially expected. 44 If the initially expected
award is within the tortfeasor’s insurance coverage, the insured
would not have filed a claim against the insurer. 45 But if the
insured is awarded more than initially expected, and beyond the
tortfeasor’s coverage limit, the insured would not be able to
recover the amount above the tortfeasor’s coverage limit if the
insured’s UIM coverage is time-barred. 46 Further, the Court
explained that requiring a lawsuit to be filed before a controversy
exists would be expensive, time consuming, and utterly pointless
except for the reason of allowing insurers to escape payment. 47
Having dispatched all of ASIC’s arguments and joining in the
majority approach to UM/UIM contract disputes, the Court
examined if the clause at issue could coexist in light of Rhode
Island public policy. 48 Would public policy support UM/UIM
contracts that both shorten the limitations period from the
statutory period and start that limitations period running on a
date before the insured has a cause of action against the

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 841–42.
Id. at 842.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 842–43.
Id. at 842.
Id.
Id. at 844.
Id.
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insurer? 49 The Court answered in the negative. 50 ASIC’s policy
would have had LaFlam file suit before ASIC even breached the
contract. 51 The Court held that a policy such as this
“impermissibly restricts” and “frustrates public policy” with
respect to the UM/UIM statute. 52
COMMENTARY
In terms of the public policy of fairness to the insured, this
case was certainly decided correctly, but the decision is less clear
when viewed in terms of economic policy. The legislature’s public
policy concern when enacting the UM/UIM statute was so that an
insured can be indemnified from UM/UIM drivers. 53 But implicit
within that policy seems to be a concern that insurance actually
indemnify an insured, and that insurance not be cost prohibitive.
The Court’s holding in this case will most likely increase the cost
of UM/UIM insurance and work against the same public policy
used to uphold their decision against ASIC. The only economic
argument raised was brushed aside by the Court as a “doomsday
scenario,” and probably did not receive the consideration it
deserved. 54 Even after an in-depth consideration of the economics
at play here, the holding probably would not have been any
different under the facts of this case. However, decisions like the
one made in this case work to increase liability costs to insurers,
and therefore, increase premiums to the insured, the economics of
which may create a conflict between the ruling here and the
legislature’s stated policy purpose.
As far as fairness and justice policy concerns, this was an easy
decision to make. If ASIC had been allowed to escape liability by
requiring that LaFlam file a legal claim before LaFlam knew that
a claim would ever accrue against ASIC, it would have just
seemed wrong. This is especially true considering LaFlam kept
ASIC up to date on the status of the claim against the tortfeasor
for years until the settlement. 55 The claim from LaFlam,
49. Id.
50. Id. at 845.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 835.
54. See id. at 841–42.
55. Id. at 833.
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therefore, came as no surprise to ASIC. What was surprising,
however, was that ASIC initiated court proceedings considering
how easily the Court dismissed ASIC’s arguments and came to a
decision.
There is one argument that the Court should have explored
deeper. The argument referred to is the “doomsday scenario”
envisioned by ASIC in which the insured sits on their claims for
years accruing prejudgment interest instead of pursuing the
claim. 56 A deeper exploration probably would not have changed
the outcome in this case—the facts in this case made ASIC’s
“doomsday scenario” look especially weak 57—but would have
provided some guidance to courts in the future when it comes to
economic considerations in closer cases.
The Court’s dismissal of this argument was based on the idea
that an injured person in need of recovery would not put off
making a claim and on the fact that an insurer has the means to
protect themselves from those who delay making claims. 58 While
the Court was probably correct about people in need of recovery
seeking recovery as soon as possible, not everyone will need
recovery so quickly.
Now that the limitations period begins on a later date than
the accident date, there will likely become situations in which an
injured person who does not need to recover as soon as possible
puts off making a claim in order to accrue interest. Indeed, it is
those who can afford to pay for high UM/UIM coverage who would
be most able to wait some time without making a claim and who
would consider the economic benefits of the statutory interest rate
in making the decision on when to file the claim. 59
56. See id. at 841.
57. See id. at 833. LaFlam filed suit against ASIC only three months
after the three-year limitation period expired. Id.
58. See id. at 841–42.
59. The statutory interest rate for civil claims is 12% from the date the
cause of action accrues; compare this to the 2.4% expected market rate of
return in the United States. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-21-10 (West);
GuruFocus, Global Market Valuations and Expected Returns – Sept. 4, 2013,
NASDAQ (Sept. 5, 2013), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/article/globalmarket-valuations-and-expected-returns-sept-4-2013-cm272928. While most
people do not have the means to wait for recovery, there do exist some for
whom it makes good economic sense to delay making a claim as long as
possible while interest accrues. Even if the insurer has the “means” to

AMERICANSTATES.SURVEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/20/2014 3:18 PM

964 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:957
While the Court was correct that ASIC’s “doomsday scenario”
will not likely provide enough “doom” to Rhode Island to rule in
favor of ASIC, it can be said with almost equal certainty that the
Court’s ruling is something for insurers to consider when setting
Rhode Island car insurance prices. To add even further to an
insurer’s considerations, it can be gleaned from this case that
there exists some instability in the regulatory environment for
insurance contracts. After this case, insurers will need to increase
policy prices to offset for the potential higher interest costs as well
as any costs that may arise from the perceived regulatory
instability.
Insurers will need to protect themselves from the costs that
will sprout from this decision. Accordingly, the losses will need to
be set off against higher insurance premiums. Considering that
the price of an insurance policy is the only barrier to buying more
insurance, it follows that insurance prices restrict the coverage
that gets purchased. It then further follows that the higher the
price of insurance, the more that insurance gets restricted. Rhode
Island already ranks among the top states for the highest car
insurance costs. 60 The holding in this case will almost certainly
increase those prices and restrict coverage even more. The
question becomes: Is Rhode Island public policy really better
supported with even higher car insurance prices?
The price increase that results from this ruling will most
likely be slight. The Court was right that there probably will not
be many people sitting on claims while interest accrues. 61
Similarly, any regulatory instability might be so slight that
insurance companies will probably not increase insurance prices
noticeably. As such, the rate increase that results from this case
will not be the “straw that breaks the camel’s back” as far as
people being able to afford UM/UIM coverage. This does not
mean, however, that economic policy should not be a consideration
in making these rulings.
The fact is that there will never be any certain case “that
protect itself from delays, those “means” likely cost more than the time-bar
clause in LaFlam’s insurance contract.
60. Chris Persaud, Chart: Car-Ownership Costs by State, BANKRATE
(Aug. 21, 2013), available at http://origin.bankrate.com/finance/auto/carowner
ship-costs-by-state.aspx.
61. LaFlam, 69 A.3d at 842.
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breaks the camel’s back.” There will always be cases like this that
simply add another “straw.” But even though the individual
“straws” will not cause a mass exodus of insurance customers
dropping their car insurance coverage, it is likely that the “straws”
will cause a few people that simply cannot afford to pay more to
drop or lower their UM/UIM coverage. Furthermore, there will be
those who, when purchasing auto insurance, decide against
purchasing UM/UIM coverage or choose to purchase less than
they feel they need because of the cost. In these cases, this
holding in this case will lead to less indemnification of the insured,
which is actually against the same public policy that the Court
used here to rule in favor of LaFlam. 62
That is not to say the Court’s decision was incorrect. Indeed,
the sense of injustice that arose from what ASIC was trying to get
away with was palpable, while any economic concerns seem slight.
The problem, though, is that economic concerns will usually
always seem slight. But that does not mean they do not deserve
consideration. This is especially true for a case like this in Rhode
Island where the cost of car insurance is already among the
nation’s highest. If they have not already done so, at some point
in the future, public policy concerns in regard to indemnification
for a policy holder are going to run square into conflict with public
policy concerns in regard to a person being able to afford to even
be a policy holder.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court was asked whether under
“the UM/UIM statute and Rhode Island public policy, would
Rhode Island enforce the two provisions of the contractual
limitations clause in this case?” 63 The Court answered this
question in the negative. 64 The Court found that provisions in
UM/UIM auto insurance policies that limit the period in which an
insured can file a claim against the insurer and which begin the
limitation period on a date before the insured accrues a claim
against the insurer are unenforceable. 65 Rhode Island public
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 835.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 845.
Id.
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policy with respect to UM/UIM coverage works to ensure
indemnification of the insured, and time-bar clauses that
“impermissibly restrict” and “frustrate” the public policy
considerations are void. 66
Jeffrey Thomas Waltemate

66.

Id.
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Property Law. Wellington Condo. Ass’n v. Wellington Cove Condo. Ass’n,
68 A.3d 594 (R.I. 2013). A dominant estate owner brought an action against
a servient estate owner alleging the creation of an express and implied
easement over a right of way. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that
the “condominium declaration did not create [an] express easement for
access to [the] alleged dominant estate owner’s tennis courts.” 1 The Court
remanded the issue of an implied easement by grant due to insufficient
evidence and ordered fact-finding to determine whether or not the implied
easement was apparent, permanent, and necessary for the enjoyment of the
dominant estate.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Wellington Condominium Association, Wellington Hotel
Association, John Rizzo, Arthur Leonard, and Frederick
Howayeck (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) appealed a judgment denying
an easement over a parcel of land owned by Wellington Cove
Condominium Association, Wellington On The Harbor
Condominium Owner’s Association, and Harrington Court
Condominium, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”). The properties at
issue in this case were neighboring condominiums located on
Narragansett Bay in Newport, Rhode Island, and were formerly
owned by the Wellington Hotel Associates (“declarant”) as a
unified parcel. 2 Over several years the adjacent properties were
developed as condominium projects “in a somewhat piecemeal
fashion.” 3 “In 1986, the declarant filed and recorded a declaration
of condominium,” which “provided that the property could be
developed in phases and, further, that portions of the property
could be withdrawn from the condominium.” 4 The declarant
utilized this provision of the declaration and assigned its right to
withdraw Phases IV and VI to Newport Partners.5 In 1992,
1. Wellington Condo. Ass’n v. Wellington Cove Condo. Ass’n, 68 A.3d
594, 596 (R.I. 2013).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. The title of this declaration was “Wellington Yacht & Racquet
Club on Newport Harbor – A Condominium.”
5. Id. “Phase IV consisted of a parcel of land adjacent to Kirwins Fifth
Ward Land and the west side of the property’s tennis courts. Phase VI was
designated for a marina adjacent to Phase IV. The tennis courts [were] part
of plaintiff’s condominium.” Id. at n.5.
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Newport Partners, as a “successor declarant,” withdrew Phases IV
and VI. 6 The remaining property after the withdrawal of Phases
IV and VI constitutes Plaintiff’s premises and the withdrawn
parcels are Defendants’ premises. 7 This severance is “dispositive
of the issues in this appeal.” 8
Following the withdrawal, Phases IV and VI were conveyed to
various new owners.9 “On March 13, 1997, Newport Partners
conveyed the withdrawn parcel to Newport Partners LLC,” who
subsequently created “Wellington on the Cove Condominium.” 10
The record disclosed that when Newport Partners withdrew
Phases IV and VI, “the claimed right of way consisted of a gravel
road which ran across the withdrawn parcel and alongside tennis
courts belonging to [P]laintiffs’ condominium.” 11 The claimed
right of way was used by Plaintiffs to access their tennis courts
and a point of access to Kirwins Fifth Ward, as its alternative
entrance on Harrington Street was blocked by a chain and
recently, since 2008, a gate, which was occasionally locked. 12 The
right of way was “paved around 1999 or 2000 by the developers of
the condominiums on Defendants’ premises.” 13 In “the summer of
2005, a chain barrier was placed between two poles, positioned at
the southern end of the claimed right of way, which impeded
access by vehicle and foot traffic.” 14 Defendants refused to remove
the barrier despite protests by Plaintiffs.15 A year later,
Defendants replaced the chain with “heavy plastic barriers which
blocked vehicular traffic, and impeded pedestrian traffic.” 16
“[P]laintiffs filed an action against defendant[s] [and] alleg[ed]
that, according to the condominium declaration, [P]laintiffs had

6. Id. at 596. “Under Article 14, section 14.1 of the declaration—
‘Reservation of Rights’—one of the rights reserved to the declarant and ‘its
successors and assigns’ is the right ‘to withdraw real estate from the
Condominium.’” Id.
7. Id. at 596–97.
8. Id. at 597.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
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an express easement over the right of way.” 17 They additionally
argued they maintained an “implied or prescriptive easement over
the right of way.” 18
In June of 2010, a two-day bench trial commenced. 19 The
trial judge found that “[P]laintiffs had failed to prove that the
declaration and its amendments reserved an express easement
over the claimed right of way,” and “‘that there [was] no amenity
located in, by, along or adjacent to Narragansett Bay which
Plaintiffs [were] entitled to access.’” 20 The trial judge then turned
to Plaintiffs’ claim of an implied easement and reasoned that
“when a common owner severs his or her own land and retains the
dominant estate, [an] implied easement over the servient estate
can arise only if the easement is ‘absolutely necessary’ to the use
and enjoyment of the dominant estate.” 21 The trial court
concluded that “the right of way was not absolutely necessary for
[P]laintiffs’ use of their properties because they were able to
access Kirwins Fifth Ward Land and their tennis courts through
the access point on Harrington Street,” and final judgment was
entered on September 8, 2010 for Defendants. 22 Plaintiffs
appealed on several grounds. 23
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The trial justice sat without a jury, and, therefore, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court must give “great weight” to his factual
findings unless “the record shows that the findings clearly are
wrong or the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material
evidence.” 24 If evidence in the record supports the trial judge’s
17. Id.
18. Id. at 597–98.
19. Id. at 598.
20. Id. The trial judge found “‘that the intent of the [d]eclarant was to
provide access to the proposed marina of Phase VI.’” Id. (internal citation
omitted). Additionally, the trial judge found “‘[w]hen the Defendants’
[p]remises [were] withdrawn, the Third Amendment did not grant to the
Plaintiffs or its members any right to use the proposed marina’ and,
‘therefore, no right of way was necessary to access any such amenity[.]’” Id.
(internal citation omitted).
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. (quoting Hernandez v. JS Pallet Co., 41 A.3d 978, 982 (R.I.
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findings, the Court “shall not substitute [its] own view of the
evidence for [that of the trial justice] even though a contrary
conclusion could have been reached.” 25
Additionally, the Court noted that the burden of proof to
prove an easement is different from that in a normal civil action,
due to the extensive policy considerations “against placing undue
burdens upon property.” 26
The Court began its review of the trial justice’s decision by
examining the text of the declaration that purportedly granted an
expressed easement. “Section 14.2 of the declaration state[d] that
‘the [d]eclarant will provide reasonable rights of way over and
across the real estate withdrawn necessary to provide adequate
access to any amenity located in, by, along or adjacent to
Narragansett Bay.’”27 Plaintiffs argued that this created an
express easement over Defendant’s land and “applie[d] to
amenities located on [P]laintiffs’ property that are located along
Narragansett Bay.” 28 Plaintiffs charge error to the trial justice
and claim he added language to section 14.2 when he concluded
“‘[w]hen the Defendants’ Premises was withdrawn, the Plaintiffs
had no right to use any amenity in, by, along or adjacent to
Narragansett Bay located within the [d]efendants’ Premises.’” 29
Rhode Island law has long held that “‘[w]hen construing an
instrument that purportedly creates an easement, it is this
Court’s duty to effectuate the intent of the parties,’” and “‘when
the written terms of an agreement are clear and unambiguous,
they can be interpreted and applied to the undisputed facts as a
matter of law.’” 30 Accordingly, oral testimony and extrinsic
evidence will not be “received to explain the nature or extent of

2012)).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 599. “[A]lthough a plaintiff in a civil action normally must
meet his burden by only a preponderance of the evidence, the plaintiff must
overcome a higher clear and convincing standard to prove an easement.” Id.
(quoting Ondis v. City of Woonsocket ex rel. Treasurer Touzin, 934 A.2d 799,
803 (R.I. 2007)).
27. Id. at 600 (emphasis added).
28. Id. The “amenities” included the tennis courts. Id.
29. Id. Plaintiffs contend the trial justice added the highlighted
language (internal citation omitted).
30. Id. (quoting Hilley v. Lawrence, 972 A.2d 643, 649 (R.I. 2009)).
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the right acquired.” 31 The Court found the text of the declaration
to be clear and unambiguous, but held that it did not extend to the
tennis courts or access to Kirwins Fifth Ward Lane because
section 14.2 applied only to the marina on Phase VI. 32 The
Supreme Court reasoned that the inclusion of “Narragansett Bay”
in the purported easement served as a limitation insomuch as it
narrowed the scope of the easement to “any such amenity [that is]
directly connected to or linked with Narragansett Bay.” 33 There
was no express easement for the tennis courts as they were not
located on Narragansett Bay, and they did not bear any
“relationship to Narragansett Bay”; 34 therefore, even if considered
an “amenity,” the tennis courts do not fit within the narrow
construction of the easement, and the Supreme Court found no
error in the trial justice’s finding.35
The Court then turned to Plaintiffs’ claim of an implied
easement. 36 The Court, relying on Wiesel v. Smira, noted two
different types of implied easements—an implied reservation of an
easement and an implied grant of an easement. 37 The trial court
justice’s synthesis of Wiesel yielded that “‘when a common owner
creates a severance of his own land and retains the dominant
portion, he is presumed to reserve whatever rights he needs in the
31. Id. at 600.
32. Id. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial justice’s finding that
“‘the intent of the [d]eclarant [in] including §14.2 in the First Declaration was
to provide access to the proposed marina.’” Id.
33. Id. at 600–01.
34. Id. at 600.
35. Id. at 600–01. The trial judge “properly focused his analysis on the
precise language of Section 14.2 and the specific easement rights that were
reserved—those relating to the marina.”
36. Id. at 601.
37. Id.; see Wiesel v. Smira, 49 R.I. 246, 253 (1928).
[T]he distinction is based upon the theory that the common owner’s
deed of a portion of his land conveys all essential rights which he
has, and that whatever is apparent and continuously necessary to
the beneficial use and enjoyment of the granted property is intended
to be conveyed so far as the grantor could do so. From this it is clear
that where the owner creates a severance by sale of the servient
portion of his premises[,] no implication of intention to reserve any
rights to himself as owner of the quasi dominant estate ought to be
made unless such rights are absolutely necessary to the use of the
property reserved.
Wiesel, 49 R.I. at 249.
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servient portion of the real estate.’” 38 The trial justice found “an
implied easement can only arise in such a situation if the rights in
the servient estate are absolutely necessary to the dominant
estate,” and concluded that the declarant, Plaintiffs and the
original condominium association, did not reserve an easement for
its premises when the parcel was severed. 39 After this finding,
the trial justice analyzed the facts “under the framework of an
implied easement by reservation, which triggers the more exacting
standard that the use of the easement be ‘absolutely necessary.’” 40
The Court began its review of the trial justice’s determination
of an implied easement by determining which party “was the
common owner of the property vested with the right to reserve an
easement unto itself.” 41 The preamble stated the declarant was
the “owner in fee simple” of the entire parcel and reserved the
right to withdraw parcels of real estate in section 14.2. 42 Thus,
Newport Partners, as successor declarant, was assigned the same
rights as the declarant and “stepped into the shoes of the
declarant.” 43 Accordingly, “it was the declarant that withdrew the
real estate and not [P]laintiffs.” 44 Therefore, the Court found the
trial justice’s conclusion to be erroneous as the trial justice
“conflated the estates that were retained by the declarant and the
portion that comprised [P]laintiffs’ premises.” 45 The Court held
that the trial justice misapplied the proper analysis because it
“rest[ed] on the erroneous conclusion that Plaintiffs conveyed a
portion of land without expressly reserving a right of way for their
use,” 46 when, in fact, it was the declarant who “withdrew and
retained a portion of the premises—the servient estate—for its
own commercial purposes, thereby in effect transferring the

38. Wellington Condo. Ass’n, 68 A.3d at 601.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 601–02 (citing Wiesel, 49 R.I. at 249).
41. Id. at 602. The court noted that the basic tenants of property law do
not “coalesce easily with complex modern real estate transactions and the law
of condominium development and ownership.” Id. Additionally, the court
noted that “[t]he law of implied easements may not be well-suited to the facts
of this complex case.” Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 601.
46. Id. at 602.
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dominant estate to [P]laintiffs.” 47 Consequently, as Plaintiffs did
not convey anything and could not “be deemed to be grantors or
characterized as [] common owner[s] who convey[ed] a portion of
[their] estate,” 48 they could not have created an implied easement
by reservation.
The Court found that the property was severed by a common
owner and a portion was retained for further development;
therefore, the facts must be analyzed under an implied easement
by grant. 49 A claim for implied easement by grant must be “(1)
apparent, (2) permanent, and (3) reasonably necessary for the
enjoyment of the claimant’s parcel prior to severance.” 50 The trial
justice did not make any findings as to an easement by grant, and
the record did not hold sufficient facts to make this
determination. 51 Therefore, the decision of the trial justice, with
respect to the implied easement, was vacated and remanded for
“further evidence and fact-finding to ascertain whether the
Plaintiffs have an implied easement by grant over the claimed
right of way.” 52
Plaintiffs’ appeal was “sustained in part and denied in
part.” 53 The trial justice’s finding of an express easement was
affirmed, and the determination of the claim of an implied
easement was vacated and remanded.54
COMMENTARY
While the trial justice and Court applied the correct
applicable law and arrived at the correct logical conclusion,
easement law is archaic, outdated, problematic, overbroad,
complex, and merely a burden to current real estate transactions
and development.55 Easements are too easy to create and are
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 603.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving
the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1261 (1981-1982). “The law of
easements . . . is the most complex and archaic body of American property
law remaining in the twentieth century.” Id.
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sometimes created inadvertently; however, existing easements are
very difficult to dispose of, especially considering the high costs of
litigation. Easements plague properties with nearly irreversible
burdens that disrupt sales, divisions and developments of
properties and potentially decrease the property’s market value—
all interests which are fundamental to property ownership.
As seen in the present case, implied easements are not only a
fall back to a failed argument of an express easement, but courts
may grant an implied easement and implicate the property
despite lack of intent to do so. Implied easements not only burden
the current landowner, but inhibit prospective purchasers of the
land. Implied easements are often difficult to discover, and their
use may be unnoticed during an inspection of the property. Even
if noticed, the scope, extent, and duration of the easement may be
impossible to ascertain. Why put such an important property
right at stake? Why allow implied easements at all? A property
owner is giving up one of his “sticks” in the property bundle; why
allow that to be decided by implication? There is nothing more
valuable to a property owner than his fundamental property
rights—including excluding others from his property—and implied
easements unduly and unnecessarily challenge this right.
Moreover, implied easements of grant and reservation should
be abolished. The policy and purpose of implied easements by
grant and reservation can be found in other easement categories—
express easements, easements of necessity and easements for an
intended use. 56 These latter easements should be construed and
only enforced in a narrow way.
Easement law needs consideration and reform. The
simplification and modernization of the law will eliminate the
outdated complexities that inherently coincide with easements. 57
In fact, England, from which the United States derived its
fundamental property law and principles, has recognized
easements’ shortcomings, and recently, called for simplification
and reform of servitude law. 58
56. Law Commission Report No. 327, Making Land Work: Easements,
Covenants, and Profits à Prendre (Jun. 7 2011), available at http://law
commissionjustice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf.
57. French, supra n.55 at 1265.
58. See JAMES A. NORMINGTON, Rethinking Easements and Restrictive
Covenants, 15 IBA REAL EST. 43 (2011); see also Law Commission Report No.
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The Court’s affirmation of the trial court’s finding is
supported by case law. However, this case law is outdated. This
case may be the last of its kind if its call for modernizing the
easement law is recognized and accepted by the legislature. As
times change, so do laws, and easement law has been left behind
and alleged servient estate property owners are suffering for it.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice’s
decision concerning the claim of an express easement. However,
the Court vacated and remanded the trial justice’s determination
of an implied easement by reservation due to a lack of fact-finding
to determine whether the requirements of an implied easement by
reservation had been satisfied.
Christopher J. Fragomeni

327, supra n.56.
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Tort Law. Oden v. Schwartz, 71 A.3d 438 (R.I. 2013). The Rhode Island
Supreme Court affirmed a judgment entered against an echocardiologist in a
medical malpractice action, holding the following: (1) the defendant did not
put forth sufficient evidence to warrant an instruction on intervening and
superseding cause, (2) testimony showing the plaintiff suffered cardiac arrest
soon after his second surgery was admissible as there was evidence
establishing a causal nexus between this injury and the defendant’s breach,
(3) the trial justice was not clearly erroneous in concluding the damages
award was not excessive, (4) the trial justice’s sua sponte instruction
prohibiting jurors from considering the parties’ insurance coverage was
proper, and (5) the statute imposing a mandatory twelve percent
prejudgment interest rate in medical malpractice actions was constitutional.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On January 26, 2004, forty-nine year old plaintiff Paul Oden
underwent open-heart mitral valve replacement surgery at Rhode
Island Hospital. 1 Heart surgeon Arun K. Singh, M.D. performed
this surgery with the assistance of defendant Carl Schwartz, M.D.,
an echocardiologist at Rhode Island Hospital. 2 Neither Dr. Singh
nor Dr. Schwartz documented any surgical complications.3
Approximately three months later, however, Mr. Oden’s
cardiologist diagnosed him with severe aortic insufficiency (“A.I.”)
allegedly caused by Dr. Singh mistakenly suturing his aortic valve
during the January 2004 mitral valve replacement. 4 As a result,
Mr. Oden required an aortic valve replacement in August 2004,
immediately after which he suffered cardiac arrest. 5
Mr. Oden brought medical malpractice actions in Providence
County Superior Court against Rhode Island Hospital, Dr. Singh,
and Dr. Schwartz, but settled his claims against Rhode Island
Hospital and Dr. Singh. 6 Thus, only the action against Dr.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Oden v. Schwartz, 71 A.3d 438, 441 (R.I. 2013).
Id.
Id. at 443–44.
Id. at 441.
Id.
Id. at 441–42.
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Schwartz went to a jury trial and is the subject of this case. 7
A.

Summary of the Testimony

At trial, Mr. Oden called two expert witnesses and Dr. Singh
to testify on his behalf. 8 Mr. Oden and his wife Linda also
testified.9 Dr. Singh testified that he mistakenly stitched Mr.
Oden’s aortic valve causing the A.I., but said he was not aware of
the problem at the time of the surgery. 10 He explained that he
was unable to see behind the mitral valve while working on it and
relied on his surgical team, his echocardiologist in particular, to
identify such a problem. 11 Dr. Singh’s testimony was somewhat
inconsistent as to whether Dr. Schwartz informed him of the A.I.
after the surgery. 12 Mr. Oden’s expert witnesses testified that
regardless of whether Dr. Schwartz reported the A.I. to Dr. Singh,
Dr. Schwartz deviated from the standard of care by “fail[ing] to
conduct a detailed study of the aortic valve” following the first
surgery, as well as by failing to document the A.I. in Mr. Oden’s
medical record. 13 In addition, one of the experts testified that Mr.
Oden would not have required a second surgery if the injured
aortic valve was properly addressed at the first surgery. 14 The
second surgery, Mr. Oden testified, made it difficult for him to “get
on with his life,” and knowing he would need a third “ma[de] [him]
sad and affect[ed] his mood.” 15 In regards to the the cardiac
arrest he suffered following his second surgery, Mr. Oden
described being cardioverted as “the wors[t] pain [he] ever felt.” 16
Likewise, Dr. Schwartz testified on his own behalf and also
called an expert witness. 17 Dr. Schwartz testified “that it was his
7. Id. at 442.
8. Id. Mr Oden’s expert witnesses were Stuart Pett, M.D., a heart
surgeon, and Justin D. Pearlman, M.D., an expert in the field of
echocardiography. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 443.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 446.
14. Id.
15. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Id. Dr. Schwartz’s expert witness was Adam B. Lerner, M.D., the
director of the cardiac anesthesia division at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical
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‘best recollection’ that he advised Dr. Singh of the A.I. at the
conclusion of the mitral valve replacement. He admitted that he
failed to document the A.I.,” and “acknowledged that, in this case,
he ‘did not do a totally detailed exam’ of the aortic valve.” 18 He
believed, however, that the standard of care did not require him to
obtain further information without Dr. Singh’s instruction, as the
surgical team “must defer to the surgeon’s decisions in this
regard.” 19 Dr. Schwartz also testified that Dr. Singh was not
concerned about Mr. Oden’s A.I. upon learning of it, thus decided
to take him off bypass. 20 Dr. Schwartz’s expert testified that, in
his opinion, Dr. Schwartz’s failure to document the A.I. in the
medical record did not meet the standard of care. 21 On the other
hand, he testified that Dr. Schwartz did meet the standard of care
by identifying the A.I. and alerting Dr. Singh to it. 22 He
acknowledged, however, that his opinion was based on accepting
Dr. Schwartz’s testimony as true.23
B.

Jury Charge and Jury Verdict

Despite Dr. Schwartz’s requests to the contrary, the trial
justice’s closing instructions to the jury did not include an
instruction on intervening and superseding cause and did include
an instruction prohibiting the jurors from speculating about the
parties’ insurance coverage. 24 Dr. Schwartz objected to both
aspects of these instructions and argued that it was improper for
the trial justice to inject the issue of insurance into the case. 25 In
response, the trial justice explained that she “deemed it important
to tell jurors that they mustn’t consider insurance as a factor in
deciding the merits of the case” because “there was so much media
coverage on this subject.” 26 In addition, she pointed out that since
“everyone has insurance,” she had not “raised anything that the
Center in Boston. Id.
18. Id. at 444.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 446.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 447.
25. Id.
26. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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jurors [did not] know about.” 27
“Before the jury retired to deliberate, Dr. Schwartz moved for
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a)(1) of the Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial justice deferred her
ruling on that motion until the jury reached its verdict.” 28 “[T]he
jury returned a $1.5 million-dollar verdict in [Mr.] Oden’s favor,”
finding “that Dr. Schwartz was 25 percent responsible for [Mr.]
Oden’s injuries and that Dr. Singh was 75 percent responsible for
those injuries. Thus, Dr. Schwartz was deemed responsible for
$375,000 of those damages, plus costs and statutory interest.” 29
C.

Post-Trial Motions

After the verdict was announced, the trial justice denied Dr.
Schwartz’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. 30 After final
judgment and statutory interest were entered for Mr. Oden in the
amounts of $375,000 and $170,260.27, respectively, the trial
justice also awarded costs in favor of Mr. Oden in the amount of
$4,416.50. 31 Dr. Schwartz then moved for a new trial under Rule
59(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. 32 He also
moved to vacate, alter, or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e),
and asked for a remittitur, contending the evidence did not
support the damages awarded.33
In ruling on these motions, “the trial justice independently
reviewed and summarized the trial testimony.” 34 She explicitly
found Mr. Oden and his expert witnesses to be credible, but found
that Dr. Singh and Dr. Schwartz were not credible. 35 While she
did not make a specific finding as to the credibility of Dr.
Schwartz’s expert, she noted that his testimony “assumed Dr.
Schwartz was telling the truth.” 36 Concluding “reasonable minds
could have reached differing results with this evidence,” the trial
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal footnote omitted).
Id. at 447–48.
Id. at 448.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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justice denied Dr. Schwartz’s Rule 59 motions. 37
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Dr. Schwartz raised five arguments on appeal.38 First, he
argued the trial justice should have instructed the jury on
intervening and superseding cause.39 Second, he argued the trial
justice should not have admitted evidence concerning the cardiac
arrest Mr. Oden suffered following his second surgery. 40 Third, he
argued the trial justice erred in concluding the damages award
was not excessive.41 Fourth, he argued the trial justice should not
have sua sponte instructed the jury on the issue of liability
insurance.42 Finally, he argued that a Rhode Island statute
imposing a mandatory twelve percent prejudgment interest rate
in medical malpractice actions was unconstitutional as it would
deprive litigants of substantive and procedural due process. 43 The
Court addressed each of these issues in turn.44
A.

Instruction on Intervening and Superseding Cause

Dr. Schwartz argued that the trial justice erred in failing to
instruct the jury on intervening and superseding causes,
contending that Dr. Singh’s failure to evaluate the aortic valve
when notified of the A.I. constituted an independent intervening
force sufficient to break the causal connection between his own
alleged failure to obtain sufficiently detailed echocardiographical
views of the aortic valve and Mr. Oden’s harm. 45 Reviewing the
issue de novo,46 the Court held that such an instruction would
have been improper.47 In so holding, the Court emphasized that
37. Id. at 450 (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviews “issues pertaining to jury
instructions” de novo. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
47. Id.
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Dr. Schwartz had the burden of proof on this affirmative defense,
and that he failed to introduce sufficient evidence to meet that
burden. 48 Further, the Court defined an intervening cause as one
that “exists when an independent and unforeseeable intervening
or secondary act of negligence occurs, after the alleged tortfeasor’s
negligence, and that secondary act becomes the sole proximate
cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.” 49 The Court largely adopted the
trial justice’s reasoning in determining that Dr. Singh’s negligence
did not fall within this definition because it was not independent
of Dr. Schwartz’s negligence.50 Rather, the Court concluded that
the two doctors, operating as part of a surgical team, had “roles
and responsibilities [that] were inextricably intertwined” and that
“if anything, this [was] a situation in which one physician’s duty
include[d] guarding against the mistakes of another, even if those
mistakes may [have been] the result of negligence.” 51
B. Admission of Testimony Pertaining to Oden’s Post-Operative
Cardiac Arrest
Next, Dr. Schwartz argued “there was no testimony from any
witness competent to opine that Mr. Oden’s post-operative cardiac
arrest in August of 2004 [was related to] * * * any act or omission
on [his part] in connection with the surgery in January of 2004,”
that instead the cardiac arrest was likely caused by Mr. Oden’s
nicotine and alcohol use, and that the trial justice thus erred in
allowing testimony concerning the cardiac arrest. 52 The Court
disagreed and concluded that Mr. Oden’s expert’s testimony was
sufficient “to suggest that a causal relationship existed between
the cardiac arrest and Dr. Schwartz’s negligence at the first
surgery, such that the admission of testimony concerning the
cardiac arrest was proper.” 53 In addition, though the Court found
Dr. Schwartz’s argument concerning Mr. Oden’s alcohol and
nicotine use to be unconvincing, it noted the jury had been allowed

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 450–51 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 451.
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.at 452 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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to hear and weigh that argument. 54
C.

Denial of Defendant’s Request as to the Damage Award

Dr. Schwartz further contended that the jury verdict was
excessive as it was “against the fair weight of the evidence” and
was improperly based on sympathy evoked by Mr. Oden’s “frail
and weak” condition on the witness stand due to his unrelated
stroke. 55 Accordingly, he argued that the trial justice erred in
denying his request for remittitur as well as his motion to vacate,
alter, or amend the damage award.56 Applying a clearly erroneous
standard of review, the Court noted that the trial judge “aptly
performed her role in assessing the credibility of witnesses,
weighing the evidence, and evaluating the propriety of the damage
award,” and held that she did not err in “conclud[ing] that the
damages award was satisfactory and that the verdict [did] not
shock the conscience.” 57
D. Insurance Instruction
Dr. Schwartz next argued that the trial justice’s sua sponte
jury instruction on insurance violated Rule 411 of the Rhode
Island Rules of Evidence. 58 Reviewing the instruction de novo,
the Court considered whether the instruction, though not
technically evidence, violated the spirit of the rule; the Court
concluded it did not. 59 First, the Court recognized that “the
overall concept of liability insurance may have pervaded the
minds of the jurors in this case,” as it is “a wholly familiar
concept—from mandatory motor vehicle insurance coverage to the
vigorous nationwide debate concerning medical insurance and
54. Id.
55. Id. at 452–53.
56. Id. at 452.
57. Id. at 453 (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. Id. at 454. “In pertinent part, Rule 411 states: ‘[e]vidence that a
person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the
issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.’ However, such
evidence may be allowed ‘when offered for another purpose, such as proof of
agency, ownership, or control, bias or prejudice of witness, or when the court
determines that in the interests of justice evidence of insurance or lack of
insurance should be permitted.’” Id. (citation omitted).
59. Id.
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medical liability.” 60 Thus, the trial justice’s instruction likely did
not awaken jurors to anything of which they were previously
unaware.61 Further, the Court cited the Advisory Committee’s
Note to Rule 411, which “declares that ‘[t]he Rhode Island
approach tempers the rule excluding evidence of liability
insurance with a realistic view of contemporary society that
recognizes the ubiquitous presence of insurance.’” 62 In this
regard, the Court concluded that the trial justices’ instruction
“directly square[d] with the spirit of Rule 411” by “prohibit[ing]
the jury from speculating about insurance coverage in its
deliberations.” 63 Finally, the Court noted that the instruction on
insurance coverage likely did not prejudice the jurors as it
occupied only thirty seconds of the two-hour-long jury
instructions. 64 For these reasons, the Court determined that this
instruction was proper. 65
E. The Constitutionality of §9-21-10(b)
Lastly, Dr. Schwartz challenged the constitutionality of Rhode
Island General Laws § 9-21-10(b) under the due process clause of
the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions.66 He argued
that by imposing a mandatory twelve percent prejudgment
interest rate in, the statute infringed on a defendant’s
fundamental right to a jury trial, thereby depriving that
defendant of substantive due process. 67 Dr. Schwartz rested this
60. Id. at 455.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. The court advised: “the trial justice might more appropriately
have refrained from using the phrase ‘a physician’s insurance premiums’ in
her instruction,” but determined that this phrase did not render the jurors
“incapable of arriving at a fair and impartial verdict.” Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 456. “Section 9–21–10(b) states in pertinent part: ‘In * * *
medical malpractice actions in which a verdict is rendered or a decision made
for pecuniary damages, there shall be added by the clerk of the court to the
amount of damages interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
thereon from the date of written notice of the claim by the claimant or his or
her representative to the malpractice liability insurer, or to the medical or
dental health care provider or the filing of the civil action, whichever first
occurs.’” Id.
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argument on the contention that “a defendant, facing the looming
threat of obtaining an unfavorable judgment with the inclusion of
prejudgment interest, [would] opt to settle rather than assert his
or her right to a trial by jury,” and that the statute operated to
punish those who did opt to assert that right. 68 Contending that a
jury trial constituted a fundamental right, Dr. Schwartz argued
the statute needed to survive a strict scrutiny.69 Dr. Schwartz
further argued that the “process in which the clerk of the court
uniformly adds such interest deprives a defendant of his or her
property without an opportunity to be heard,” thereby depriving
the defendant of procedural due process.70
In addressing these arguments, the Court stated that it would
not hold a statute unconstitutional unless the party challenging
its constitutionality “prove[d] beyond a reasonable doubt that the
act violate[d] a specific provision of the Rhode Island Constitution
or the United States Constitution.” 71 In addition, the Court
determined that the prejudgment interest statute constituted
economic legislation that did not implicate a fundamental right.72
As such, the Court examined the statute using a rational basis
standard of review, under which “the statute [would] be upheld ‘if
there [was] any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis’ for the [twelve] percent prejudgment
interest rate in medical malpractice actions.” 73 The Court
concluded that the statute served two purposes, compensating
plaintiffs for delay and encouraging early settlement of claims,
and thus held that it passed a rational basis review. 74 Likewise,
the Court determined that “[t]he fact that the prejudgment
interest award [was] uniform, not discretionary,” did not deprive a
defendant of procedural due process because it “[was] both an
expedient and efficient use of judicial resources.” 75 For these
reasons, the Court held that §9-21-10(b) was constitutional. 76

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id. at 457.
Id.
Id. at 456 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 457.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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COMMENTARY
Though this case presented the Court with several issues, this
Commentary will focus on just one: whether Rhode Island’s
twelve percent prejudgment interest rate violates defendants’
constitutional rights. As the Court resolved this issue quite
straightforwardly, despite it being an issue of first impression,
this Commentary will offer a more in-depth discussion of the
arguments on either side of the debate.
Prejudgment interest is generally understood to serve two
purposes. First, by compensating plaintiffs for the inability to use
money they were entitled to use, prejudgment interest puts
plaintiffs in the position they would have been in had a judgment
been paid immediately. 77 Second, prejudgment interest provides
defendants with an incentive to resolve disputes efficiently, for
example by settling. 78 In the case at hand, the Court deferred to
these two purposes in holding that Rhode Island’s legislature had
a rational basis for imposing a mandatory twelve percent
prejudgment interest rate. 79
In theory, however, these purposes are served when the
interest is at or near the market rate. 80 As the market rate is
currently quite low, and as Rhode Island’s twelve percent
prejudgment interest rate is among the highest in the United
States, the question becomes whether it really serves these
purposes. 81 For example, it could be argued that Rhode Island is
overcompensating plaintiffs to whatever degree a twelve percent
prejudgment interest rate exceeds that which is truly necessary to
77. For example, plaintiffs could invest and collect interest on their
judgments once paid; likewise, plaintiffs might need to borrow money at
interest until a judgment is paid. Michael S. Knoll, A Primer on Prejudgment
Interest, 75 TEX. L. REV. 293, 294–02 (1996).
78. Id.
79. Oden, 71 A.3d at 457.
80. Knoll uses the term “market rate” to make this point. Knoll, supra
note 77, at 297. It should be noted, however, that prejudgment interest rates
are frequently compared to the “prime rate,” or base institutional lending
rate. For the purposes of this discussion, I use the term “market rate” to
include a broader range of interest rates at which the plaintiff and defendant
might, respectively, borrow or lend the money at stake in the action.
81. See Brandon Gee, Defense Bar: Interest Rate on Verdicts
Unreasonable, MASS. LAWYERS WEEKLY, (July 1, 2013), http://masslawyers
weekly.com/2013/07/03/defense-bar-interest-rate-on-verdicts-unreasonable/.
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compensate them. The marginal difference between a truly
compensatory prejudgment interest rate and an overly
compensatory prejudgment interest rate might not, then, be
rationally related to the purpose the interest rate is intended to
serve, in which case the rate might indeed violate due process.
The Court seemingly dodged this possibility, however, by applying
a low level of scrutiny and using double-negatives, concluding that
it “[could not] say that, even in today’s economy, [twelve] percent
[was] not a reasonable measure of the loss sustained through
delay in payment.” 82
Yet, even if the court approached its analysis with a higher
level of scrutiny, the result would likely be the same. First, Rhode
Island’s prejudgment interest rate can certainly be defended as
rationally related to the goal of compensating plaintiffs for delay.
The Rhode Island Association for Justice’s amicus brief, quoting
the trial justice, set forth such a defense:
Although institutional lending rates are quite low right
now, that fact alone does not render the rate of 12 percent
irrational or unrelated to an important legislative
purpose. One or two percentage points over the prime
rate is generally reserved for a bank’s best corporate
customers. For the average person or small business,
rates are higher. Home loans are between four and six
percent, second home and automobile loans are around
seven to eight, or even nine. Vendors and suppliers add
18 to 21 percent to their invoices. Retailers and revolving
credit companies charge 21 to 29 percent. Currently, 12
percent is pretty much in the middle and, as such, it
provides compensation and serves as an incentive . . .
assessing interest at the prime rate would do little, if
anything, to promote early and fair settlements. In fact,
it would serve as a disincentive. Banking and other
institutions such as insurance carriers can achieve a
higher rate of return if they keep their money instead of
settling . . . The statute, at its statutory rate of 12
percent, is rationally related to all of its purposes. 83
82. See Oden, 71 A.3d at 456 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
83. Brief for Paul Oden and Linda Oden as Amicus Curiae Rhode Island
Association for Justices Supporting Appellees and the Constitutionality of
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Second, it seems Rhode Island’s true goal is to encourage
settlement, and by erring on the higher end of the interest-rate
spectrum, Rhode Island seems to be targeting large, institutional
defendants that would lack incentive to settle if the prejudgment
interest rate were closer to market value. In that regard, any
difference between a truly compensatory prejudgment interest
rate and an overly compensatory prejudgment interest rate would
be rationally justified by Rhode Island’s interest in protecting its
consumers and small businesses from large institutions with
ample resources to litigate. Thus, although the Court did not
articulate this line of reasoning in such depth, it was correct in
holding that Rhode Island’s legislature had a rational basis for
imposing a mandatory twelve percent prejudgment interest rate.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed five
distinct issues in this case. First, it held that there was
insufficient evidence to warrant an instruction on intervening and
superseding cause. Second, the Court held that testimony showing
the plaintiff suffered cardiac arrest soon after his second surgery
was admissible where there was evidence establishing a causal
nexus between this injury and the defendant’s breach. Third, the
Court held that the trial justice was not clearly erroneous in
concluding the damages award was not excessive. Fourth,
acknowledging that the concept of insurance coverage is a matter
of common knowledge, the Court held that the trial justice’s sua
sponte instruction prohibiting jurors from considering the parties’
insurance coverage was proper and did not violate the spirit of
Rule 411 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Finally, the court
held that §9-21-10(b) was constitutional as it was rationally
related to Rhode Island’s goals of compensating plaintiffs and
encouraging settlement.
Mackenzie Flynn

R.I. GEN. LAWS §9-21-10 at 7, Oden v. Schwartz, 71 A.3d 438 (R.I. 2013) (No.
SU-11-0167) (citation omitted).
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Tort Law. Vasquez v. Sportsman’s Inn, Inc., 57 A.3d 313 (R.I. 2012). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated a preliminary injunction preventing a
bar and a related corporation from selling property upon a finding that a
customer had not established a prima facie case that the bar owed him a duty
of care when he was shot and seriously injured outside the bar.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Gilberto Vasquez (“Vasquez”) sued the Sportsman’s Inn and
DLM, Inc. (“DLM”) for failure to provide sufficient security on the
premises after an unknown individual shot him outside the bar in
the early morning hours of November 12, 2006.1 The Sportsman’s
Inn was the subsidiary of DLM, and DLM’s only source of income
was the rent the Sportsman’s Inn paid to it. 2 When Vasquez
learned that DLM listed the Sportsman’s Inn property for sale, he
filed a motion for a preliminary injunction with the trial court as
the property value was the largest asset among the defendant
businesses.3 The trial judge granted the preliminary injunction
after finding that Vasquez would likely prevail on arguing that
the Sportsman’s Inn breached the duty of care it owed him and
that piercing the corporate veil was appropriate. 4 The defendants
subsequently appealed the trial judge’s decision.
During the preliminary injunction hearing, the president of
the Sportsman’s Inn testified that security personnel worked
inside, not outside, of the bar and used a metal detecting wand to
prevent individuals from bringing weapons into the bar. 5 He
further testified that on the night Vasquez was shot, only one
security personnel out of the usual three was working.6 Vasquez
also testified at the hearing and stated that after leaving the bar,
he “remembers . . . hearing a gunshot, falling to the ground, and
waking up in a hospital.” 7 Additionally, Vasquez testified he

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Vasquez v. Sportsman’s Inn, Inc., 57 A.3d 313, 315, 317 (R.I. 2012).
Id. at 316.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id. at 315.
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consumed about five alcoholic drinks while at the bar and took
ecstasy earlier in the day. 8 The Court noted that Vasquez did not
testify about his interactions, specifically “arguments or
altercations” while at the bar that evening. 9 A Providence Fire
Department first responder testified that Vasquez was “found on
the ground . . . outside of the doors in close proximity to the club”
but he could not recall specifically where Vasquez was. 10
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that proximity to the
bar door was not enough to establish that the defendants owed
Vasquez a duty of reasonable care.11 The standard of review for
preliminary injunctions is whether the trial judge made an abuse
of discretion, which is very deferential to a trial judge’s decision.
The Court only needs to find four factors to determine that the
trial judge made a valid decision in issuing a preliminary
injunction: (1) that the moving party needs to show “a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits”; (2) that the moving party “will
suffer irreparable harm without the requested injunctive relief”;
(3) that the moving party must be the party favored by a “balance
of the equities”; and (4) that the “injunction will preserve the
status quo.” 12 Here, the Court found that the first factor of the
test was wrongly decided and had no reason to analyze the other
factors.
Regarding the first factor, the Court held Vasquez could not
establish “a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of his
underlying negligence claim.” 13 The general presumption is
landowners do not owe a duty of care to others from harm caused
by a third party unless the landowner has a special relationship
with the other person.14 Bars do have a special relationship with
their patrons, and thus owe a duty of care to their patrons due to
the nature of the alcoholic beverages they serve. 15 This duty,
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 314–15.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 319.
Id.
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however, is qualified to “incidents occur[ing] in the proximity of a
particular establishment ‘and had their origins within.’” 16 Here,
the lack of testimony establishing an explanation for why Vasquez
was shot and that some preceding incident was within the
Sportsman’s Inn control failed to show that this incident had its
origin within the Sportsman’s Inn and was detrimental to
establishing a prima facie case of breach of duty. The Court noted
one mention that Vasquez had argued with another customer at
the bar in the record, but the evidence was scant and not
mentioned at all during the injunction hearings. 17 Accordingly,
the Court was cautious not to impose liability on a business where
the injury might be unforeseen and not preventable. 18 Dissenting
Justices Goldberg and Indeglia argued that because neither party
significantly raised the negligence finding on appeal, the Court
should have focused on the parties’ primary issue of piercing the
corporate veil. 19
COMMENTARY
The majority was right to address the negligence issue even if
the parties were primarily focused on appealing the decision to
pierce the corporate veil because not addressing the negligence
issue would have created a much easier standard for establishing
negligence for purposes of a preliminary injunction. The specific
facts regarding the plaintiff’s illicit drug use earlier in the day, the
lack of specific facts about his exact proximity to the bar entrance,
and the lack of testimony about his conduct and interactions at
the bar likely led the Court to believe this would be too easy of a
standard for a “reasonably high likelihood of success on the
merits” and would impose an unfair burden on a business if it was
enjoined from certain financial activities but then ultimately won
its case. If not for these facts (or, lack thereof), it certainly would
have been possible for the Court to affirm the trial judge’s decision
that the defendants had likely breached a duty of care. The Court
noted the Sportsman’s Inn was not an infrequent site of police

16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 320 n.12.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 321–22 (Golderberg, J. & Indeglia J., dissenting).
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reports. 20 Common sense would suggest that the origins of a
shooting for anyone leaving a bar are likely to be within that bar.
The parties’ lack of focus on the negligence issue, which the
dissent points out, also suggests that the parties themselves may
have found the finding of negligence reasonable. 21 In hearing
appeals, the Court should not focus on the issue the parties have
primarily raised to the neglect of other issues that could have
major impacts on other areas of the law in future cases.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated Vasquez’s
preliminary injunction to prevent the sale of the Sportsman’s Inn
because the Court held Vasquez could not establish “a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits of his underlying negligence
claim.”
Lena Thomas

20. Id. at 315. In a span of less than eleven years, the police were called
to the Sportsman’s Inn 667 times. Id. at n.3.
21. Id. at 321–22.
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Wills and Trusts Law. Swain v. Estate of Tyre Ex Rel. Reilly, 57 A.3d 283
(R.I. 2012). The Rhode Island Slayer’s Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-1.1,
prohibits the stepchildren of a decedent from recovering as contingent
beneficiaries from the decedent’s estate when the stepchildren’s father is the
slayer of the decedent under the Act. Such recovery would benefit the slayer,
which is prohibited by the Act.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On October 5, 1993, Shelley Arden Tyre (“Shelley”) executed a
will, naming her soon to be husband, David Swain (“David”), “as
the sole beneficiary of her estate” and his two children, Jennifer
and Jeremy Swain, the plaintiffs, “as the only contingent
beneficiaries,” named in the event David died within thirty days
after Shelley’s death. 1 Shortly thereafter, Shelley and David were
married.2 On March 12, 1999, “Shelley died while scuba diving
with David,” and, thereafter, “David was named as the executor”
of her will. 3 Shelley’s parents, however, brought a wrongful death
claim against David alleging that he was a slayer who caused
Shelley’s wrongful death and that he “should be subject to civil
liability for a criminal act.” 4 On July 3, 2002, Shelley’s parents
successfully petitioned the Jamestown Probate Court to remove
David as executor and replace him with James H. Reilly (Reilly).5
In February of 2006, a trial was held to establish David’s liability
on all three counts alleged by Shelley’s parents, and it was
determined that David was a slayer pursuant to the Act.6
On June 27, 2008, in response to a petition filed by Reilly, the
Jamestown Probate Court issued a written order precluding
Jennifer and Jeremy from “inheriting under Shelley’s will.” 7
1. Swain v. Estate of Tyre ex rel. Reilly, 57 A.3d 283, 285-86 & n.4 (R.I.
2012).
2. Id. at 285–86.
3. Id. at 286 n.5.
4. Id. at 286; “Section 33-1.1-1(3) states that a slayer is ‘any person who
willfully and unlawfully takes or procures to be taken the life of another.’”
Id. at n.8 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-1(3) (1956)).
5. Id. at 286.
6. Id.; Shelley’s parents were awarded $2,815,085.46 in compensatory
damages and $2 million in punitive damages. In response, David motioned
for a new trial, which was denied and also appealed to the Supreme Court,
but the trial court’s ruling was affirmed. Id.
7. Id. at 286–87; “The probate judge issued a written order declaring
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Jennifer and Jeremy appealed this order to the Newport County
Superior Court on the basis that, as they were named as
beneficiaries in Shelley’s will, they “were not inheriting ‘through’
their father” and, so, were not barred from their inheritance by
The Rhode Island Slayer’s Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-1.1 (“the
Act”). 8 Shelley’s Estate, however, argued that the language of the
Act, stating “[n]either the slayer nor any person claiming through
him . . . shall . . . receive any benefit as the result of the death of
the decedent,” should be interpreted broadly with “‘discretion to
determine when a slayer will benefit by either taking directly or
indirectly,’” which would bar Jennifer and Jeremy from the
inheritance as their inheritance would benefit David.9 “On crossmotions for summary judgment, the hearing justice found in favor
of the Estate,” holding that, because “Jeremy had personally
contributed and raised money to finance [David’s] defense” and
“Jennifer and Jeremy had both stated that they would use . . .
[their inheritance] for their father’s criminal defense, if
necessary,” Jennifer and Jeremy were barred from the inheritance
by the Act as the Act prohibits a slayer, here David, from profiting
“from his wrongdoing.” 10
Thereafter, Jennifer and Jeremy
appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.11
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Upon review of the trial justice’s grant of summary judgment,
the Supreme Court considered the statutory language of the act de
novo, finding that “the clear intent of [the Act] is to ensure that a
slayer does not benefit [in any way] from his or her wrongdoing”
and that the Act “‘shall be construed broadly in order to effect’”
that intent. 12 Focusing on this language in the Act, the Court was
that ‘neither [David], nor his heirs at law, shall receive directly or indirectly
from the Estate of [Shelley].’” Id. at 286.
8. Id. at 287.
9. Id. at 287 n.10 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2).
10. Id. at 287. The justice relied on “§ 33-1.1-15, which prescribes that
[the Act] be interpreted ‘broadly to effectuate the policy of this State that no
person shall be allowed to profit from his or her wrongs.’” Id. (citing R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 33-1.1-15).
11. Id. at 287. The plaintiffs appealed with the additional argument that
“Shelley’s publicity rights . . . are inheritable,” however, as this issue was not
raised in the lower court, it was precluded. Id. at 288 n.13.
12. Id. at 292–93 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2; § 33-1.1-15).
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not persuaded by the plaintiffs’ contention that, as they are not
“claiming through” David, they are not barred. 13 The Court held
that, even though the Act does not specifically bar a slayer’s issue
from inheriting, because it is undisputed that the slayer will
benefit if his issue is allowed to inherit, the Act bars their
inheritance. 14 Jennifer and Jeremy stated that they would use
their inheritance to support their father’s criminal defense, “if
necessary,” and the majority considered this admission to be a
clear statement that if they inherit they intend to confer a benefit
upon David.15
Finally, the majority rebutted the dissent’s argument that the
majority’s holding added an ‘issue’ “category of prohibited
beneficiaries” and construed the Act “‘limitlessly’” by explaining
that their holding is limited to “the facts of this case, in which
there is no dispute that the plaintiffs’ taking under Shelley’s will
unquestionably would confer a benefit upon David” but that this
will not always be the case when dealing with contingent
beneficiaries. 16 Also, the dissent’s argument that the benefit was
not deriving from the “‘death of the decedent’” as required by the
statute but is “‘one step removed’” was rebutted by the majority’s
decision that the “explicit language of the Act [] forbids a slayer
from benefitting or acquiring property ‘in any way as a result of
the death of the decedent.’” 17
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court gave great weight to the
intent of the Act, 18 coming to a conclusion that seemingly
embraces such intent. The intent of the Act, to “ensure that a
slayer does not benefit from his or her wrongdoing”19 certainly
appears to be met by preventing David, the slayer, from
benefitting through his children, who stated on record that they
13. See id. at 292–93.
14. Id. at 293.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 293–94 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2) (Robinson, J., &
Flaherty, J., dissenting).
17. See id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2); (Robinson, J., & Flaherty,
J., dissenting).
18. See id. at 292, 294.
19. Id. at 292–93 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2).

SWAIN.SURVEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

SURVEY SECTION

4/20/2014 3:38 PM

995

would use their inheritance to pay for his defense. However, in
this question of first impression, the Court may not have given the
proper consideration to the plain language of the Act. 20 The
contention of the dissent, that Jennifer and Jeremy do not fall into
either of the two categories of people prohibited from receiving a
benefit from the death of the testatrix and that the benefit to
David is not deriving from the “‘death of the decedent’” as required
by the statute but is “one step removed,” are important arguments
and, although the majority attempted to rebut these arguments in
its analysis, there are still factors, addressed below, that are
worth consideration.21
The Act states that “[n]either the slayer nor any person
claiming through him or her shall in any way acquire any
property or receive any benefit as the result of the death of the
decedent.” 22 Under the plain language of this statute, the
restrictions contained therein are that the slayer himself, or
“those claiming through him” 23 are barred from inheritance if the
benefit is “the result of the death of the decedent.” 24 The
reasoning behind the majority’s holding is that the slayer cannot
benefit “‘in any way’” even if the benefit to the slayer is “one step
removed from the ‘death of the decedent’” and even if the
inheritance is being taken from a party not indicated in the
statute and who is specifically named by the decedent. 25 The
majority, does not appear to be basing its conclusion on the
language of the Act and the plaintiffs’ claim to the inheritance as
beneficiaries, as much as it is basing its conclusion on the way the
plaintiffs intend on using their inheritance, as such use may
benefit the slayer.26
The majority may be interpreting the statute too broadly by
restricting the inheritance of named beneficiaries on the basis of
the manner in which they may want to use their inheritance in

20. See id. at 285, 292–94.
21. See id. at 293–95 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2).
22. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2.
23. See id.; The majority stated, “it is clear that plaintiffs are not
claiming through the slayer. Rather, they seek their share explicitly under
the terms of Shelley’s will.” Swain, 57 A.3d at 291.
24. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2; Swain, 57 A.3d at 294–95.
25. See Swain, 57 A.3d at 293–94 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2).
26. See id. at 292–94.
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the future.27 The majority’s decision, therefore, appears to be
opening the door to prohibiting from inheritance anyone who may,
at some point in the future, “confer a benefit on the slayer,”
because a benefit derived by the slayer “‘in any way’” would be
prohibited. 28 This holding is not only a disincentive to similarly
situated beneficiaries from testifying as to their intended use of
their inheritance but it is a punishment to named beneficiaries
who have done nothing wrong because they volunteered
information on their possible intended use.29 Furthermore, the
majority notes that David’s murder conviction was overturned
and, therefore, there may not even be a benefit conferred to him
by the plaintiffs, but instead, the inheritance would serve to
benefit the plaintiffs, themselves, as “reimbursement for money
already spent for David’s benefit.” 30 This holding, therefore, is not
only a punishment to named beneficiaries for their possible
intended use of their inheritance but is a punishment to named
beneficiaries for the completely legal way in which they chose to
spent their money in the past. 31 Thus, though the majority has
based its decision on the intent of the Act by considering the
possibility that the slayer may benefit from the plaintiffs’
inheritance, it appears to go beyond the true intent of the Act, as
expressed in its plain language, by focusing in on one part of the
text and interpreting it so broadly as to ignore the restrictive
language in the Act.32
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that even though the
Act does not specifically bar inheritance by a slayer’s issue, the
Act does bar a slayer from benefitting “‘in any way . . . as the

27. See id. at 292–95.
28. See id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2).
29. See id. at 294.
30. See id. at 293 n.21.
31. See id. at 293–94 n.21.
32. The intent of the Act is “ensur[ing] that a slayer does not benefit
from his or her wrongdoing.” The intent can also be found in the plain
language of the Act, restricting those prohibited beneficiaries to “the slayer
[and] any person claiming through him or her.” The majority, however, only
appears to focus on the language that the slayer shall not, “in any way . . .
receive any benefit as the result of the death of the decedent.” See id. at 292–
94 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2) (emphasis added).
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result of the death of the decedent.’” 33 The Act, therefore,
according to the majority, barred the step children of the decedent
from inheriting under the decedent’s will because the slayer would
benefit from decedent’s death if her stepchildren, also the slayer’s
issues, inherited under her will and used their inheritance to
financially support his defense. 34 There is, however, a compelling
argument that the Court has gone too far by using the Act to
prohibit an inheritance based on the way in which the beneficiary
might use that inheritance in the future.

Charlene Pratt

33.
34.

See id. at 293–94 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2).
See id. at 293.
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Workers’ Compensation. Ellis v. Verizon New England, Inc., 63 A.3d 510
(R.I. 2013). In order for an employee’s injury to be compensable under
Rhode Island’s workers’ compensation laws, the injury must occur during
the period of employment, at a location where the employee is reasonably
expected to be, and while the employee is reasonably fulfilling duties of the
employment. Rhode Island adopts an “actual-risk” test to determine if an
employee’s injury arose out of the course of employment. In essence, the
employer must subject the employee to the actual risk that resulted in the
employee’s injuries. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that dangers
associated with the use of the streets are an actual risk of employment, if the
employer requires the employee to use the streets. Additionally, an
unprovoked assault can be considered a danger of the streets, dependent
upon the area that the assault occurs in.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On September 17, 2007, Paul Ellis (“Ellis”) was sent by his
employer, Verizon New England, Inc. (“Verizon”), to repair
outdoor cable lines. 1 The lines were located on Union Avenue in
the West End of Providence, Rhode Island. 2 When Ellis arrived at
the job site, he witnessed a man shouting statements such as,
“The country is going down. The President is dead.” 3 Ellis
initially ignored the man and continued to repair the cable lines;
however, he eventually approached the stranger. 4 The stranger
did not verbally respond, but instead struck Ellis several times in
the head with a piece of wood.5 The stranger fled the scene, but
was later apprehended by authorities and criminally indicted.6
Ellis filed suit against Verizon in Workers’ Compensation
Court. 7 The trial court stated that in order for an employee’s
injury to be compensable under Rhode Island’s workers’
1. Ellis v. Verizon New England, Inc., 63 A.3d 510, 512 (R.I. 2013).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. The injury resulted in two different wounds to Ellis’ head and
required fourteen staples to close his lacerations. Id. Ellis did not return to
work for approximately two months after the assault. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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compensation laws, a nexus is required between the injury and
the conditions of the employment. 8 Specifically, the employer
must subject the employee to the actual risk that caused the
injuries sustained.9 Ellis offered testimony from James Lucht, the
Information Group Director of Providence Plan, an organization
that “compiles and aggregates statistics on violent crimes in
various Providence neighborhoods.” 10 Lucht testified that the
West End was a hot spot for violent crime based on data from
2002 to 2007. 11 The majority of the data was publicly available;
however, the statistical breakdown of specific crimes was not
publicly available. 12 Therefore, the trial court held that the
publicly unavailable statistics were inadmissible because Verizon
could not be held accountable for information that it could not be
aware of. 13 Further, Ellis’ supervisor testified at trial that he was
unaware of any assaults that occurred in the West End area on
Verizon employees. 14 Ellis’ workers’ compensation benefits were
denied because he failed to differentiate between the types of
crimes associated with the West End and was unable to establish
Verizon’s knowledge of the statistical data for the area. 15
Therefore, the trial judge held that Verizon did not subject Ellis to
the actual risk that caused his injuries. 16
Ellis appealed and the Appellate Division affirmed the trial
court’s ruling, holding that “the trial judge did not err in
determining that the evidence adduced at trial failed to establish
8. Id. at 513. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-33-1 (2003) (“ . . . receives a
personal injury arising out of employment, connected and referable to the
employment . . . ”).
9. Ellis, 63 A.3d at 513.
10. Id. at 512.
11. Id. Lucht testified that “‘[v]iolent crimes’ included murder, sexual
assault, robbery, and aggravated assault.” Id.
12. Id. at 512–13.
13. Id. at 513.
14. Id. at 512. Ellis’ supervisor was tenured with the company and had
worked with Verizon for thirty-nine years. Id. Despite the lack of knowledge
of prior assaults in the area, Verizon sent employees to the neighborhood in
pairs while the assailant was at large and continued to reassign employees
that were unwilling to work in the area for weeks afterwards. Id.
15. Id. at 513. Under Rhode Island workers’ compensation law, the
plaintiff has the burden of establishing the connection between the injury and
the conditions of the employment. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-33-1 (2003). See also
Toolin v. Aquidneck Island Med. Res., 668 A.2d 639, 640 (R.I. 1995).
16. Ellis, 510 A.3d at 513.
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that this random assault was an actual risk of Ellis’s
employment.” 17 A writ of certiorari was granted by the Rhode
Island Supreme Court. 18 The Court reviewed only one of the four
issues considered on appeal: if street perils,19 in particular an
unprovoked assault, 20 of the West End were an actual risk of Ellis’
employment. 21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The issue of whether there is a nexus between a plaintiff’s
injury and the conditions of the plaintiff’s employment in a
workers’ compensation claim is “a mixed question of law and
fact.” 22 The Court shall accept the findings of fact from the trial
court; however, if the facts are undisputed, the issue is purely a
question of law and the Court may substitute the judgment. 23
The Court adopted a three-prong test to determine if a nexus
existed between the injuries sustained and the employee’s
conditions of employment:
We first inquire whether the injury occurred within the
period of the employee’s employment. Next, we examine
the situs of the injury to determine whether it occurred at
a place where the employee might reasonably have been
expected to be. Third, we inquire whether the employee
was reasonably fulfilling the duties of his or her job at the
time of the injury or was performing some task incidental
to those conditions under which those duties were to be
performed. 24
The Court only found the third prong to be at issue 25 and adopted
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. A street peril is a danger that is associated with the use of the
streets. See generally id. at 516.
20. An unprovoked assault is different from an assault specifically
directed at an individual for personal reasons. Id. at 515 n.2. See, e.g.,
Gaudette v. Glass-Kraft, Inc. 163 A.2d 23 (R.I. 1960).
21. Ellis, 63 A.3d at 514.
22. Id. at 513–14.
23. Id. at 514.
24. Id. at 514–15.
25. Prongs one and two were not at issue because it was undisputed that
the assault occurred during Ellis’ work hours and at a location where Verizon
required him to be. Id. at 515.
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the actual-risk test to determine if the injury arose out of the
course of employment. 26 Under the actual-risk test, an injury
that arises from an actual risk of the particular employment is
compensable, even if the risk is one that is general to the
community.27 Specifically, the Court considered if street perils
were compensable under the actual-risk test, and if so, if an
unprovoked assault is considered a street peril.28
Reluctant to broaden the scope of the actual-risk test too far
and risk a flood of workers’ compensation claims, the Court turned
to the overarching policy of the governing laws.29 On one side of
the scale, the Court recognized that workers’ compensation
redress is available to ensure that employees have a means to
provide for medical and financial ends if they are injured during
employment. 30 The Court reasoned that an employer is better
situated to carry the burden that may result from the risks of his
employment than the employee. 31 However, despite the
humanitarian underpinning of workers’ compensation litigation,
the Court additionally acknowledged that the Legislature did not
intend to open the floodgates and compensate every employee
injured during the course of their employment. 32
Policy considerations aside, the Court reviewed applicable
precedent and persuasive authority in order to determine if
streets perils can be an actual risk of employment and if an
In
unprovoked assault can be considered a street peril. 33

26. Id. The Court mentions two other known approaches for determining
if prong-three is met: “increased-risk” test (“[I]njury is compensable if the
employment increased the amount of exposure to a general risk that is not
unique to that employment but, rather, is one to which the general public is
exposed”) and “positional-risk” test (“ . . . essentially applies a ‘but-for’
analysis . . . ”). Id. See generally 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON,
LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 3.03 at 3–5; § 3.04 at 3–5, § 3.05 at
3–6 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2012).
27. Ellis, 63 A.3d at 515.
28. Id. at 515–16.
29. Id. at 517.
30. Id.
31. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 53–55.
32. Ellis, 63 A.3d at 517. See, e.g., Zuchowski v. U.S. Rubber Co., 229
A.2d 61, 65–66 (R.I. 1967) (stating that allowing compensation for all injuries
that occur during the course of employment would be to treat employers as
insurance companies).
33. Ellis, 63 A.3d at 516, 518.
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preceding case law, 34 Rhode Island recognized that the risks of
using the public streets, such as car accidents, can be actual risks
of employment if the employer requires the employee to use the
streets. 35 Therefore, the Court recognized that Ellis’ injuries
would have been compensable had he been struck by an
automobile while crossing the street because Verizon required
Ellis to use the streets. 36 However instead of Ellis’ injuries
resulting from an automobile accident, the injuries were caused
from a stranger that was “at least slightly off his rocker.” 37
Nevertheless, the Court found “no meaningful difference” between
the two risks and reasoned that “in either instance, the possibility
of injury is an actual risk to which employees are necessarily
exposed if they are required by their employees to travel on public
roads.” 38 Additionally, the Court looked to the New York Court of
Appeals 39 to reinforce its expansion of street perils. 40 With
reliance on Katz v. Kadans & Company, the Court recognized that
urban streets are filled with “street brawlers, highwaymen,
escaping criminals, [and] violent madmen” and with using the
streets comes the risk of engagement with such “dangerous
characters.” 41 Even so, the Court cautioned that street perils
34. See, e.g., Toolin, 668 A.2d at 641 (holding that an automobile
accident that occurred while the plaintiff was traveling from appointment to
appointment for her employer was an actual risk of the employment); Branco
v. Leviton Mnfg. Co., 518 A.2d 621, 623 (R.I. 1986) (holding that being struck
by an automobile while crossing an intersection from an employee parking lot
was an actual risk of employment); Sullivan v. State, 151 A.2d 360, 361–62
(R.I. 1959) (holding that being struck by an automobile while using the
highway to retrieve refreshments for an employer was an actual risk of
employment). But see Nowicki v. Bryne, 54 A.2d 7, 8–9 (R.I. 1947) (failing to
hold that a stray bullet crossing the street, encountered while departing from
work, was an actual risk of employment).
35. Ellis, 63 A.3d at 516.
36. Id. at 517. In order for Ellis to repair the outdoor cable lines he had
to park his work vehicle on the street and walk to and from that location. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Katz v. A. Kadans & Co., 134 N.E. 330, 331 (N.Y. 1922) (holding
that stabbing injuries sustained by a chauffeur during employment hours
were compensable because the risk of being stabbed by an insane man was
incidental to the conditions of his employment).
40. Ellis, 63 A.3d at 518.
41. Id. (quoting Katz, 134 N.E. at 331). With reliance on Katz, the Court
accepted that the streets encompass a variety of actual risks outside of
automobile accidents. Id.
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should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis and should only satisfy
the actual-risk test if the employer requires the employee to use
the streets which encompass such perils. 42
The Court concisely summarized its holding and stated: “the
risks of the street are the risks of employment, if the employment
requires the employee’s use of the street.” 43 Therefore, street
perils were an actual risk of Ellis’ employment because Verizon
required Ellis to work on the streets on a regular basis. 44
Moreover, the Court expanded the definition of street peril and
held that a “random assault by a stranger” in an urban area was a
street peril under the circumstances.45 Thus, Ellis’ injuries were
compensable under Rhode Island workers’ compensation laws
because they resulted from an actual risk that Verizon subjected
him to, namely the street peril of an unprovoked assault.46
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court correctly and appropriately
expanded the scope of the actual-risk test. The Court considered
public policy, legislative intent, Rhode Island precedent and
precedent of neighboring states to ensure that the floodgates to
workers’ compensation would not explode.47 The Court
emphasized a case-by-case approach when considering various
street perils as actual risks and emphasized that the employer
must subject the employee to such risks in order for the injury to
be compensable.48
Unfortunately there are a wide range of street perils
associated with urban city streets that extend beyond automobile
accidents.49 Many of these risks can pose greater danger than the
danger associated with other employment tasks.50 If an employer
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting Hudson v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 583 S.W.2d 597,
602 (Tenn. 1979)).
44. Ellis, 63 A.3d at 518.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See supra notes 30–32, 34–35, 39–41 and accompanying text.
48. Ellis, 63 A.3d at 518.
49. See, e.g., Katz, 134 N.E. at 331 (stating examples of different types of
street perils associated with urban areas to include: fragmented pavements,
hostile crowds, ferocious animals, fleeing criminals, police chase and gunfire).
50. For example, the injuries associated with a slip and fall that
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chooses to subject an employee to these (often escalated) risks of
the streets, the employer should bear the burden of compensation
if the risk manifests itself into actual harm.51 The employer is
often in a better position to bear the burden of compensation
because the State of Rhode Island requires all employers 52 to
obtain workers’ compensation insurance.53 Although employers
should not be used as insurance agencies in workers’
compensation litigation, Rhode Island workers’ compensation laws
require employers to act as an intermediary to insurance
companies.54
Between two “innocent” parties, the insured
employer is better equipped to bear any loss than a potentially
insolvent plaintiff. 55 Nonetheless, regardless of the insurance
requirement imposed on Rhode Island employers, it is still
essential to maintain control over the compensability of injuries
that occur in the employment context to avoid overcompensation
and the possibility of illegitimate claims.56
Safeguards are in place to ensure that workers’ compensation
benefits are not abused.57 A plaintiff has the burden to prove that
occurred while a janitor is mopping a high school hallway will most likely be
less severe than the injuries associated with a mugging that takes place as
the janitor disposes of the trash in a dumpster across the street in an urban
neighborhood.
51. See Ellis, 63 A.3d at 518. It should also be noted that injuries from
some forms of street perils may have little chance for recovery in the
traditional tort system. For instance, in Ellis, it was unlikely that the
plaintiff could have filed an intentional tort against his assailant and
recovered from a crazed stranger on the streets. Generally see id. Therefore,
it is more appropriate for a risk-subjecting employer to bear the burden than
an innocent plaintiff. Id. at 517.
52. Employer is defined as “[e]very person, firm, and private corporation,
including any public service corporation, including the state, that regularly
employs employees in the same business or in or about the same
establishment under any contract of hire, express or implied, and a city or
town in this state that votes to accept the provision of those chapters in the
manner provided . . . ” R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-29-6 (2003).
53. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-36-1 (2003).
54. See id. See also supra note 32.
55. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-36-1 (2003).
56. Rhode Island also regulates the forms of workers’ compensation
benefits. See, e.g., Bissonnette v. Fed. Dairy Co., Inc., 472 A.2d 1223, 1226
(R.I. 1984) (holding that “pain is not compensable under [Rhode Island’s]
compensation statute”); Provencher v. Glass-Kraft, Inc., 264 A.2d 916, 919
(R.I. 1970).
57. For example, using a case-by-case approach instead of adopting a
broader scope of risk approach. See Ellis, 63 A.3d at 518.
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his injuries are compensable under the three-prong test 58 and
specifically, that his employer subjected him to an actual risk that
resulted in harm. 59 The Rhode Island Supreme Court adhered to
the general rules governing workers’ compensation benefits and
acknowledged that the employment context often encompasses
risks that may not be generally thought of but, that employees are
still forced to face. 60
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the actual-risk test
to determine if an employee’s injury arose out of the context of the
employment. 61 The Court held that street perils, in particular a
random assault by a stranger, are an actual risk of employment if
the employer requires the employee to use the streets. 62
Additionally, the sufficiency of a particular street peril under the
actual-risk test and whether the employer actually subjected the
employee to such risk should be considered on a case-by-case basis
to retain structure and to balance policy considerations.63
Therefore, if an employer requires an employee to use the streets
and a street peril associated with that area results in an actual
injury, the injury is compensable under Rhode Island’s workers’
compensation laws. 64
Nicole M. Manzo

58. See supra text accompanying note 26.
59. Ellis, 63 A.3d at 515.
60. See id. at 517–18.
61. Id. at 515.
62. Id. at 518.
63. Id. at 517–18.
64. Ellis, 63 A.3d at 518. The injury would be compensable so long as
the first two prongs of the adopted test were satisfied. See supra note 26.

2013 RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC LAWS
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 004, 005. An Act Relating to
Domestic Relations – Persons Eligible to Marry. As amended, this
law redefines persons eligible to marry in Rhode Island. The
“Equal access to marriage” section, § 15-1-1, provides that “any
person who otherwise meets the eligibility requirements of
chapters 15-1 and 15-2 may marry any other eligible person
regardless of gender;” thus, allowing same-sex marriage.
Meanwhile, § 15-1-2 was renamed to forbid kindred marriages,
and §15-1-3 remains to void any incestuous marriages. Under
§15-1-5, bigamous marriages are void, as are marriages where
either of the parties were mentally incompetent at the time of the
marriage.
The Act added §§15-1-7 to 15-1-9 to address marriage
codification, the recognition of relationships entered into in
another state or jurisdiction, and the applicability of state laws to
marriages not recognized by federal law, respectively. Section 151-7 reiterates that “marriage is the legally recognized union of two
(2) people,” and that interpretation of the martial or familial
relationship must be construed consistently with this definition
throughout all areas of the law. Next, section 15-1-8 provides that
if two persons are within Rhode Island’s jurisdiction and “have a
legal union other than a marriage that provides substantially the
same rights, benefits, and responsibilities as a marriage,” and is
not expressly prohibited by Rhode Island law, then that marriage
is recognized under Rhode Island law. Also, section 15-1-9 extends
any provisions and benefits of Rhode Island law to anyone
recognized as a spouse under Rhode Island law, regardless of
federal recognition of that individual as a spouse.
Section 15-3-6.1 was added to protect freedom of religion in
marriage and provides that religious institutions have “exclusive
control over its own religious doctrine, policy and teachings
regarding who may marry within its faith, and on what terms,”
consistent with §15-1-2 (forbidding kindred marriages), §15-1-3
(incestuous marriages void), §15-1-4 (marriages of kindred allowed
by the Jewish religion), and §15-1-5 (bigamous marriages void).
Further, no official of any church or religious denomination is
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required to officiate or solemnize any marriage and is immune
from any civil suit for refusing to do so. The state and local
government may not “base a decision to penalize, withhold
benefits from, or refuse to contract with” any such church or
religious denominations for refusing to solemnize a marriage.
Section 15-3.1-12 was added to merge civil unions into
marriages by action of the parties of a civil union, provided that
these parties are otherwise eligible to marry under the amended
Rhode Island law, and the parties to the marriage will be the
same as the parties to the civil union. Upon solemnization of the
marriage and filing for a marriage license pursuant to §15-2-1, the
civil union is merged into a marriage effective as of the date of the
recording of the marriage certificate. Alternatively, parties to a
civil union may apply to the clerk of the town or city in which
their civil union was recorded and, at no additional expense or
requirements, have the union legally designated and recorded as a
marriage. Section 15-3.1-13 provides that the date the marriage
certificate is recorded is the recognized date of marriage between
the parties.
The sections entitled “Civil Unions” were repealed entirely.
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 029, 044. An Act Relating to
Courts and Civil Procedure – General Powers of Supreme and
Superior Courts. This Act requires the approval of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court regarding any rules that regulate the
practice, procedure, and business of the state’s Workers’
Compensation Court. This change is consistent with the
procedures that are currently in effect for the Superior, Family,
and District Courts, as well as the Traffic Tribunal in Rhode
Island.
Further, the Workers’ Compensation Court is now
included within the judicial bodies that are empowered to “make
the rules for regulating practice, procedure and business therein.”
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 148, 197. An Act Relating to
Criminal Offenses – Children.
The Rhode Island General
Assembly amended the law to allow the tattooing of minors under
the age of eighteen (18) for medical purposes. In order for this
exception to apply, the minor must be accompanied by a parent or
legal guardian. Both parties must provide the tattoo artist with
valid government-issued, photo identification and must submit
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written proof that he/she is the minor’s parent or guardian, and a
physician’s written notarization of consent for the tattoo. The
tattoo artist must be properly licensed in the state of Rhode Island
and is charged with proper maintenance of their clients’ records.
If the tattoo artist makes a good faith effort to validate the
identities of the minor and parent or guardian but is deceived, the
artist shall not be charged with violation of this law. Upon first
conviction of violation of this law, the maximum penalty shall be a
fine not to exceed three hundred dollars ($300); but upon
subsequent violations resulting in conviction, the violation will be
classified as a misdemeanor and accompanied by a fine of up to
five hundred dollars ($500). It is within the power of the
Department of Health to create regulations relating to compliance
with this law as well as create applications and certificates
necessary to implementing this law.
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 158, 233. An Act Relating to
Behavioral Healthcare, Developmental Disabilities and Hospitals.
Should a parent not be able to care for a person with
developmental disabilities, this act allows an interested and
approved relative (such as an adult sibling) to serve as a shared
living provider subject to already-existing rules and receive the
financial aid or subsidies. The Director of Mental Health,
Retardation, and Hospitals continues to be authorized to set
regulations relating to care by approved parents and now also by
approved relatives of persons with developmental disabilities.
This act also directs the Department of Behavioral Healthcare,
Developmental Disabilities and Hospitals to “develop options,
fiscal impact analysis, and recommendations for the expansion of
shared living services to siblings of individuals with
developmental disabilities who are no longer able to be cared for
at home by aging parents.”
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 165, 222. An Act Relating To
Health and Safety – Licensing of Massage Therapy
Establishments. This act creates various substantive and
procedural changes in licensing and regulating the massage
therapy profession, including the establishment of a sevenmember board appointed by the director of health and approved
by the governor. In part, this act serves to protect the profession
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through prohibiting unlicensed persons from holding themselves
out as massage therapists under any of nine terms or their
derivatives, codifying licensing standards, and suggesting further
possible regulations for the board’s consideration.
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 185, 235. An Act Relating To
Towns And Cities – Subdivision Of Land. This act modernizes
public hearing and notice requirements with an additional
requirement that municipalities establish and maintain an
electronic public notice registry, allowing any person or entity to
register for electronic notice of any changes to local regulations.
Municipalities are also encouraged to provide notice to interested
parties and to the general public of the new registry.
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 190, 200. An Act Relating to
Domestic Relations – Divorce and Separation. As amended, this
act denies an individual custody of, or visitation with, a child if
that individual has been convicted of, or pled nolo contender, to a
violation of §11-37-2 (first degree sexual assault), §11-37-4 (second
degree sexual assault), or §11-37-8.1 (first degree child
molestation sexual assault), or a comparable law of another
jurisdiction, and the child in question was conceived as a result of
that violation. However, the court may order supervised visitation
and counseling if, after a hearing by the family court, it finds that
the natural mother or legal guardian consents to visitation with
the child, and the court determines visitation is in the best
interest of the child.
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 192, 240. An Act Relating to
Bryant University. Amended to state that the town of Smithfield
shall, from March 1, 2014 onward, charge any private, non-profit
college or university located and operating within its town for the
costs of its usage of police, fire, and rescue services, unless
specifically reimbursed otherwise. However, colleges and
universities in Smithfield are free to enter into a memorandum of
agreement with the town to stipulate alternative billing
agreements.
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 193, 371. An Act Relating to
Alcoholic Beverages – Regulation of Sales. As amended, this law
allows retail Class A liquor license holders to open beginning at
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10:00 a.m. on Sundays instead of noon, as was previously
authorized. The law still requires license holders to close no later
than 6:00 p.m. on Sundays, unless the following Monday is a
holiday, in which event it is permissible to stay open no later than
9:00 p.m.
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 255, 432. An Act Relating to
Courts and Civil Procedure – Particular Actions – Small Claims
and Consumer Claims. As amended, this law increases the
jurisdictional limit on counterclaims properly filed in small claims
court from one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) to two
thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500).
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 271, 361. An Act Relating To
Public Utilities And Carriers – Property Assessed Clean Energy Residential Program. This law establishes a new financing
program, “Property-Assessed Clean Energy” (PACE), which lowers
the financial barriers to homeowners associated with energy
upgrades. PACE financing allows loans of up to twenty years in
duration at low fixed rates. Liens established through PACE are
subordinate to previously existing liens but superior to liens
created after the PACE filing; however, participating financial
institutions are also protected through a Loan Loss Reserve Fund
(LLRF). The Office of Energy Resources contracts with approved
financial institutions to manage a LLRF with a minimum deposit
of one million dollars, backed by American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act, Department of Energy State Energy Program
funds. Municipalities need not raise bonds and are not liable for
the performance of the program. Municipalities may also receive
assistance from Rhode Island’s Office of Energy Resources in
implementing and publicizing the PACE program. The law
requires the Office of Energy Resources to, beginning on or before
July 1, 2014, publish on its website a list of the types of eligible
energy efficiency and renewable projects that are available,
respond to municipal requests for information, offer
administrative and technical assistance to participating
municipalities, and develop and offer informational resources to
help residents make best use of the PACE program.
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 291, 393. An Act Relating to Motor
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and Other Vehicles – Miscellaneous Rules. This Act increases the
penalties for sending text messages while operating a motor
vehicle. A conviction for a first violation of this law can now result
in an eighty-five dollar ($85) fine, up to a thirty (30) day license
suspension, or a combination of both. For a subsequent violation,
conviction can result in a one hundred dollar ($100) fine, up to a
three (3) month license suspension, or both. A third violation and
any thereafter, can now result in a one hundred twenty-five dollar
($125) fine, up to a six (6) month license suspension, or both.
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 293, 402. An Act Relating to
Courts and Civil Procedure – General Powers of Supreme and
Superior Courts. This section was amended to increase the
“reasonable” arbitration cost that the court could charge to
litigants from three hundred dollars ($300) to five hundred dollars
($500). Also, if a party wishes to reject an arbitration award and
proceed to trial, the court may now order a three hundred dollar
($300) filing fee in conjunction with the demand, as opposed to the
previous two hundred dollar ($200) fee. The amendment mandates
that if both parties reject the arbiter’s award, then the first filing
fee received will designate the party rejecting the award, whereas
it was previously apportioned amongst the parties.
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 327, 392. An Act Relating to
Criminal Offenses – Flags and Emblems. This section was
amended to add the attorney general, deputy attorney general,
assistant or special assistant attorney general to the list of public
officers, impersonation of which results in a violation of this law
and up to one (1) year imprisonment or a one thousand dollar
($1,000) fine upon conviction. This act stipulates that an
unauthorized person, firm, or corporation cannot use the
department of the attorney general’s emblem in order to
perpetrate fraud, deceit, or harm. Conviction of using the emblem
in such a manner is a misdemeanor and subjects the individual to
a one (1) year term of imprisonment, a fine of up to five hundred
dollars ($500), or both.
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 338, 424. An Act Relating To Labor
And Labor Relations – Minimum Wage. This amendment raises
the minimum wage to $8 per hour beginning on January 1, 2014
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for approximately 23,000 Rhode Island workers and requires
annual adjustments by the Department of Labor and Training
commencing January 1, 2015. The amendment also requires the
Rhode Island minimum wage rate to automatically increase to
fifteen cents ($.15) above the rate set in the Fair Labor Standards
Act, “if the federal minimum wage equals or becomes higher than
the state minimum.”
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 334, 415. An Act Relating to
Delinquent and Dependent Children – Proceedings in Family
Court. As amended, this law requires a probation counselor to file
a petition in family court alleging a violation of probation if, at
any time during a child’s probationary period, he is charged with
an additional and subsequent offense, that if committed by an
adult would constitute a felony. A probation counselor has
discretion to file a petition in the family court alleging the same if,
during the child’s probationary term, he is charged with an
additional and subsequent “wayward/disobedient or status
offense.” Prior to the amendment, a probation counselor only had
an obligation, at the end of the child’s probationary period, to
report to the court regarding the child’s conduct during the
probationary period.
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 336, 429. An Act Relating to
Criminal Offenses – Children. As amended, this law includes a
new section requiring, among other things, signs provided by the
department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities,
and hospitals to include the following language, in both English
and Spanish:
“WARNING: SMOKING CIGARETTES CONTRIBUTES TO
LUNG DISEASE, CANCER, HEART DISEASE, STROKE AND
RESPIRATORY ILLNESS AND DURING PREGNANCY MAY
RESULT IN LOW BIRTH WEIGHT AND PREMATURE BIRTH.”
The signs must be white with red lettering, at least onequarter of an inch high, and must also include information
pertaining to resources available in Rhode Island for those who
wish to quit using tobacco products. These signs, along with any
and all signs concerning the sale of tobacco products to individuals
under the age of 18, must be displayed prominently wherever
tobacco products are sold and must also be available electronically
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in both English and Spanish on the department of behavioral
healthcare, developmental disabilities, and hospitals’ websites.
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 454, 481. An Act Relating to
Criminal Offenses. This law was amended to include regulations
for firearms where there is no maker’s name, model,
manufacturer’s number or other identifying marks on the firearm.
Should a firearm be missing such identification, without obtaining
recertification paperwork, a person shall not knowingly possess,
transport, or receive any such firearm. Possession of a firearm,
without recertification paperwork, without its identifying marks
or with such marks that have been altered, removed, or
obliterated constitutes prima facie evidence that the individual in
possession of the firearm altered, removed, or obliterated the
identifying mark(s). Recertification paperwork may be obtained
by the person in possession of such a firearm, with proof of
ownership and/or transfer from a Federal Firearms License (FFL)
dealer, from a Rhode Island based licensed firearms business
owner who is also an FFL dealer or from a local police chief or
department official, if there has only been partial damage to the
firearm’s identifying mark(s). Within sixty (60) days, the firearms
business owner, local police chief, or police department official
shall recertify the firearm to the person who presented it and
certify the identification information in a notarized document, or if
there are no identification markers on the firearm, then any other
mark that has been only partially damages and thus is still
identifiable and traceable to the record owner so long as the
certifying party is reasonably able to verify the ownership of the
firearm and its identifying marks. If a recertified firearm is sold
or transferred or a report by the record owner is submitted that
the firearm was stolen, the recertification documentation is
immediately voided. Violation of this law may result in a term of
imprisonment for up to five (5) years, and does not apply to the
lawful exchange of component parts of firearms nor to antique and
collectible weapons lawfully in firearm collectors’ and dealers’
possession.
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 455, 464. An Act Relating to
Criminal Offenses – Firearm Violations. This law created Section
11-47-5.2, “Possession of a stolen firearm,” thereafter making it a
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felony to possess a firearm that one knows to be stolen and
providing the appropriate sentencing guidelines. Under the new
law, any person found in violation is to be sentenced to no less
than three (3) and not more than fifteen (15) years of
imprisonment, which is an increase from the previous maximum
of ten (10) years.
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 462, 463. An Act Relating to
Alcoholic Beverages – Manufacturing and Wholesale Licenses.
This Act, as amended, provides that an alcohol manufacturer
licensee may provide “clearly marked” samples to guests as part of
a “tour and/or tasting” for off-premise consumption. However, the
Act requires that the sample beverage be manufactured at the
licensed plant and also places a limit of three hundred seventyfive milliliters (375 ml) per visitor for distilled spirits and seventytwo ounces (72 oz) per visitor for malt beverages.

